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Introduction
“[...] dangers [for the euro area] can be identified relatively easily. The most obvious
one is the lack of flexibility in the labour market. [...] this poses an almost lethal threat
to Monetary Union.”
Ottmar Issing (Issing, 2000, 35)
The European debt crisis has caused the most serious crisis in the euro area since its
foundation in 1999. In May 2010, Greek government bond yields reached new peaks
and financial markets feared a contagion of the crisis to a set of heavily indebted euro
area countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Spain). As response, European governments,
the European Commission and the IMF agreed on a bilateral fiscal support for Greece
and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). In spring 2011, the quasi-default
of Ireland and Portugal sparked the set up of a permanent crisis fund, the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Both extraordinary steps calmed financial markets in the
short-run. In fall 2011, fears of illiquidity or insolvency of Italy, the haircut on Greek
government bonds, and uncertainty about the stability of the financial system triggered
a further wave of the crisis. Even the EMU exit of Greece or the break-up of the EMU
were discussed. In response the EFSF was bolstered up and politicians agreed on a
strengthened Stability and Growth Pact. However, the fiscal support and tighter bud-
get rules will not solve the underlying structural problems of the euro area economies
- rigid wages and prices that prevent a realignment of real exchange rates to adjust
intra-euro area current account imbalances.
Since 1999 until the recent crisis, the euro area experienced an era of increasing current
account imbalances triggered by diverging wage growth, inflation rates, competitiveness
and real growth. In particular in southern Europe, wages increased far above what was
justified by productivity. As consequence, these countries lost competitiveness within
1
2the euro area and accumulated current account deficits, financed by net capital im-
ports. In contrast, wage austerity in Germany, which slowed down German domestic
consumption and investment, led to immense German current account surpluses and
net capital exports (Schnabl and Zemanek, 2011). This development continued for
about a decade and set up the foundations of the current crisis. The consequences of
the crisis – high public and private debt levels, rising government bond yields and cap-
ital outflows from crisis countries, slowing euro area economic growth and even worse
growth forecasts1 – highlight the necessity of a timely adjustment of macroeconomic
imbalances in the euro area.
Given a single currency in the euro area, the theory of optimum currency areas pro-
vides a framework for the discussion of economic adjustment in the monetary union. In
particular, the seminal paper by Mundell (1961) shows that the realignment of real ex-
change rates in a monetary union depends on changes of relative wages and prices. That
is because nominal exchange rates can no longer balance diverging wage growth and
price inflation. Moreover, the common monetary policy might not fit to a single coun-
try’s need. To facilitate a timely realignment of real exchange rates, member countries
of a monetary union need flexible labour markets. However, labour market flexibility
had been low before the EMU was constituted in 1999 (Bayoumi and Eichengreen,
1992) and has remained relatively low (European Commission, 2008, 2010). Today,
this threatens the stability of the euro area.
Yet this general need for macroeconomic flexibility in a monetary union can be softened
by integrated euro area capital markets (Mundell, 1973) or fiscal policies (Persson and
Tabellini, 1996, Belke and Baumga¨rtner, 2002, von Hagen and Wyplosz, 2008), which
both can serve as a risk sharing mechanism in the face of asymmetric shocks. Mundell
(1973) argued that a monetary union would accelerate capital market integration by
stimulating cross-border capital asset holdings. Portfolio diversification provides a
risk sharing mechanism between countries that mitigates asymmetric shocks. Fiscal
policy can mitigate asymmetric shocks, too, either by inter-regional redistribution or
by anti-cyclical public deficits or surpluses (Persson and Tabellini, 1996, Belke and
Baumga¨rtner, 2002). However, the experience of the last years, a constrained fiscal
policy due to high public debt levels and current disturbances in international financial
1Only Germany seems to be an exception.
3markets point to a very prominent role of the labour markets for economic adjustment
of euro area macroeconomic imbalances.
The important stance of labour market flexibility for the functioning of the euro area
has been highlighted in early research (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992, Gordon, 1996,
Pissarides, 1997, Bean, 1998). There was also the thinking that countries who enter a
monetary union would promote structural reforms. As under fixed exchange rates re-
alignments of nominal exchange rates or expansionary policy is lost, structural reforms
are the only option to address unemployment and rising government deficits (Sibert
and Sutherland, 2000, Calmfors, 2001, Belke et al., 2006a). However, Herz and Vogel
(2005), Belke et al. (2006b) as well as Duval and Elmeskov (2006) find no clear empir-
ical evidence that EMU has enhanced structural reform activity.
Literature on the political economy of reforms in a general context explains reasons for
delayed structural reforms. Saint-Paul (2004) and Alesina et al. (2006) use the insider-
outsider-theory to explain how insiders can block structural reforms. Reforms would
only be implemented if there were no alternative. Conesa and Garriga (2003) argue
that reform deadlocks could emerge because the costs of reforms arise immediately but
benefits are only earned in the future (time asymmetry of welfare costs and gains).
In this context, Drazen and Grilli (1993) argue that economic downturns accelerate
structural reforms because political groups will more easily accept reforms.
Up to now, little research has been done on the determinants of structural reforms
within a monetary union. This thesis wants to help to close that gap by investigating
determinants for structural reforms in the euro area. First, we theoretically scrutinize
how the common monetary policy of the European Central Bank causes a reform bias
between small and large countries because inflation rates of small and large countries
enter the monetary policy objective function with different country weights (Chapter
1). Second, we examine how private market adjustment, structural reforms and their
interaction affect the intra euro area current account balances of euro area countries
(Chapter 2). Third, we analyse how an asymmetric foreign asset and liability distribu-
tion across the euro area affects single countries’ need for structural reforms in labour
markets (Chapter 3). Fourth, the impact of fiscal stabilization policy on structural
reform activity is examined (Chapter 4).
Chapter 1
Common Monetary Policy and Optimum Labour
Market Flexibility in the Euro Area
Abstract This paper analyses national differences in labour market flexibility between
small and large euro area countries. An augmented Barro-Gordon model of a monetary
union is used to analyse the impact of a common monetary policy on single countries’
labour market flexibility. It is shown that given a common monetary policy based on in-
flation targeting, a small member of the monetary union requires a more flexible labour
market than a large country. The small country substitutes lost monetary autonomy
by labour market flexibility in the case of domestic economic shocks and maintains its
independence from inflation shocks in other member countries of the monetary union.
It is further shown that business cycle synchronization in the monetary union reduces
the need for labour market flexibility.
1.1 Introduction
Globalization, the European integration process and most recently the need to adjust
to diverging current account imbalances in the context of the European debt crisis
have built up pressure on euro area countries to deregulate labour markets (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2007, European Commission, 2008, Zemanek, 2010). The lack of
labour market flexibility in euro area countries prior to the year 1999, which had been
identified as risk for the stability of the monetary union (Bayoumi and Eichengreen,
1992, Issing, 2000) has not significantly improved after more than a decade of EMU.
The level of labour market flexibility remains low for most of euro area countries as mea-
sured for example by the labor sub-index of the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom
(The Heritage Foundation, 2009). However, there is evidence that small open countries
4
5of the euro area have on average more flexible labour markets than large countries (Fig-
ure 1). This observation is backed by empirical results of Duval and Elmeskov (2006)
who find that small countries implement more structural reforms than large countries.
Figure 1: Country size and labour market flexibility in the euro area
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Source: IMF and the Heritage Foundation, Note: The Labour Freedom Index ranges from 0 to 100
with high values indicating higher labour market freedom. Nominal GDP figures of 2009 are taken
from the IMF World Economic Outlook.
Previous research has identified low industrial diversification (Kenen, 1969), trade
openness and the exposure to world market competition (Belke et al., 2006b) as well as
less political opposition against reforms (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006, Saint-Paul, 2004)
as explanations for relatively higher labour market flexibility in small countries. In
the context of a monetary union, a common monetary policy can also explain high
labour market flexibility in small countries (Hefeker, 2006). The central bank reacts
only to a lower extend to country specific unemployment shocks in small countries due
to their small weight in the one-size monetary policy reaction function. To avoid rising
unemployment due to an unemployment shock the small country requires a relative
high degree of labour market flexibility.
In this paper, we show how a common monetary policy that primarily aims for low
and stable inflation, as implemented in the case of the EMU, is a source for different
6degrees of labour market flexibility of small and large euro area countries. Our the-
oretical analysis follows research on labour market flexibility based on an augmented
Barro-Gordon framework (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, Barro and Gordon, 1983b,a).
The framework is based on research by Berthold and Fehn (1998), Sibert and Suther-
land (2000), Calmfors (2001) and Belke et al. (2006b) who compare labour market
flexibility given autonomous (nationally independent) and a common (supranational)
monetary policy. We analyze the determinants of labour market flexibility in a baseline
scenario and show how the consideration of domestic business cycles and business cycle
synchronisation in the monetary union affect optimum labour market flexibility.
1.2 Differences in labour market flexibility in a
monetary union
1.2.1 Diversification, openness and political power
The general need for macroeconomic flexibility in a monetary union arises from irre-
versible fixed nominal exchange rates and a common monetary policy. Autonomous
monetary policy and/or nominal exchange rate alignments cannot be used in a mon-
etary union to adjust to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. For a real exchange rate
realignment, relative prices and wages between countries have to change. Given fixed
nominal exchange rates, prices and wages, and therefore labour markets need to be
flexible in a monetary union (Mundell, 1961).
The level of labour market flexibility depends on factors as discussed e.g. by Bean
(1998), who argues that more flexibility will be particularly required if business cycles
within the monetary union are less synchronized. The common monetary policy can-
not work as a country-specific stabilizer and may be regarded with discontent from a
single country’s perspective. Moreover, if countries of a monetary union have differ-
ent production structures, the probability of asymmetric shocks increases, which raises
the required degree of labour market flexibility. This argument is in line with Krug-
man (1993) who argues that in a monetary union regional specialization of industries
increases, because market integration and market harmonisation unlocks the cost ad-
7vantages of a single region.
In this context, Kenen (1969) contributes industrial diversification as determinant of
divergent degrees of labour market flexibility within a monetary union. Small countries
with a low-level of industrial diversification are vulnerable to asymmetric shocks be-
cause other industrial sectors cannot compensate for sector specific asymmetric shocks.
Therefore, the need for labour market flexibility in less diversified, small countries of a
currency union is greater than in large countries.
Another strand of literature links different levels of trade openness to differences in
labour market flexibility (Herz and Vogel, 2005, Belke et al., 2006a,b). Trade openness
increases the share of output and employment that is exposed to international com-
petition. The economic success of the international sector depends on the country’s
competitiveness in the world market. A high degree of regulation is a disadvantage for
a relatively large share of the economy. To assure international competitiveness, open
countries, which are often small countries (Alesina, 1998), require more flexible labour
market institutions.
Research on the political economy of reforms comes to a similar conclusion. Duval and
Elmeskov (2006) argue that higher international competition of small open countries
is associated with a higher degree of overall labour demand elasticity with respect to
wages. As enterprises react more likely with job cuts on wage growth above productiv-
ity growth in a highly competitive environment the power of trade unions to set wages
above clearing-level is limited in small open economies. Saint-Paul (2004) argues that
labour market rigidities allow a redistribution of rents between different categories of
workers (from low skilled to skilled). In small open economies, the high degree of
dependency from world market competition leads to a higher degree of factor price
equalization and reduces the possibility of rent distribution. Therefore rents from rigid
labour market institutions are smaller in small open countries and opposition from
insiders and lobbyists to protect rigid institutions is reduced.
Less opposition from insiders lowers the political costs of reforms for politicians and
makes structural reforms more likely. On the other hand, political costs of avoiding re-
forms are higher in a small open country with a large international sector because rising
8unemployment from the relatively large international sector cannot be absorbed by ad-
ditional labour demand of the relatively small domestic sector. That makes politicians
more willing to implement flexible labour market institutions to prevent rising unem-
ployment. Moreover, the large international sector lobbies more intensively for labour
market flexibility to enhance the competitiveness against foreign firms (Høj et al., 2006).
The empirical literature on determinants of labour market flexibility is less clear-cut.
Pitlik and Wirth (2003) find in their empirical analysis a small but significant posi-
tive impact of trade openness (a proxy of country size) on structural reform activity.
Duval and Elmeskov (2006) find a significant positive influence of country size on struc-
tural reforms. In contrast, in a study of Herz and Vogel (2005) regression coefficients
for openness and country size on structural reforms are not significant. Belke et al.
(2006a,b) find that significant coefficients of country size and trade openness depend
on the underlying sample.
1.2.2 Common monetary policy and labour market flexibility
in the euro area
An important explanation for differences in labour market flexibility in a monetary
union is the common monetary policy. With a common monetary policy, the ECB
conducts a monetary policy for the euro area as a whole. Given that the ECB uses av-
erage target indicators weighted by country size, the central bank will only marginally
react to country specific shocks in small countries due to their small weight in the
monetary policy reaction function. In contrast, country specific shocks in large coun-
try are reflected to a larger extend in the monetary policy reaction function. Thus,
a “one-size” common monetary policy does not equally stabilize all countries against
asymmetric shocks.
Hefeker (2006) analyses the role of a common monetary policy in a theoretical set-
ting, where a common central bank reacts to unemployment in single member states
according to their size. He shows that small countries have the incentive for flexible
labour markets in a monetary union to compensate for national unemployment shocks
which are only marginally addressed by a common monetary policy. Hefeker (2006)
9assumes that inflation rates are equal in all countries of the monetary union and that
the central bank reacts to average unemployment in the monetary union. However,
the de jure aim of the ECB is to provide price stability for the euro area as a whole
(European Central Bank, 2004).2
The ECB primarily decides on interest rates based on the Harmonized Index of Con-
sumer Prices (HICP). This euro area index is calculated from weighted national price
indices of all member countries. Country weights in the HICP depend on the member
countries’ economic size in terms of private consumption as a share of overall euro area
consumption (European Central Bank, 2004, Eurostat, 2001) which differ significantly
(Table 1). The focus of the common monetary policy on the euro area-wide HICP al-
lows a single country’s national inflation rate to deviate from the central bank’s target,
for instance, because of different domestic wage growth rates, fiscal policies or country
specific shocks. Thus, the impact of national inflation on average inflation and mone-
tary policy of the ECB depends on a country’s weight.
Table 1: Country weights of euro area countries in the HICP in 2009 (in percent)
Country Weight
Austria 3.02
Belgium 3.39
Cyprus 0.25
Finland 1.68
France 20.60
Germany 26.07
Greece 3.46
Ireland 1.56
Italy 18.50
Luxembourg 0.26
Malta 0.08
Netherlands 5.09
Portugal 2.20
Slovak Republic 0.68
Slovenia 0.37
Spain 12.79
Source: Eurostat (2009)
2Sauer and Sturm (2007) provide empirical evidence that the ECB’s monetary policy is in line with
its aim.
10
1.3 Common monetary policy and optimum labour
market flexibility in a monetary union
1.3.1 Model setting
We augment a Barro-Gordon model (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, Barro and Gordon,
1983a,b) to analyse differences in labour market flexibility between large and small
countries in a monetary union. In contrast to the previous literature (Berthold and
Fehn, 1998, Sibert and Sutherland, 2000, Calmfors, 2001, Belke et al., 2006b, Hefeker,
2006), the central bank has only inflation in its monetary policy reaction function.
Based on this conservative monetary policy setting, which aims to reflect the ECB
monetary policy, we analyse the impact of country size on labour market flexibility.
The original framework by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) analyses monetary policy of
a central bank that has an inflation target as well as an unemployment target and
assumes a short-term Phillips-curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment.3 If
inflation rises above expected inflation (surprise inflation), the labour cost will fall in
real terms because nominal wages are temporally fixed in contracts. Unemployment
falls. Therefore, the central bank can exploit the Philips-curve trade-off to reduce un-
employment at the cost of higher than expected surprise inflation. However, rational
forward-looking economic agents will anticipate surprise inflation and adjust their in-
flation expectations, which lifts in the long run overall inflation. The outcome is a
inflation bias of a monetary policy with two objectives – inflation and unemployment.
This framework has been augmented to analyse optimum labour market flexibility
(Calmfors, 2001). In addition to the decision of the central bank on inflation and un-
employment, the national government decides on the optimal degree of labour market
flexibility for the economy. The government can opt for high labour market flexibil-
ity to allow the economy to adjust more easily to idiosyncratic unemployment shocks.
Nevertheless, higher labour market flexibility is not without costs. The government
faces political costs in form of opposition from voters such as employees who lose their
rents originating in rigid labour markets. General strikes, as they have occurred in
3Alternatively, the model can be set up with a central bank that targets inflation and economic
growth. A Lucas-supply function describes the trade-off between growth and inflation.
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France on several occasions, or a change in government, as in Germany in 2005, are
examples for such political costs. Hence, the government balances the political costs
of flexible labour markets against lower unemployment.
Within this extended framework, unemployment can either be reduced by surprise in-
flation of the central bank or by increased labour market flexibility of the government.
The central bank decides on the optimum inflation rate given its desired level of un-
employment, the government decides based on the expected monetary policy reaction
function on the optimum labour market flexibility. In contrast, in our model, the cen-
tral bank only aims to achieve its inflation target while national governments decide
on labour market flexibility. That model setting aims to reflect the decision process
in the euro area. The independent ECB decides on monetary policy to keep euro area
inflation low, while labour market policy remains at a national level.
The monetary union model consists of two countries called 1 and 2. A supranational
central bank is responsible for a common monetary policy, which targets stable and low
inflation based on an union-wide inflation index weighted by country size. The central
bank minimizes its loss, which is defined as the deviation of union-wide inflation piEMU
from the objective inflation rate k with k > 0. Thereby, k indicates an inflation target
above zero, similar to the ECB objective inflation of “[...]below but close to 2% [...]”
(European Central Bank, 2004, 51). Positive and negative deviations of union-wide
inflation from the target are a loss for the central bank and enter the loss function
multiplied by 0.5. Thus, following the literature, the loss functions of the central bank
in a monetary union LEMU is defined as standard quadratic loss function:
LEMU =
1
2
(piEMU − k)2 (1)
Union-wide inflation piEMU is the average of domestic inflation rates of both countries
piDm with m indicating country 1 or 2, weighted by the relative economic size. Relative
economic size is expressed by a for country 1 and (1− a) for country 2 with 0 < a < 1.
piEMU = api
D
1 + (1− a) piD2 (2)
Domestic inflation rates piDm consist of common inflation pi that depends on common
monetary policy which is assumed to be equal in both countries. Further, domestic
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inflation is affected by country-specific inflation shocks m, with m ∼ N
(
0, σ2m
)
. These
shocks are at this stage assumed to be exogenous and independent from other variables.
Thus, domestic inflation rates are defined as:
piD1 = pi + 1 (3)
piD2 = pi + 2 (4)
Inserting equations (3) and (4) into equation (2) and then into equation (1) yields the
central bank’s extended loss function in the monetary union, accounting for country
specific domestic inflation rates:
LEMU =
1
2
[a (pi + 1) + (1− a) (pi + 2)− k]2 (5)
Given the reaction function of the supranational central bank, each country’s govern-
ment independently decides on labour market flexibility based on the loss functions Vm.
The governments’ loss functions include unemployment um, the deviation of domestic
inflation piDm from target inflation k and the political costs of implementing labour mar-
ket flexibility via structural reforms γsm. The term sm represents the degree of labour
market flexibility and γ its weight in the governments loss function with γ > 0 and
sm ∈ (0, 1). Given that piDm = pi + m, the loss function Vm is:
Vm =
1
2
(pi + m − k)2 + 1
2
u2m + γsm (6)
National unemployment um is defined by an augmented Phillips curve (Calmfors, 2001)
and is determined by structural unemployment u˜ with u˜ ranging from 0 to 1, the
deviation of domestic inflation pidm from expected inflation pi
e and a country-specific
idiosyncratic unemployment shock µm with µm ∼ N
(
0, σ2µm
)
. In addition, the degree
of labour market flexibility sm in the domestic economy determines unemployment
(Calmfors, 2001). The variable sm is defined as the share of unregulated sectors in
the economy while (1− sm) is the share of regulated sectors. In unregulated sectors
of the economy wages are assumed to be fully flexible. Real wages are renegotiated
continuously keeping track with domestic inflation. In contrast, in regulated sectors,
wages are set by long-term contracts based on the expected inflation. The Phillips-
curve applies:
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um = (u˜− θsm)− (1− sm) (pi + m − pie) + (1− sm)µm (7)
Labour market flexibility sm has three effects on unemployment. First, labour market
flexibility lowers structural unemployment weighted by factor θ with θ ∈ (0, u˜) (first
term).4 Second, rising labour market flexibility reduces the trade-off between unem-
ployment and inflation as a larger share of the economy will renegotiate wage contracts
(second term). Third, labour market flexibility lowers the impact of country specific
idiosyncratic shocks on unemployment (third term) because wages easily adjust to the
shock. Thus, labour market flexibility reduces the effect of surprise inflation (deflation)
on unemployment and increases the ability of an economy to absorb country specific
idiosyncratic unemployment shocks via wage variation instead of employment variation.
To obtain the desired degree of labour market flexibility given a certain country size,
both governments of the monetary union independently minimize their loss from un-
employment and political costs of implementing labour market flexibility. The gov-
ernments decide under uncertainty at the beginning of the period, using ex-ante in-
formation about future unemployment as well as expected inflation and anticipate the
central bank’s monetary policy reaction for the whole monetary union. The level of
labour market flexibility that minimizes a government’s loss based on the available
information is its optimum degree of labour market flexibility.
1.3.2 Optimum labour market flexibility
First, the baseline model is solved to obtain optimum labour market flexibility for coun-
try 1.5 In this baseline model, it is assumed that domestic and foreign inflation shocks
and idiosyncratic unemployment shocks are uncorrelated, with covariances σ1,2 = 0,
σµ1,µ2 = 0 and σm,µm = 0. The terms γ, θ and u˜ are assumed to be equal in both
countries to simplify the model. To derive optimum labour market flexibility the model
is solved backwards, starting with the optimization of the central bank’s loss function.
4θ can only reach the value of u˜, which ensures a non-negative structural unemployment rate, in
the case of s = 1.
5The solution for country 2 is similar. Therefore, we show only the case of country 1. By changing
the country size of country 1 we can analyse the small-country and the large-country-case.
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Therefore, the central bank’s loss function (5) is minimized with respect to the common
inflation pi. This yields an expected inflation rate on which the private sector bases
its wage contracts. Using pie and taking the domestic inflation shocks into account
provides the realized inflation rate pi∗ that results from the central bank’s monetary
policy reaction on domestic inflation shocks, limiting the central bank’s loss.
pie = E [pi] = E [pim] = E [piEMU ] = k (8)
pi∗ = k − a1 − (1− a) 2 (9)
Equation (8) shows, that the private sector in the monetary union expects a union-
wide inflation rate as well as domestic inflation rates equal to the central bank’s target.
This is because the central bank only has an inflation objective and inflation shocks
are ex-ante expected to be zero. In response to domestic inflation shocks, the central
bank will choose an optimum monetary policy leading to a union-wide inflation rate
pi∗ of equation (9). A domestic inflation shock (higher inflation or lower inflation than
the target) increases the central bank’s loss. Hence, the central bank responds to rising
or decreasing inflation with a restrictive or expansive monetary policy to maintain its
objective inflation.
However, the effect of a domestic inflation shock on the average union-wide inflation
depends on the relative size of the country where the shock occurs. A shock in a large
(small) country affects the union wide inflation piEMU relatively more (less) via domes-
tic inflation piDm which will be answered by a relatively strong (moderate) monetary
policy response by the central bank, leading to pi∗.
Governments anticipate the central bank’s monetary policy reaction and select ex-ante
their optimum degree of labour market flexibility. For example country 1, the expected
value of the government’s loss function (6) is minimized with respect to s1 and subject
to the unemployment equation (7), the expected inflation rate equation (8), and the
inflation rate determined by monetary policy (9).6 The first derivation yields the ex-
ante marginal loss of labour market flexibility of government 1 before an inflation shock
occurs, given the information about inflation shocks and the expected central bank’s
6Assuming that realized inflation equals common inflation rate, pi∗ = pi.
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monetary policy reaction. The ex-ante marginal cost function is set equal to zero and
solved for s1, which is optimum labour market flexibility s
∗
1 for government 1. The
subscript EURO indicates our baseline solution:
s∗1,EURO = 1−
γ + θ (θ − u˜)
(1− a)2 (σ21 + σ22) + θ2 + σ2µ1 (10)
Equation (10) reveals the determinants of optimum labour market flexibility:
• High political costs of labour market reform γ reduce optimum labour market
flexibility as the utility of higher labour market flexibility is more likely to be
offset by the political costs of flexibility.
• High structural unemployment u˜ and a larger effectiveness of labour market flex-
ibility to reduce structural unemployment θ will result in high labour market
flexibility.
• The variance of country specific idiosyncratic unemployment shocks σ2µ1 positively
affects optimum labour market flexibility. The more the economy will potentially
be affected by unemployment shocks, the more flexibility will be needed to cush-
ion the effects of a shock on unemployment, as monetary policy does not react
to domestic unemployment fluctuations.
• Relative country size a is negatively related to labour market flexibility. The
larger a country, the more is the country’s domestic inflation reflected by average
union-wide inflation. As the central bank reacts relatively more to inflation in
large countries, less labour market flexibility is needed to achieve a low unemploy-
ment rate in the case of an inflation shock. With less labour market flexibility,
the government “saves” political costs of labour market flexibility.
• The variances of domestic inflation shocks σ21 and σ22 increase optimum labour
market flexibility due to two transmission effects of national inflation shocks on
unemployment – an indirect and a direct effect as explained below.
Indirect transmission
First, we assume a high variance of the domestic inflation shock in country 2 (σ22).
7
If inflation in country 2, e.g. Germany, increases due to an inflation shock 2, country
7At this point, country size is not relevant.
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1’s (e.g. Portugal’s) inflation is not directly affected. However, Germany’s increased
inflation lifts the euro area inflation rate and thereby the central bank’s loss (see Figure
2). To maintain the inflation target k, the central bank will react with a restrictive
monetary policy. Due to the common monetary policy, the restrictive monetary policy
will be in place for all euro area countries. For Portugal, the restrictive monetary pol-
icy would create surprise deflation, which increases Portuguese unemployment via the
Phillips-curve trade-off. Further, the deviation of inflation from expected inflation in
Portugal, constitutes a loss for the Portuguese government.
Figure 2: Transmission of an inflation shock in country 2 to inflation and unemployment
in country 1
The transmission of the inflation shock in Germany to the Portuguese unemployment
rate can be reduced or eliminated if Portugal has flexible labour markets. Then, mone-
tary policy impulses triggered by Germany would not affect unemployment in Portugal
as the trade-off between inflation and unemployment within the Portuguese economy
is eliminated. Whether Portugal will choose high labour market flexibility (which is
not free of cost), however, depends on its relative size within the monetary union. As
Portugal is relatively small the inflation transmission will be more severe as the central
bank reacts relatively more to inflation shocks in large Germany. The utility of high
labour market flexibility in Portugal is likely to exceed its political costs. Therefore, a
small country, such as Portugal, will desire a high degree of labour market flexibility. In
contrast, if country 1 is large (e.g. France instead of Portugal), the negative unemploy-
ment effects are comparatively small. In the presence of reform costs, a large country
1 will prefer low labour market flexibility to avoid the political costs. Therefore, high
inflation volatility in a large country increases the need for labour market flexibility in
a small country.
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Direct transmission
Second, a high variance of inflation shocks in country 1, e.g. Portugal, (σ21) is as-
sumed. In that case an inflation shock will directly change, e.g. reduce, Portuguese
inflation (see Figure 3). For instance, Portuguese inflation falls below expected inflation
(pi1 < pi
e) which is a loss for the government and increases Portuguese unemployment
via the Philips-curve trade-off given an inflexible Portuguese labour market. The cen-
tral bank reacts to the inflation shock with expansive monetary policy as the union
wide inflation rate deviates from the objective rate. Therefore, monetary policy will
partly compensate the Portuguese negative inflation shock 1. Domestic and expected
inflation rates converge again and the unemployment rise is lower than without the
monetary policy reaction (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Inflation shock in country 1 and the monetary policy response
However, the degree of monetary policy response and hence shock compensation by
the central bank depend on the relative size of Portugal within the monetary union.
An inflation shock in Portugal will affect union wide inflation only marginally as the
country is small. Therefore, the monetary policy response of the ECB to a reduced or
increased inflation will also be very moderate. In contrast, an inflation shock in large
Germany will be almost completely addressed by monetary policy. Therefore, a small
country such as Portugal with a high inflation variance will choose high labour market
flexibility to equalize inflation shocks, whereas a large country can rely mainly on the
common monetary policy as adjustment mechanism.
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Thus, given equal reform costs a small country will prefer higher labour market flexi-
bility than the large member of a monetary union to avoid the transmission of inflation
shocks in a large country to its labour markets and to substitute the loss of an au-
tonomous monetary policy by labour market flexibility.
Figure 4 illustrates the negative relationship between country size and optimum labour
market flexibility for a numerical example, based on equation (10). The x-axis shows
the relative country size, with a country size 0 < a < 0.5 characterizing a small
country and 0.5 < a < 1 a large country. The y-axis is optimum labour market
flexibility. Structural unemployment u˜ is set at 5 percent, the weight of labour market
flexibility in the loss function γ is set at one and efficiency of labour market flexibility to
reduce structural unemployment θ at 0.05 to avoid non-negative figures of structural
unemployment in the case of perfect labour market flexibility. Shock variances are
assumed to be in this example σ21 = 1, σ
2
2
= 2 and σ2µ1 = 1.
8 In Figure 4, a small
country (e.g. a = 0.2) would prefer a high labour market flexibility of around 0.65,
while a large country (e.g. a = 0.8) chooses a low level of labour market flexibility of
0.1.
Figure 4: Country size and optimum labour market flexibility, baseline model
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From equation (10), optimum labour market flexibility prior the monetary union can be 
derived. The pre-monetary situation, indicated by subscript pre-EURO, would ceteris paribus 
be if relative country size a  becomes one. Optimum labour market flexibility reduces to:  
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The central bank completely reacts to changed inflation, thus, only structural unemployment, 
reform costs and national unemployment shocks are considered for optimum labour market 
optimum labour 
market flexibility s1* 
relative country 
size a  
8A variation of variables’ values does not significantly change our result.
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1.4 Business cycles and optimum labour market
flexibility in a monetary union
1.4.1 Domestic business cycles
In this section we analyse how domestic business cycles affect optimum labour market
flexibility in the context of a common monetary policy. For this purpose, we resolve the
assumption that inflation and unemployment shocks are not correlated across borders.
The overall shock characteristics of the inflation shock m and the unemployment shock
µm remain unchanged m ∼ N
(
0, σ2m
)
and µm ∼ N
(
0, σ2µm
)
.
We model domestic business cycles by a negative correlation between unemployment
shocks µm and inflation shocks m which is σm,µm < 0. In a recession high unemploy-
ment is linked to low inflation, as additional unemployment reduces consumption, wage
growth, demand and therefore inflation. In contrast, low unemployment, rising wages
and more consumption are responsible for higher inflation during a boom. Taking that
assumption into account, the model is solved from the perspective of the small country
1 to obtain optimum labour market flexibility (indicated with subscript BC for busi-
ness cycles). In comparison to equation (10), equation (11) additionally includes the
covariance between the inflation shock and the unemployment shock σm,µm :
s∗1,BC = 1−
γ + θ (θ − u˜)
(1− a)2 (σ21 + σ22)− 2 (1− a)σ1,µ1 + θ2 + σ2µ1 (11)
Business cycles modelled as negative correlation between inflation and unemployment
shocks raise optimum labour market flexibility irrespective of country size because of
rising unemployment volatility. While the inflation shock affects unemployment via
the Phillips-curve relationship, unemployment is also affected by the unemployment
shock itself. As we assume a negative correlation between inflation and unemployment
shocks, both effects on unemployment have by assumption the same direction. The
central bank only responds to the inflation shock with monetary policy dependent on
country size, but does not compensate for the full unemployment variation.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between relative country size and optimum labour
market flexibility dependent on the correlation between unemployment and inflation
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shocks, indicated by the correlation coefficient ρ1,µ1 ∈ (−1, 1). The bold line indicates
ρ1,µ1 = 0, which is the baseline result of equation (10) in section 1.3.2. The thin
line is the business cycle result for a perfect negative correlation of unemployment and
inflation shocks ρ1,µ1 = −1 of equation (11). All other variable remain as assumed in
the baseline model in Figure 4.
Figure 5: Country size and optimum labour market flexibility, domestic business cycles
1.4.2 Business cycle synchronization in a monetary union
The effectiveness of a common monetary policy is affected by the degree of business
cycle synchronisation in the monetary union (Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2004). Unsyn-
chronized business cycles with divergent inflation developments make monetary policy
less optimal from the single countries’ perspectives as national inflation development
might cancel out in the average union-wide inflation. The average union wide infla-
tion rate might remain around the target rate although some countries experience high
inflation and other countries low inflation. Then, the monetary policy supports an
economic divergence within the monetary union. Monetary policy will fit better to na-
tional inflation developments in a monetary union if business cycles are synchronized
as average inflation reflects the national inflation in member countries.
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To model business cycle synchronization, domestic business cycles are allowed to cor-
relate across borders by a correlation of national inflation shocks σ1,2 6= 0. A positive
correlation indicates business cycle synchronisation and a negative correlation indicates
unsynchronized business cycles. By doing so, we can analyse how the degree of busi-
ness cycle synchronization, indicated by the correlation coefficient, affects optimum
labour market flexibility in a monetary union. The optimum labour market flexibility
for country 1 with correlated domestic business cycles (indicated by subscript SY NC)
is given in equation (12). In comparison to equation (11), the covariance between
both domestic inflation shocks (the degree of business cycle synchronisation) σ1,2 is a
determinant for optimum labour market flexibility.
s∗1,SY NC = 1−
γ + θ (θ − u˜)
(1− a)2 (σ21 + σ22)− 2 (1− a)σ1,µ1 − 2 (1− a)σ21,2 + θ2 + σ2µ1 (12)
Unsynchronized business cycles σ1,2 < 0 have a positive effect on optimum labour
market flexibility. If business cycles are unsynchronized, the effect of an inflation shock
on unemployment in the small country will be further intensified by the monetary pol-
icy reaction on an adverse inflation shock in the large country (which has the opposite
inflation development). If, for example, Portugal has low inflation during a recession,
the optimal monetary policy reaction should be an expansive monetary policy. How-
ever, as Germany has high inflation during a boom, the central bank will pursue on
average a restrictive monetary policy. Inflation in Portugal falls even more and un-
employment rises further. Hence, in particular a small country in a monetary union
requires additional labour market flexibility to keep unemployment low if business cy-
cles are unsynchronized.
In contrast, synchronized business cycles σ1,2 > 0 reduce the need for labour mar-
ket flexibility which is consistent with Mundell (1961) and Bean (1998). In the case
of full business cycle synchronization, monetary policy will meet the demand of both
countries. Too low inflation in Portugal during a recession will be compensated by
expansive monetary policy in response to low inflation in Germany, which is also in
a recession, and vice versa. Figure 6 shows the relationship between country size and
optimum labour market flexibility for different degrees of business cycle synchronisa-
tion, indicated by correlation coefficients of national inflation shocks ρ1,2 ∈ (−1, 1).
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The bold line shows the reference value for optimum labour market flexibility with
uncorrelated national business cycles ρ1,2 = 0. The thin line indicates ρ1,2 = 1,
which is equivalent to perfect business cycle synchronisation, the dashed line reflects
unsynchronized business cycles ρ1,2 = −1. All other variable remain as assumed in
the baseline model in Figure 4.
Figure 6: Country size and optimum labour market flexibility, business cycle synchro-
nisation
1.5 Economic Policy Implications
We have shown that a conservative common monetary policy, aiming for stable in-
flation in a monetary union, can be a source for different degrees in labour market
flexibility. Our theoretical analysis is based on an augmented Barro-Gordon model of
a two-country monetary union, where the central bank targets a union wide inflation
rate, which is an average of national inflation rates weighted by country size, similar to
the euro area. Based on this model, we show that small members of a monetary union
need in particular flexible labour markets. First, they substitute lost autonomous mon-
etary policy by labour market flexibility and second, they keep their autonomy from
monetary policy reactions to inflation deviations in large countries. Business cycle
synchronization reduces the need for labour market flexibility in a monetary union.
23
Within the euro area, a country’s inflation affects all countries of the monetary union
via the common monetary policy. Such effects are more likely to originate in large
countries, as their inflation rates have a higher weight in average euro area inflation.
Therefore, economic policy, especially in large countries of the euro area, need to pay
attention to possible spill-over effects of national inflation via the common monetary
policy. For instance prior the crisis in 2007, the austerity in German fiscal policy
had compensated for high inflation in Southern European countries where expansive
fiscal policy had accelerated inflation. As the euro area inflation rate had remained
around the target of two percent, the European Central Bank was not forced to tighten
monetary policy. As labour markets have remained inflexible in the euro area, these
divergent inflation developments translated into economic divergences. Real exchange
rates and current account balances between euro area countries diverged and laid the
foundation of the current crisis.
To increase the overall degree of labour market flexibility in the euro area to foster
a readjustment of current account balances, a realignment of real exchange rates and
to prevent further divergence, it is necessary to reduce reform costs, in particular for
large countries. This could be achieved for instance with a better communication of
the need and benefits of labour market reforms for economic growth, employment,
income and shock absorption. Otherwise, given the further existence of the euro area,
labour market flexibility will be enforced during a crisis as currently observed in Greece,
Portugal and Spain.
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Chapter 2
Current Account Balances and Structural
Adjustment in the Euro Area
This paper has been published as: Zemanek, Holger, Ansgar Belke and Gunther Schn-
abl (2010), “Current Account Balances and Structural Adjustment in the Euro Area,”
International Economics and Economic Policy, 7(1), 83-127.
Abstract In the past decade, a set of euro area countries has accumulated large current
account deficits. After a brief relaxation of the euro area internal imbalances in the wake
of the financial crisis, it appears as if this pattern arises anew when times normalize
again and Germany still sticks to export-led growth. This issue has been labelled one
of the most challenging economic policy issues for Europe inter alia by the European
Commission and some other players on the EU level. In this paper, we analyse the
role of private restructuring and structural reforms for the urgently needed sustainable
readjustment of intra-euro area current account balances. A panel regression reveals
a significant impact of structural reforms on intra-euro area current account balances.
This implies that in particular structural reforms and wage restraints in notorious
current account and budget deficit countries such as Greece are highly suitable to
support long-term economic stability in Europe.
2.1 Introduction
Since the creation of EMU, the intra-euro area current account balances of euro area
member states have diverged steadily and significantly. While Germany has seen rising
trade surpluses against other euro area countries in the years 2002 to 2007, other coun-
tries like Spain, Italy and Portugal have accumulated large current account deficits.
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Up to the present, this divergence of intra-euro area current accounts seems to persist
and shows just slow signs of a temporary reversal in the wake of the financial crisis
(de Grauwe, 2009b, Gros et al., 2005, Decressin and Stavrev, 2009). Only most recently
after the financial crisis has severely hit the real economy, intra-euro area current ac-
count deficits and surpluses started to shrink slowly. However, the impact of national
structural reforms and private market adjustment on intra-euro area current accounts
has still not been analysed in the necessary depth. Our contribution tries to fill this gap.
In general, changes of the current account balance of whatever sign are no indication
of malfunctioning as they reflect inter-temporal saving as well as consumption and
investment preferences of private enterprises, households and governments (Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1994). Additionally, business cycles, demographic developments (de Santis
and Lu¨hrmann, 2006) and fiscal policy are important determinants of empirical reali-
sations of the current account balance. Furthermore, the European integration process
certainly affected intra-euro area current account balances. In particular, Spain, Italy,
Greece and Portugal have taken advantage of improved access to international financial
markets in the wake of EMU. A rising expected rate of return (Blanchard and Giavazzi,
2002), convergence of interest rates (Fagan and Gaspar, 2007, Mendoza et al., 2007)
and a reduced currency risk for lenders tends to accelerate domestic investment.
In contrast, some analysts interpret intra-euro area current account balances as the
result of diverging competitiveness in the euro area (Arghyrou and Chortareas, 2006,
European Commission, 2009). They argue that the real appreciation due to wage aus-
terity in Germany and rising wages in Southern Europe distorted the international
competitiveness of Spain, Greece, and Portugal (Blanchard, 2007). Absent labour
market flexibility, a main mechanism to adjust competitiveness in a currency union
(Mundell, 1961), can therefore been drawn upon as the main reason for such large
and persistent current account deficits and surpluses in the euro area (Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2002, Blanchard, 2007, European Commission, 2009). However, this line of
reasoning has been controversially discussed more recently. For instance, de Grauwe
(2009d) argues that in the face of the crisis, flexibility represents a handicap for euro
area countries and rigidities are virtuous. His main argument is that rigidities in wages,
employment and social security allow countries to better deal with the fixed levels of
debt imposed on households and firms. But the insolvency crisis surrounding Greece
26
and, to a lesser extent, also countries like Portugal and Spain highlighted the necessity
of a grave austerity programme in order to be able to earn more from net exports than
a country has to pay for interest on the debt burden. Otherwise a country cannot sta-
bilize its debt. Greece is an excellent case in point because, for instance, its shipping
industry which is heavily dependent on the business cycle heavily suffers from a com-
petititveness problem which has been aggravated by the financial and economic crisis.
Hence, going for structural reforms and a nearly 10 percent cut of real wages was the
only way out from insolvency for Greece. This insight is also highly beneficial also for
countries like Portugal which cannot keep their capital stock constant any more by the
cash flow it generates.
Up to now, research on this issue of structural reforms and external balances in the
euro area has been quite scarce. Kennedy and Sløk (2005) analyse the role of struc-
tural policy reforms for the solution of global current account imbalances for 14 OECD
countries. They find a significant but small contribution of structural policy indicators
to explain current account positions. In the same context, Mussa (2005) argues that
structural reforms in industrial countries are desirable as they might boost long-term
growth and hence import demand. In the euro area, structural reforms affect the ad-
justment capacity of the currency union as a whole. Therefore, external balances will
more easily readjust in the wake of shocks in general such as the introduction of the
single currency or of asymmetric shocks manifesting themselves in diverging country-
specific competitiveness positions. This view goes far back to the seminal paper by
Mundell (1961) on optimum currency areas as well as to more recent research, such as
Pissarides (1997) or Blanchard (2007).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical
pattern of the evolution of intra-euro area current account balances. Section 3 reviews
the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of structural reforms and private
market adjustment on current account balances. In section 4, we estimate the indi-
vidual impacts of private restructuring and structural reforms on euro area bilateral
trade accounts in a dynamic panel for 11 euro area countries for the years 1991 to 2007.
Section 5 concludes with some policy implications.
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2.2 Current account balances within the euro area
After the start of EMU in 1999, unexpectedly large intra-euro area current account bal-
ances emerged. The emerging large gap between Germany (and some smaller countries)
on the one hand and most other EMU members is increasingly regarded as the crucial
issue for the macroeconomic and political stability of the euro area (European Com-
mission, 2009). Accordingly, some analysts argue that intra-euro area current account
balances are determined, at least partly, by asymmetric changes in the international
competitiveness of euro area countries (Blanchard, 2007, European Commission, 2009).
Therefore, we start with an assessment of international competitiveness as a determi-
nant of the (speed of) adjustment of current account balances. Later on, we analyse
how national policies and the international division of labour might have affected cur-
rent account balances.9
2.2.1 The competitiveness approach
From the perspective of competitiveness driven intra-euro area balances, Germany
holds a relatively strong competitiveness position, for instance, vis-a´-vis Spain since
German current account surpluses vis-a´-vis Spain have been quite large recently. In
this context, the real exchange rate is the most commonly used measure of cost and
price competitiveness (Lipschitz and McDonald, 1992, Arghyrou and Chortareas, 2006).
In a monetary union with a common currency, the real exchange rate only depends
on changes in relative prices between countries. A country with low competitiveness
needs to undergo a real depreciation and, hence, to deflate its general price level in
relative terms to regain competitiveness. Domestic products have to become cheaper
as compared to foreign goods. If this is the case, exports increase, imports decrease
and the current account deficit is eliminated. Conversely, a country with a compet-
itive economy could reduce its export surplus by a real appreciation, for instance by
increasing wages. This would accelerate national inflation via higher costs and prices.
9Economic integration in general and Eastern enlargement of the European Union in particular
created a wider European single market, thereby stimulating structural adjustment and economic
specialization. Borbe´ly (2006) in some cases applies methods quite similar to ours, but takes a different
perspective analyzing trade specialization patterns in the enlarged European Union with a special
focus on the new EU member states and the cohesion countries. From a sectoral trade point of
view, she presents empirical findings on revealed comparative advantage and a broader picture of
competitiveness on the single market. Empirically identifying the determinants of successful trade
specialization and taking into account the role of foreign direct investment, she offers new insights
into the dynamics of trade, innovation and integration. Thus, our study complements her work in
increasing our understanding of the nature of international adjustment processes.
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Competitiveness in the euro area would be re-balanced via flexible prices and wages.
The argument that a monetary union with heterogeneous members requires flexible
markets goes back to the literature on optimum currency areas (OCA). The seminal
paper by Mundell (1961) demonstrates that members of a monetary union need flexible
labour markets to adjust to asymmetric shocks. Otherwise, membership in a common
currency area is not beneficial. Sudden changes in relative prices necessitate a gradual
readjustment in the enterprise sector to restore relative competitiveness. Note that
in contrast to Mundell’s case, the current pressing disequilibrium within EMU has
not emerged suddenly through a shock, but gradually via persistent asymmetric wage
growth rates. The argument is well known and runs as follows.
According to the trade theories of factor price equalisation, trade and/or labour mi-
gration act as transmission channels for relative wage adjustment. In a country char-
acterized by an increasing price level competitiveness, decreases and exports tend to
decline (trade channel). Competitiveness of the home country is regained by reduc-
tions of wages whereas in the partner country exports tend to rise and labour demand is
boosted which, in turn, encourages wage increases. Additionally or alternatively, parts
of the labour force migrate from the country in recession to the country finding itself
in a boom (labour migration channel) . Labour movement will continue until relative
wages and relative prices are re-balanced. Both mechanisms only work efficiently if
wages are flexible and/or labour mobility is high.
According to the trade theories of factor price equalisation, trade and/or labour mi-
gration act as transmission channels for relative wage adjustment. In a country char-
acterized by an increasing price level competitiveness, decreases and exports tend to
decline (trade channel). Competitiveness of the home country is regained by reduc-
tions of wages whereas in the partner country exports tend to rise and labour demand is
boosted which, in turn, encourages wage increases. Additionally or alternatively, parts
of the labour force migrate from the country in recession to the country finding itself
in a boom (labour migration channel).10 Labour movement will continue until relative
wages and relative prices are re-balanced. Both mechanisms only work efficiently if
10This is the main mechanism through which U.S. states adjust to unemployment. In this context,
Wasmer (2003) argues that higher labour mobility results from high labour market flexibility. US
labour force faces low employment protection and invests therefore more in person specific human
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wages are flexible and/or labour mobility is high.
However, adjustment of competitiveness differences lasts longer, if prices and wages are
rigid (European Commission, 2008). Moreover, it is more costly in terms of unemploy-
ment because in cases of downward wage rigidity labour demand decreases (Blanchard,
2007). In contrast, the more competitive country faces a shortage of labour. In the
long run, as unemployment increases, the pressure for adjustment in the less compet-
itive country increases. (Blanchard, 2007, 7) calls this way of adjustment competitive
disinflation, representing “[...] a period of sustained high unemployment, leading to
lower nominal wage growth until relative unit labour costs have decreased, [and] com-
petitiveness has improved.” Both the speed of this adjustment process and the level of
unemployment during the adjustment process depend on the degree of nominal wage
rigidity and the degree of price stickiness. Such a period of competitive disinflation has
often been argued to have taken place in Germany, where real wages have remained
widely constant since the turn of the millennium after unemployment had increased to
historical levels.
In case of EMU, it is the common monetary policy and the low inflation policy of
the ECB, which narrow the scope for a competitive disinflation process without any
downward movements of the wage. Assuming that nominal wage cuts are unlikely,
a country with lagging competitiveness that holds nominal wages constant can only
realize real wage cuts by means of sizeable inflation. The lower inflation is, the smaller
will be real wage cuts and competitiveness gains against other euro area countries 11,
and the more the re-balancing process is postponed.
Seen on the whole, thus, downward wage flexibility is - given similar levels of pro-
ductivity increases - crucial for balancing current account balances in the euro area
via the competitiveness channel. This is even more valid as the common currency
has reduced transaction costs for intra-euro area trade and has enhanced price trans-
parency across borders (Badinger, 2007, European Commission, 2008). What is more,
the process of globalisation and the rising competition from China and the Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) going along with the former, have further
capital, which enables them to be mobile. In contrast, European workers tend to invest in firm
specific human capital, which makes them less mobile.
11Here we simply assume no real wage cuts in competitor countries.
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enhanced the pressure on competitive as well as on less competitive euro area countries.
Figure 7 displays the development of unit labour costs in the euro area from 1999 to
2007. While Germany and Austria almost kept the level of 1999, in Ireland, Portugal,
Spain, Greece, Italy, and Netherlands unit labour costs have increased significantly
up to 30% compared to 1999. This implies a real appreciation and a huge loss in
competitiveness of the former countries which in turn has, according to the majority
of studies (see section 2.3.1), significantly contributed to the build-up of intra-euro
area current account imbalances. In view of the rather large unit labour cost growth
differential, this pattern should hold even without imposing overly large values on
export and import demand price sensitiveness in the euro area countries. It is important
to keep in mind that these imbalances are driven by the private sector (trade unions and
enterprises) rather than by the harmonized common macroeconomic policies (European
Commission, 2009).
Figure 7: Unit labour costs in the euro area, 1999=100
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From this perspective, intra-euro area imbalances, which are steadily rising from 1999 to
2008, imply that there was neither wage competition nor wage harmonization within the
euro area across this period. Apparently, relative wages have not adjusted to diverging
competitiveness to a sufficient extent and have thus ultimately failed to correct the
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rising current account imbalances. According to Altissimo et al. (2006) this is due to
the fact that structural rigidities and in particular downward rigid prices and wages
in the euro area have prevented any significant adjustment of real exchange rates in
many euro area countries as one of the dominant textbook driving forces of the current
account balance. Correspondingly, the European Commission (2006) comes up with
the result that country-specific unit labour costs respond differently to positive and
negative output gaps. During an economic downturn, the loss of competitiveness is
typically higher in Portugal, Italy, Greece, France and Finland than in Germany and
Austria. In general, this pattern has to be attributed to different degrees of real wage
rigidity.
2.2.2 National inflation and wage policies
Despite a common monetary policy, national policies of fiscal policy, taxation, or wage
determination remain heterogeneous across the euro area. This might have contributed
to the emergence of different country-specific developments of income, consumption,
investment and, thus, also of import demand. What is more, structural differences in
wage growth and inflation between members of the euro area have persisted and have
even increased in the last couple of years in the euro area for several reasons.
First, there are marked differences in inflation traditions and inflation expectations.
The ECB’s low inflation target seems to be anchored to a different extent in antici-
pated national inflation rates, which is reflected in divergent long-run expected inflation
across different member countries of the euro area (Hofmann and Remsperger, 2005).
Along with inflation differences having been lower more recently than in the past,
wages and prices continued to rise in many Southern European countries despite a
tighter monetary policy stance in the EMU centre. In this context, structural infla-
tion differences just seemed to mirror the process of price level convergence within the
euro area, as some EMU members such as Greece, Portugal and Slovenia continued to
catch-up in terms of productivity, the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Second, differences in consumption and production structures across countries have an
impact on national inflation. As countries are exposed differently to extra euro area
trade, changes in the external value of the euro should have a country-specific impact
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on imported inflation (Honohan and Lane, 2003, Hofmann and Remsperger, 2005). For
example, since Ireland trades more with the UK than with Germany, a depreciation of
the euro against the pound should raise import prices in Ireland more than in Germany.
Furthermore, countries are asymmetrically exposed to common temporary shocks, such
as the surge of raw material and oil prices due to different degrees of dependence on
crude oil (Hofmann and Remsperger, 2005, European Commission, 2006). More tech-
nology intensive economies such as Germany tend to use relatively less oil per unit
GDP than Southern European countries, which therefore have been hit more severely
by an increase in raw material prices.
Third, structural differences among national euro area inflation rates might also be
driven by idiosyncratic business cycles (Honohan and Lane, 2003, European Commis-
sion, 2006). For instance, after the turn of the millennium Spain and Ireland experi-
enced a period of sustained growth while German growth still remained sluggish. As
a result, the implementation of the common monetary policy and the country-specific
real interest rate shocks resulting from it contributed to asymmetric economic develop-
ments (European Commission, 2008). Decreasing interest rates and persistent inflation
rates reduced real interest rates and boosted demand in former high inflation countries
such as Spain or Ireland (Lo´pez-Salido et al., 2005). In contrast, relatively high real
interest rates in Germany reduced investment demand and kept inflation low.
Fourth and probably most importantly, national inflation rates were driven by different
degrees of national wage and productivity growth. In Germany, high unemployment,
being partly a legacy of its unification, restrained real wage growth. Beyond EMU,
German wage austerity since the mid 1990s represents a consistent response to low
wage competition from the CEECs and East Asia. In addition, German productivity
increased. In contrast, wage growth in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece remained
high, for instance due to inflation indexation in Spain (Lo´pez-Salido et al., 2005)
and/or buoyant capital inflows. Productivity growth remained moderate. Further-
more, structural reforms in labour and complementary markets were implemented at
different speeds and scopes (Belke et al., 2006b, de Grauwe, 2009b). This affected the
differential between the country-specific inflation dynamics (Beck et al., 2009).
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2.2.3 Division of labour and industry specialization
Beyond different degrees of price competitiveness and country-specific economic poli-
cies, some other factors are made responsible by analysts for the recent pattern of
intra-euro area current account imbalances. One obvious candidate is the division of
labour among euro area member countries, i.e. the degree and area of specialization
of national industries. For instance, Amable and Verspagen (1995) and Ilzkovitz et al.
(2008) emphasise the role of the so-called non-price competition which covers a large
set of variables such as sectoral and geographical specialization of the export sector,
production and technology structure, as well as the quality of products.
First, a clear pattern of specialization in specific goods and export markets is impor-
tant for competitiveness. A country with a sectoral specialization in difficult-to-imitate
goods has an advantage which gives - other things equal - ample room for higher rela-
tive wage growth and vice versa (Ilzkovitz et al., 2008). Additionally, the geographical
specialization, i.e. the structure of a country’s main export destinations, matters. Ex-
port specialization to dynamic (emerging) markets will boost overall exports relative
to exports to mature markets.
Second, the production structure determines how and to what extent rising wage costs
can be passed on to international markets and, thus, for the realisation of a country’s
current account imbalance. If a country is specialized in the production of labour
intensive goods, the power to pass prices to international markets is low and interna-
tional market shares are lost in response to higher wages. This is because rising wages
are translated to a larger extent into rising production costs as wage costs account
for a larger share of overall costs. Hence, wage growth in countries with more labour-
intensive production such as Italy, Greece, or Portugal might accelerate the loss of
market shares relative to countries with capital-intensive production such as Germany.
This effect is particularly strong in the euro area, where a common monetary policy
and integrated capital markets provide almost equal capital costs (European Central
Bank, 2008).
As displayed in Figure 8, the capital intensity of production in the euro area differs
significantly between Germany, Austria and France at the top and Greece, Spain and
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Portugal at the bottom. Notably, the capital per worker ratio in Portugal is almost one
third of the German one. Labour productivity of bottom group countries is much lower
than in capital-intensive countries. Theoretically, low productivity growth needs to be
accommodated by lower wage increases if competitiveness shall not be eroded. The
squares denote those countries experiencing high relative unit labour cost growth since
1999. They indicate that in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, relative wage growth
was not accompanied by relative labour productivity gains. Productivity growth in
Ireland was very likely influenced by the fast growth of the financial sector and there-
fore can be expected to be corrected nearly automatically in the years to come.
Figure 8: Capital intensity versus labour productivity in the euro area, 2007
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Third, the nature of competition and the heterogeneity of goods matter for current
account balances. Supply of diversified and/or high quality goods allow a country to
claim higher prices in international markets as customers are willing to offer an extra
pay for special characteristics of goods (Aiginger, 2000). In this case, firms are able to
shift higher wage costs to international customers. Such kind of quality competition
dominates in high-technology and high-skill industries (Aiginger, 2000). In contrast,
low-technology and low-skill (labour-intensive) industries mostly compete via prices.
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In the latter case, excessive wage growth is more harmful because competition with
low labour cost countries, such as the new EU members or the East Asian emerging
markets, is much fiercer. With rigid labour markets, unemployment tends to rise as a
dire consequence and to become structural and persistent. In the euro area, Portugal,
Spain, Greece, and to some extent also Italy for a long time relied mainly on low-tech
and medium-tech exports (European Central Bank, 2005, Baumann and di Mauro,
2007). They have suffered from price competition from new EU member countries and
East Asia (Bennett and Zarnic, 2008). Current account deficits have thus gradually
increased in these cases.
2.2.4 The role of the non-tradable sector
Although the divergences in euro area current account balances have become visible
in the tradable sector, there is a need for adjustment also in the non-tradable sector,
mainly for two reasons. First, non-tradable goods (i.e. services) such as logistics, IT,
construction, personnel and financial services are used as inputs for the production
of tradable goods. Rising prices in the non-tradable sector push up the costs in the
tradable sector. Second, price increases in the non-tradable sector tend to fuel inflation
(Lo´pez-Salido et al., 2005) which reduces the purchasing power of wages in the tradable
sector. In turn, the trade unions in the tradable sector claim a higher inflation compen-
sation within the wage bargaining process. By this second-round effect the production
costs of tradable goods increase and the competitiveness of the tradable sector shrinks.
This corresponds to a kind of reversed Balassa-Samuelson setting where rising wages
in the non-tradable sector trigger wage adjustment in the traded goods sector, which
might reduce the current account balance.
Figure 9 supports this view and provides evidence that the non-tradable sector con-
tributed significantly to the striking labour cost divergence in Europe. It displays the
cumulative growth of sectoral unit wage costs12 in percent from 1999 to 2007 for eleven
core euro area countries subdivided by sector. We classify the industry and the manu-
facturing branch as tradable sectors, whereas services and construction are defined as
non-tradable goods. The black dot indicates the cumulative nominal labour cost growth
within the period. In countries whose current account deficit has widened since 1999,
12Unit wage costs as defined by the European Commission are equivalent to the compensation of
employees in sector i divided by gross value added of sector i.
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the growth of unit wage costs in services and construction exceeded those in industry
and manufacturing by far. In contrast, in Germany and Austria unit wage costs in the
service and construction sectors have increased only moderately which contributed to
low overall unit labour cost growth as also argued by the European Commission (2006).
Figure 9: Nominal unit wage costs by major sectors and overall unit labour costs,
cumulative changes in index points 1999-2007
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In sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.4, we have collected an array of potential determinants of intra-
euro area current account imbalances. Moreover, we have identified certain areas in
which either private adjustment or, as a substitute, government initiated structural
reforms might lead to a re-balancing of the imbalances. Taking this as a starting point,
we now turn to a deeper and more concrete analysis of the relation between struc-
tural reforms, market forces and the current account in order to deliver the theoretical
underpinnings of our estimation equations in section 2.4.
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2.3 Structural reforms, market forces, and the cur-
rent account
The quite obvious significance of the lack of market-based adjustment mechanisms in
general, but especially of labour market flexibility, for intra-euro area current account
balances puts two questions on the agenda. First, how structural reforms, in particular
on the labour market, affect the current account balance (section 2.3.1) and, second,
how more labour market flexibility can be achieved. With respect to the latter, we first
investigate how national governments can enhance labour market flexibility by struc-
tural reforms (section 2.3.2. Then, we investigate potential responses of the private
sector to falling exports and rising import competition (section 2.3.3. This is for what
we later on coin the notion of “market adjustment”.
2.3.1 Structural reforms and the current account
There are at least two competing theories on how structural reforms, in particular on
the labour market, might affect the current account balance. The first one is related
to the intertemporal approach to the current account (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1994). In
our context, it would imply the following. Since structural reforms tend to be painful
today but promise future gains, it would be rational for countries to borrow today in
order to compensate for the current pain of structural reforms. Hence, the current ac-
count balance should decline in the short run. However, since future gains of structural
reforms will be used to pay back the loans in the future, we should observe a reversal
and a positive change of the current account in the future. However, returns of reforms
in the future are uncertain.
A second argument concerning the sign of the impact of structural reforms on current
account balances is propagated by (Kennedy and Sløk, 2005, 9). They argue that, in a
first step, wages and prices decline as result of structural reforms. Hence, the country
receives a price advantage and exports increase and imports decline. As a result, the
current account balance improves in the short run. Profitability increases with a time
lag and the internal interest rate increases. Investment goes up and foreign capital is
attracted which, in turn, tends to reduce capital exports and, therefore, goods exports.
In the long run, the current account surplus should thus decline. This theory therefore
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refers to the competitiveness approach of current accounts (see section 2.2.1).
Bertola and Lo Prete (2009) analyse the effects of rising income growth and income
risk as result of labour market deregulation. They argue in the same vein as Kennedy
and Sløk (2005) that labour market deregulation should improve the current account
balance of the reforming country without much delay, since forward-looking individ-
uals increase their precautionary savings because of higher uninsurable risk. Another
explanation for rising current account balances is that purchasing power shifts towards
individuals with higher saving propensities.
Hence, the impact of structural reforms on the current account balance is a priori not
clear. However, up to now the majority of available empirical results for developed
countries (Kennedy and Sløk, 2005, Bertola and Lo Prete, 2009) points at a current
account improving effect of structural reforms. In this paper, we would like to scrutinize
this pattern for the case of intra-euro area current account imbalances.
2.3.2 Structural reforms
Governments might be trying to lower huge current account deficits. By doing this,
structural reforms can play an important role in reducing intra-euro area balances by
increasing labour market flexibility and improving labour market institutions. In par-
ticular, the adequate choice of labour market institutions is crucial for a good labour
market performance because it affects the reservation wage13 and the wage bargaining
power of employees (Arpaia and Mourre, 2005, Nickell and Layard, 1999). High labour
market flexibility increases the responsiveness of the labour market to competitiveness
(section 2.2.1) and therefore the current account balance.
A radical straightforward reform strategy is to relax employment protection and to
reduce unemployment benefits. First, less employment protection increases employers’
flexibility when responding to changes in demand via lay-offs. This reduces workers’
bargaining power and facilitates wage cuts in the face of recession. Second, lower un-
employment benefits raise the incentive of unemployed labour force to accept jobs at
a lower wage because the reservation wage as the implicit minimum wage is reduced.
13As defined as the lowest wage at which workers accept a particular type of job.
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This in turn lowers prices for labour-intensive and low technology production as unit
labour costs fall (see section 2.2.3).
Lower wages reduce production costs and prices, which might accelerate exports and
shift demand from imports to domestic products. In particular, in a monetary union
lower employment protection necessitates wage flexibility because monetary policy can-
not address idiosyncratic shocks. The adjustment speed increases and unemployment
can be avoided (Blanchard, 2007).
Nevertheless, reducing labour protection may not be the best response to current
account deficits. The European Commission (2006) argues that given more flexible
labour markets, volatility of unemployment rises with indeterminate effects on struc-
tural unemployment over the business cycle. Yet, structural reforms should assure an
adjustment of current account balances by keeping unemployment low. In this con-
text, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) show that risk averse workers tend to accept lower
wages in return for a higher employment probability which encourages enterprises to
create low wage and low productivity jobs. Both, structural unemployment and overall
productivity decline (see also Arpaia and Mourre (2005)). In contrast, more generous
unemployment benefits can influence productivity positively by creating more capital-
intensive jobs (Acemoglu, 2001).
To address these caveats, structural reforms could be supported by productivity im-
provement, for instance by active labour market policies such as better education and
training to arrive at a skilled labour force. Unemployed labour could be re-trained
for a changed labour market demand. This argument corresponds with the European
Commission’s flexicurity approach which asks member states to improve labour market
flexibility (wages and mobility), to balance employment protection and security in the
labour market, as well as active labour market policy (European Commission, 2007).
Through this mechanism, rising productivity lowers production costs and improves the
current account balance.
Beyond the pure labour market focus, also product market deregulation tends to in-
crease adjustment pressure as the responsiveness of prices and wages to changes in
the market environment increases (Bayoumi et al., 2004). The European single mar-
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ket program has already increased competition by streamlining the regulations in the
EU tradable sector and dismantling trade barriers such as tariffs and exchange rate
fluctuations. However, competition in the non-tradable sector is still limited (Euro-
pean Commission, 2007) and national price levels have tended to diverge rather than
to converge (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2009). The effect of product market deregulation
is not overall clear. On the one hand, more intense competition could reduce prices
and would hence lead to a current account improvement. On the other hand, product
market deregulation might lower the entry-thresholds of foreign competitors to the do-
mestic market, which could in turn worsen the current account balance (Kennedy and
Sløk, 2005).
Even if needed quite pressingly, structural reforms nevertheless tend to be delayed by
political reform costs and/or a relaxed budget constraint. Political reform costs are
arising for instance from opposition by insiders and/or outsiders (Saint-Paul, 2004,
Alesina et al., 2006). Employed labour force opposes labour market reforms as rents in
form of a high reservation wage are lost. The government faces protests and strikes as
most prominently experienced in France. In this context, as politicians are concerned
about their re-election, the time asymmetry of reform costs and benefits matters. Costs
of reforms (in terms of voters’ discontent) arise immediately but benefits are reaped in
the future, possibly after elections (Conesa and Garriga, 2003).
The upshot is that politicians tend to postpone reforms and try to fight rising un-
employment resulting from low competitiveness or current account deficits by fiscal
expansion. The opposition against additional government debt is less, as costs im-
posed by higher taxes or higher inflation are postponed after elections. This ability
to postpone reforms via higher government expenditure is lower in times of economic
downturns when the resources for fiscal expansion are depleted (Drazen and Grilli,
1993). Then political groups will more easily accept reforms as costs of non-reforming
are more evident and room for fiscal expansion is small. Additionally, the common
currency in the euro area disables the escape route of monetary expansion and devalu-
ation to adjust current account deficits temporarily (Belke et al., 2006b, Bertola, 2008).
Governments are forced to reform which refers to the “there is no alternative” (TINA)
argument. In contrast, bail-outs of single EMU members and outright government
bond purchases by the ECB would be equivalent of postponing national reform efforts.
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2.3.3 Private sector adjustment
In contrast to the government, the private sector generally tends to adjust earlier to
declining exports or rising import competition because of its tighter budget constraint.
As declining exports and/or rising import competition translate into lower or negative
profit margins, pressure by shareholders and capital lenders forces private enterprises
to restructure. Usually, the main pillar of such private adjustment will be cutting
unit labour costs, which may incorporate a larger capital stock, better technology, less
employment and/or lower wages. With flexible labour markets, wage costs can easily
be adjusted within the wage bargaining process. In contrast, inflexible labour mar-
kets force private enterprises to lay off workers. However, the current account balance
should improve under both scenarios. There are several ways of restructuring.
First, the private sector can increase productivity by substituting capital for labour.
In this case, wage costs per unit of output, i.e. unit labour costs, typically decline but,
at the same time, unemployment tends to increase. Figure 10 shows the difference in
the degree of substitution of labour by capital, henceforth called labour-capital substi-
tution, between Germany and Italy as well as the real exchange rate14 and the bilateral
trade balance between both countries since 1992. As shown by the downward-sloped
smoothed bold line, Germany, for instance, substituted more capital for labour than
Italy. This gap was especially large in the 1990s.
Germany suffered from a strong real appreciation of the Deutschmark in the late 1980s
and during its unification boom which deteriorated the German trade balance. A
faster speed of labour-capital substitution helped to restore the German economy, as
indicated by the real depreciation and the improved trade account. After the introduc-
tion of the euro in 1999, relative labour-capital substitution continued which can best
be interpreted as the response to an overvalued entry of the mark into the monetary
union (European Commission, 2008). The rise of the German current account surplus
continued until the financial crisis started in mid-2007 and even accelerated in 2008,
when substantial competitiveness gaps within the euro area became apparent by rising
14As a real exchange rate variable we use a rate based on unit labour costs, which is highly correlated
with a CPI based real exchange rate variable. In Figure 10, an appreciation corresponds to an increase
of the index.
42
spreads on euro area countries’ government bonds.
Figure 10: Labour-capital substitution and the real exchange rate, Germany versus
Italy
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Second, one possibility to cut unit labour costs is by international outsourcing of
labour-intensive production via FDI (offshoring)15 and/or importing labour-intensive
intermediates (Farrell, 2004). For instance, Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008) estimate
that offshoring intermediate good(s) production contributed significantly to overall pro-
ductivity growth in Italy. For Germany, Sinn (2004) coined the concept of a Bazaar
economy, arguing that German manufacturers have extensively made use of offshoring
and imports of intermediates, leading to unprecedented trade surpluses. Hence, the
share of imported intermediate goods rose to over 50 percent of export values in 2007
(Sinn, 2007). Companies have increased their competitiveness by reducing firm unit
labour cost at the cost of domestic manufacturing employment (Farrell, 2004, Sinn,
2007).16
15According to International Monetary Fund (2007, 164), offshoring or offshore outsourcing is de-
fined by the movement of parts of production to less costly foreign locations.
16However, Welfens and Borbe´ly (2009) partly reject the Sinn hypothesis, referring to an input-
output analysis according to which the national outsourcing effect is in some cases economically more
important than the international outsourcing effect.
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To summarize, both private market adjustment and structural reforms have the poten-
tial to reduce intra-euro area balances via more flexible labour markets. Unit labour
cost moderation at the firm level is the main driving force of the adjustment process.
Both structural reforms and private market adjustment should lead to a rather similar
outcome with respect to current account balances, but impose different costs in terms
of political reform costs or unemployment. However, structural reforms influence the
degree of labour market flexibility and therefore determine how current account bal-
ances will adjust by setting the ”rules of adjustment”. Flexible labour markets allow
direct relative wage adjustment. In contrast, rigid labour markets force the private
sector to adjust via labour-capital substitution and/or offshoring.17
2.4 Empirical analysis
Taking our analysis in sections 2.2 and 2.3 as a starting point, we now proceed by em-
pirically testing for the impact of private market adjustment and structural reforms on
the current account balances of the euro area member countries. For this purpose, we
employ an up-to-date dynamic panel estimation framework. During this exercise, we
also assess the empirical significance of potential interdependencies (complementarity
vs. substitutability) within both processes towards more flexibility - structural reforms
and private market adjustment. Because private market adjustment is probably en-
dogenous with respect to structural reforms, we lay special emphasis on one direction
of this interrelation, namely the question whether the degree of structural reforms has
a specific impact on the relation among current account imbalances and private market
adjustment. To be more specific, we test the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Structural reforms and private market adjustment affect current account
balances. This hypothesis suggests a significant impact of both measures
in promoting current account balance adjustment as described in sections
2.3.2 and 2.3.3.
Hypothesis 2 Structural reforms modify the characteristics of the current account ad-
justment process. Here we test, whether structural reforms and private
17Note that negative employment effects in home country emerge in case of horizontal and vertical
integration of multinational enterprises as well as in the case of outsourcing especially in the low-skilled
sector. If labor markets are rigid in these segments, structural unemployment tends to emerge.
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market adjustment are interdependent in a sense, i.e. are complements or
substitutes with regard to their impact on the current account balance.
Hypothesis 3 The effectiveness of structural reforms and private market adjustment has
been affected by the start of European Monetary Union (EMU). Here, we
take the OCA literature as a starting point suggesting that EMU has
reinforced the need for structural reforms and, hence, their effectiveness
is higher from 1999 on.
2.4.1 Data and variables
We estimate the impact of private market adjustment and structural reforms on cur-
rent account balances in the euro area based on a dynamic panel of bilateral yearly
differences of 11 euro area countries.18 As we measure current account balances in
percent of GDP, we can use the full matrix. The sample period covers the period from
1991 to 2007. Since we work with annual data, we arrive at a maximum number of
1870 observations. Due to missing data, the sample in the end even becomes a little
smaller.
Current account balances
As our research focuses on intra-euro area current account balances, we use bilateral
trade account balances (TAB)19, in percent of national GDP. As usual, structural
reforms are assumed to promote exports and/or to decrease imports as the domestic
competitiveness rises. Due to a lack of data, we cannot include trade in services or
bilateral current account balances. We control for business cycle effects and nominal
price effects by adding private consumption20 and export price inflation.
Structural reforms
The measurement of structural reforms is not easy and its discussion fills many pages.
We follow empirical papers on structural reforms such as Belke et al. (2006b) and use
the (difference of the) Fraser Index of Economic Freedom of the World as indicator of
the intensity of structural reforms.21 The index measures economic freedom cardinally
18Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
19Bilateral current account data are generally not available.
20Here, we use the change in private consumption as the latter might have a direct impact on the
trade balance and it is highly correlated with real GDP growth.
21For details of the computation of the index see Gwartney and Lawson (2003).
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taking values in the range of 1 to 10, with higher values indicating a higher degree
of economic freedom. An advantage of this index is the disaggregation according to
different policy areas. However, the drawback is that annual data are only available
from the year 2000 on. In our empirical investigation we decided to make use of the
summary index (FI) as well as of the labour market sub-index (FI − labor).
a second step, we use the following two macroeconomic variables as proxies of struc-
tural reforms and assume that these macroeconomic indicators proportionally display
the effects of accumulated previous structural reforms. The advantage of this method
is twofold. First, these indicators are available for a longer period, and, second, the
macro variables might serve as instrumental variables of some sort because private
adjustment is endogenous with respect to the degree of structural reforms. Thereby,
these macroeconomic variables might indicate long-term effects of structural reform.
As a first macro variable, we use structural unemployment as measured by the non-
accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU) which is the unemployment rate
consistent with constant wage inflation and which reflects structural imbalances in
labour markets. However, calculations on structural unemployment depend on the
estimation concept used. We include calculations of the NAWRU from the Euro-
pean Commission. We assume that declining structural unemployment is due to (past)
structural labour market reforms.
As a second macro variable, social benefits (SB) in percent of GDP are used as a proxy
of cumulated past structural reforms of the welfare system, especially unemployment
compensation. Large social benefits are associated with moral hazard and inefficient
allocation of public transfers. Additionally, social benefits can act as an implicit mini-
mum wage. A reduction of social benefits increases the pressure for wage moderation
by boosting the incentive of unemployed to accept job offers at lower wages. Both,
lower structural unemployment and lower social benefits are assumed to be correlated
with an increase in current account balances.
To enhance the coherence and readability of our estimation results we finally multiply
both macroeconomic proxies with (−1). After this transformation, higher realisations
of (−1) ∗ NAWRU or (−1) ∗ SB proportionally correspond to a higher degree of
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structural reforms. In accordance with Bertola and Lo Prete (2009), we expect both
proxies to be positively correlated with the bilateral trade balance.
Private restructuring
To measure private restructuring we use six different proxies. First, private market ad-
justment, such as increasing productivity or wage moderation, target unit labour costs,
which are seen as an important determinant of competitiveness and might therefore
affect current account balances. Hence, we apply changes in unit labour costs (ULC)
as a proxy of private restructuring of the enterprise sector. Second, we use the nomi-
nal compensation rate (NCR) which measures wage costs including fringe benefits.22
Again, both indicators are multiplied by (−1). Third, we test for the impact of pro-
ductivity (PROD) and, fourth, the degree of labour-capital-substitution (LABCAP )
on the trade account. These latter two variables are of course not multiplied by the
factor (−1) by the same logic as applied above.
Our fifth and the sixth measure of the extent of private restructuring consist of a proxy
for offshoring and an indicator of technological competitiveness. In any case, it is rather
difficult to find an undisputed proxy for emphoffshoring. Offshoring is in most cases
measured at a highly disaggregated level. For example, International Monetary Fund
(2007) and Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2008) use input-output data for their analyses;
Goerg et al. (2008) base their empirical analysis on plant level data. Neither data set
fits for our analysis since data are not available for all countries during the observation
period. Therefore, we use as fifth variable outward FDI in percent of GDP as a proxy
of offshoring, based on the assumption that offshoring as proxy for private restructuring
is associated with increasing outward FDI. This approach excludes offshoring that is
not linked to FDI such as outsourcing of services to firms abroad or increasing imports
of intermediate products.
Sixth, we measure technological competitiveness by making use of the Balassa index
of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) (Balassa, 1965), which accounts for a
22Compensation includes employer’s contribution to statutory social security schemes or to private
funded social insurance schemes and unfunded employee social benefits paid by employers (such as
children’s, spouse’s or payments made to workers because of illness, accidental injury).
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relative export share in an industry compared to all countries.23 We calculate the
RCA indicator for ten industries of each country and aggregate over industries by
classifying all industries according to the kind of technology used. In so doing, we
multiply the RCA variable by 1 for higher technology industries and by −1 in case
of lower technology industries.24 The differentiation in “higher technology (high and
medium-high technology)” and “lower technology (low and medium-low technology)”
follows (Baumann and di Mauro, 2007, 23). Our final ranking of countries with respect
to the industrial specialisation is quite similar to that gained by Baumann and di Mauro
(2007).
Control variables
To control for business cycle effects in bilateral trade data we use private consumption,
as is standard in this type of literature. Additionally, private consumption accounts for
differences in consumption of euro area countries that might have driven the current
account balances. Since nominal trade account data are also influenced by nominal
prices, we check for relative price developments by employing a variable measuring
relative export price inflation. We have to drop import price inflation due to mulit-
colinearity. Finally, a dummy variable accounts for a possible structural break at the
start of EMU. The dummy is coded as one for all years in which a country is member
of the EMU and is otherwise set to zero.
2.4.2 Empirical model
To analyse the impact of structural reforms and market adjustment on current account
balances, we use three differently specified regression equations. In the following, we
give some details about each of the three different specifications. Let us start with
hypothesis one.
23The Revealed Comparative Advantage is calculated as written below, were m indicates sectors
and i countries: RACm,i =
Xm,i∑n
m=1 Xm,i∑j
i=1
Xm,i∑j
i=1
∑n
m=1 Xm,i
with m ∈ (1, n) and i ∈ (1, j).
24Industry 9 (ITS-SITC Rev.3: “Commodities and Transactions, n.e.s.”) is multiplied by 0 as it
cannot be explicitly classified as a lower or higher technology branch.
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We test the validity of our first hypothesis claiming that structural reforms and private
market adjustment affect current account balances by means of the following regression
equation:
Ck,t = β0 + β1Ck,t−1 + β2Lk,t−1 + βPPk,t + βGGk,t + βXXk,t + βddk,t + k + µk,t (13)
where Ck,t denotes a vector of changes in bilateral trade account balances with Ck,t =
TABi,j,t
GDPi,t
− TABi,j,t−1
GDPi,t−1
. The indices i and j identify the countries involved, t denotes
time, and k is the cross-section index of country pairs. Pk,t represents the vector of
proxies for private market adjustment, Gk,t stands for a vector of proxies for structural
reforms, and Xk,t captures a set of control variables. In our dynamic model setting,
we also include the one-period lagged dependent variable as well as the level of the
trade account balance (L) prevailing in the previous period to account for the degree
of initial problem pressure. We expect that the higher a trade deficit turns out to be,
the larger the probability of structural reforms or private restructuring is, as the need
for adjustment is especially pronounced. The vectors Pk,t, Gk,t and Xk,t contain the
change in the bilateral absolute differences between country i and j, with:
Pk,t = ∆Pi,t −∆Pj,t (14)
Gk,t = ∆Gi,t −∆Gj,t (15)
Xk,t = ∆Xi,t −∆Xj,t (16)
This variable transformation generates stationary time series to avoid spurious regres-
sion. Panel unit-root tests (Levin et al., 2002, Im et al., 2003) for the transformed
variables reject non-stationary nature of all independent variables. The dummy vari-
able d controls for the impact of EMU on competitiveness. We account for unobserved
heterogeneity using cross-section fixed effects k. µk,t is the white noise error term.
Hypothesis one is corroborated if the coefficient βG of structural reforms reveals a pos-
itive sign on FI, FI − labor, (−1)NAWRU and (−1)SB. This would indicate that
structural reforms in a country tend to enhance bilateral trade balances. The estimated
coefficients of private market adjustment, βP , are expected to have a positive sign, too.
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Let us now proceed with the specification of the regression equation related to our
hypothesis two. The latter actually claims that structural reforms influence the private
adjustment process. For this purpose, we scrutinize the interrelations between market
adjustment and structural reforms via adding an interaction term Pk,tGk,t. This yields:
Ck,t = β0 + β1Ck,t−1 + β2Lk,t−1 + βPPk,t + βGGk,t + βAPk,tGk,t + βXXk,t+
+βddk,t + k + µk,t
(17)
This specification enables us to test whether the relationship between the dependent
variable Ck,t and the independent variable Pk,t is influenced by the third independent
variable Gk,t (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). Such interaction effects can be isolated by
product terms of the independent variable Pk,t (the so-called focal variable) and the
second independent variable Gk,t (moderator variable). Note, that the interpretation
of regression coefficients changes in this case. With respect to our own estimation exer-
cise the interpretation of regression coefficients can be summarized as follows (Jaccard
and Turrisi, 2003): βP captures the effect of Pk,t on Ck,t when Gk,t = 0, βG estimates
the effect of Gk,t on Ck,t when Pk,t = 0, and βA indicates the number of units that βP
increases/decreases if Gk,t grows by one unit.
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Generally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that structural reforms affect the private
adjustment process if βA becomes statistically significant. If the estimated coefficient
of the interaction between structural reforms and private restructuring βA has (not)
the same sign as the estimated coefficient of private adjustment, βP , then it indicates
a complementary (substitutive) relationship between structural reforms and private
restructuring. Let us now finally derive the regression framework to test our third
hypothesis.
Our third hypothesis maintains that the effectiveness of private market adjustment and
structural reforms to balance current accounts has been affected by membership of the
respective country in EMU. We decided to test the former by adding an interaction term
Pk,tdk,t which interrelates private market adjustment with the EMU dummy variable
25The contrary explanation is possible: βA indicates the number of units that βG increases/decreases
if Pk,t grows by one unit. However, we assume in our theory that structural reforms affect the private
adjustment process.
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or an interaction term Gk,tdk,t measuring the impact of EMU on the effectiveness of
structural reforms in influencing current account balances. In this case, the regression
equations boil down to be the following:
Ck,t = β0 + β1Ck,t−1 + β2Lk,t−1 + βPPk,t + βGGk,t + βA1Pk,tdk,t + βXXk,t+
+βddk,t + k + µk,t
(18)
Ck,t = β0 + β1Ck,t−1 + β2Lk,t−1 + βPPk,t + βGGk,t + βA2Gk,tdk,t + βXXk,t+
+βddk,t + k + µk,t
(19)
Based on these specifications, we estimate the effect of EMU membership on the im-
pact of private market adjustment and structural reforms on current account balances.
Positive signs of the estimated coefficients βA1 and βA2 indicate a rising importance of
private market adjustment or of structural reforms for current account balances since
the start of the EMU.
We estimate the three specifications (13), (17) as well as (18) or (19) based on a dy-
namic panel model by means of a System-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995,
Blundell and Bond, 1998) to account for possible endogenous variables, fixed effects
and heteroskedasticity. In contrast to the Difference-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991),
the System-GMM addresses poor performance of first-differenced-variable instruments.
Our data set fits the requirement of a relatively small time dimension (max. 17 points
in time) and many cross sections (110 country pairs) which has originally been raised
in the context of the Arellano-Bond procedure. We hold the number of instruments at
a minimum to enhance the discriminating power of post-estimation over-identification
tests. However, time lags are large enough to account for long-term adjustment. All
variables are assumed to be endogenous with respect to the dependent variable except
the EMU dummy, which we treat as exogenous for obvious reasons. The presented
results in the tables are derived from robust two-step estimations, which have been
corrected for potential bias of standard errors due to small sample size (Windmeijer,
2005).
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In order to arrive at a valid model specification the null hypotheses of the Arellano-
Bond AR(2) correlation test26 and the Hansen over-identification test (Hansen, 1982)
have to be rejected. As we use a robust estimation, the Sargan over-identification test
(Sargan, 1958) becomes inconsistent (Roodman, 2006, 12). Hence, we only report the
empirical realisations of the Hansen test statistic. To check for the validity of our model
specification, we also perform specifications, which include additional time dummies
(Roodman, 2006). That improves the autocorrelation tests and the robustness of stan-
dard errors.27 As the overall pattern of our results is untouched by this specification,
only results based on specifications excluding deterministic time dummies are reported.
2.4.3 Estimation results
Test of hypothesis 1: Do structural reforms and private market adjustment
affect current account balances?
Our estimation results related to our first hypothesis are reported in Table 2 for the
Fraser summary index, in Table 3 for the Fraser labour market sub-index, in Table 4
for the macro variable structural unemployment and in Table 5 for the macro indicator
social benefits.
In general, the estimated coefficients of the variables measuring the impact of private
market adjustment on bilateral trade balances turn out to be of rather low significance.
Only the coefficients of FDI (column 5), productivity (column 3), and the nominal
compensation rate (column 7) are significant at the common levels. In contrast, the
estimated coefficients of structural reforms turn out to be positive and significant in
almost all estimations. Especially, a relative increase in the overall as well as in the
labour market-specific Fraser Index and a reduction of structural unemployment rela-
tive to the partner country is linked to an improvement of the bilateral trade balance.
The estimated coefficients of the macroeconomic control variables are in accordance
with theory and, thus, corroborate the robustness of our estimation results. For in-
26It is important to note that the absence of AR(2) is the necessary condition for unbiased and
efficient estimation with GMM-SYS, but not of AR(1). First order residual autocorrelation in the
starting equation is no problem since the estimators work with first differences. Hence, the significance
of AR(1) autocorrelation does not limit the validity of our results.
27We use time dummies to make the assumption of no autocorrelation across individuals in the
idiosyncratic disturbances more likely to hold (Roodman, 2006).
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stance, a relative increase in private consumption and and relatively lower export prices
reduce the (nominal value of the) bilateral trade balance. The estimated coefficients of
the EMU dummy (Table 4 and 5) are in several cases significant and display a positive
sign. This clear empirical pattern reflects that after the start of EMU, bilateral trade
balances in the majority of countries declined more rapidly. In short, this mirrors the
development of intra-euro zone current account balances since 1999 between Germany
as a net creditor country and Spain, Italy, Portugal, France and Ireland as net debtor
countries.
Overall, our results confirm our hypothesis that in general structural reforms and, only
in some cases, also private market adjustment tends to increase the trade balance. The
weaker evidence for private market adjustment might reflect the fact that private capi-
tal inflows (from Germany) and public capital inflows (from EU institutions) allowed to
postpone private restructuring in the majority of euro area member countries. Hence,
our results confirm empirical research of Kennedy and Sløk (2005) and Bertola and
Lo Prete (2009).
Table 2: Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural
reforms (Fraser summary index) on bilateral trade balances (2001-2006)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 1 2 3 4 5 6
market ∆ (-1)*nominal -0.012
adjustment compensation rate (0.517)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs -0.006
(0.005)
∆ productivity -0.003
(0.008)
∆ labour capital -0.006
substitution (0.037)
∆ FDI 0.015*
(0.007)
∆ RCA 0.001
(0.001)
structural ∆ Fraser Index 0.085** 0.074** 0.081** 0.090** -0.151 0.076
reforms (summary index) (0.042) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.189) (0.050)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.287*** -0.264*** -0.287*** -0.288*** -0.017 -0.377***
variables (t-1) (0.079) (0.082) (0.072) (0.078) (0.172) (0.076)
trade balance 0.090** 0.068** 0.076* 0.072* -0.008 0.161*
(t-1) (0.040) (0.029) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.081)
∆ private consumption -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.019 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007)
∆ export prices 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.044* 0.018*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.010)
EMU dummy
constant -0.011 -0.015 -0.010 -0.012 -0.019 -0.020
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.023) (0.019)
model N 660 660 660 660 640 562
specification instruments 23 23 23 23 18 23
AR (2) 0.699 0.584 0.734 0.747 0.225 0.710
Hansen (p-value) 0.580 0.486 0.549 0.343 0.849 0.053
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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Table 3: Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural
reforms (Fraser labour market sub-index) on bilateral trade balances (2001-2006)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 7 8 9 10 11 12
market ∆ (-1)*nominal compensation rate 0.070
adjustment compensation rate (0.478)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs -0.005
(0.005)
∆ productivity -0.006
(0.008)
∆ labour capital -0.003
substitution (0.038)
∆ FDI 0.018
(0.011)
∆ RCA 0.000
(0.001)
structural ∆ Fraser Index 0.016** 0.010 0.013* 0.018** -0.051* 0.008
reforms (labor market) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.028) (0.010)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.250*** -0.241*** -0.266*** -0.274*** -0.097 -0.368***
variables (t-1) (0.090) (0.085) (0.079) (0.089) (0.120 (0.077)
trade balance 0.075* 0.061 0.072 0.065 -0.018 0.130**
(t-1) (0.043) (0.039) (0.048) (0.042) (0.044) (0.065)
∆ private consumption -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.014* -0.011 -0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
∆ export prices 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.026* 0.019*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010)
EMU dummy
constant -0.013 -0.016 -0.010 -0.017 -0.011 -0.007
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.021
model N 660 660 660 660 640 562
specification instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23
AR (2) 0.487 0.470 0.607 0.704 0.264 0.738
Hansen (p-value) 0.853 0.731 0.729 0.242 0.933 0.063
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
Table 4: Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural
unemployment on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 13 14 15 16 17 18
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 0.436
adjustment compensation rate (0.309)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.000
(0.002)
∆ productivity 0.011**
(0.005)
∆ labour capital -0.014
substitution (0.012)
∆ FDI -0.001
(0.003)
∆ RCA -0.000
(0.001)
structural ∆ (-1)*structural 0.037* 0.037** 0.047** 0.035*** 0.067* 0.029
reforms unemployment (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.035) (0.019)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.141* -0.189*** -0.164** -0.154** -0.187** -0.244***
variables (t-1) (0.072) (0.070) (0.081) (0.075) (0.074) (0.065)
trade balance 0.016 0.022 0.023 0.017 0.019 0.059***
(t-1) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
∆ private consumption -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
∆ export prices 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.015 -0.023** -0.019 -0.022 -0.039* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.010)
constant 0.003 0.016* 0.007 0.010 0.026 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.007)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 26 30 30 27 28 25
AR (2) 0.962 0.627 0.801 0.869 0.217 0.403
Hansen (p-value) 0.638 0.526 0.400 0.647 0.216 0.630
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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Table 5: Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and social benefits
on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 19 20 21 22 23 24
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 0.568*
adjustment compensation rate (0.309)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.004)
∆ productivity -0.001
(0.005)
∆ labour capital -0.014
substitution (0.013)
∆ FDI -0.002
(0.003)
∆ RCA -0.000
(0.001)
structural ∆ (-1)*social benefits 0.012* 0.013** 0.012** 0.009 0.027** 0.003
reforms (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.143* -0.192*** -0.152* -0.137* -0.201*** -0.251***
variables (t-1) (0.078) (0.070) (0.079) (0.078) (0.074) (0.061)
trade balance 0.017 0.026 0.021 -0.014 0.011 0.066***
(t-1) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.015)
∆ private consumption -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
∆ export prices 0.005*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.013 -0.018* -0.012 -0.022* -0.027** -0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
constant 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1520
specification instruments 27 32 26 28 28 26
AR (2) 0.943 0.615 0.854 0.962 0.188 0.367
Hansen (p-value) 0.513 0.145 0.447 0.385 0.216 0.402
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
Test of hypothesis 2: Reforms as a propagation mechanism fostering the
impact of private adjustment on the current account balance?
The estimation results related to our second hypothesis are displayed in Tables 6 and 7
for structural unemployment and social benefits as our indicators of the degree of struc-
tural reforms. Estimations using Fraser Index variables do not deliver any significant
interaction term and are not reported. The estimated coefficients of the interaction
term between private market adjustment and structural reforms are reported in the
grey highlighted rows. Some coefficients of the interaction terms are significant with a
negative sign, suggesting a substitutive relationship. Since the estimated βA in case of
a negative sign of βA indicates the number of units that βP decreases if Gk,t grows by
one unit, a straightforward interpretation is that a higher degree of structural reforms
diminishes the impact of private adjustment on the current account balance. In other
words, less structural reforms require more private market adjustment and vice versa.
An alternative interpretation is that private market adjustment mechanisms are not
needed as pressingly any more if structural reforms, for instance in the area of social
benefits, are conducted.
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However, if we measure private market adjustment via FDI we find a complementary
relationship (Table 7, column 35). In this case, we feel legitimized to conclude that
structural reforms foster the effectiveness of FDI to increase the current account bal-
ance. Notably, the described pattern of results is not dependent on whether we consider
an interaction with social benefits or with structural unemployment as an indicator of
the reform intensity, which again stresses the robustness of our results.
Seen on the whole, thus, our estimation results indicate that we cannot reject our sec-
ond hypothesis if we measure the degree of reforms by structural unemployment and,
alternatively, by means of a social benefit variable. Structural reforms tend to influence
the current account adjustment process. More specifically, we find mainly substitutive
relationships between structural reforms and private market adjustment.
Table 6: Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and structural unemploy-
ment on bilateral trade balances including an interaction term (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 25 26 27 28 29 30
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 0.518*
adjustment compensation rate (0.287)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.002)
∆ productivity 0.011*
(0.006)
∆ labour capital -0.011
substitution (0.014)
∆ FDI -0.001
(0.003)
∆ RCA -0.001
(0.001)
structural ∆ (-1)*structural 0.044** 0.039** 0.058*** 0.033* 0.081** 0.029
reforms unemployment (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.021)
interaction (market adjustment* -0.574* -0.004* 0.004 -0.030* 0.005 0.000
term structural reforms) (0.314) (0.002) (0.007) (0.016) (0.005) (0.001)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.176*** -0.187*** -0.196*** -0.211*** -0.187** -0.241***
variables (t-1) (0.063) (0.067) (0.066) (0.075) (0.075) (0.066)
trade balance 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.018 0.061***
(t-1) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
∆ private consumption -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ export prices 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.021* -0.022** -0.024* -0.016 -0.036* -0.007
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009)
constant 0.011 0.013* 0.016* 0.003 0.022 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 32 36 32 50 34 30
AR (2) 0.721 0.640 0.572 0.521 0.219 0.425
Hansen (p-value) 0.497 0.594 0.412 0.215 0.254 0.806
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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Table 7: Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and social benefits on
bilateral trade balances including an interaction term (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 31 32 33 34 35 36
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 0.632**
adjustment compensation rate (0.325)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs -0.001
(0.005)
∆ productivity -0.001)
(0.005
∆ labour capital -0.025
substitution (0.017)
∆ FDI -0.001
(0.003)
∆ RCA -0.000
(0.001)
structural ∆ (-1)*social benefits 0.009 0.018** 0.011* 0.009 0.031** 0.003
reforms (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007)
interaction (market adjustment* -0.383** -0.001 -0.005 -0.008* 0.012* -0.001
term structural reforms) (0.194) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.147* -0.132 -0.182** -0.132* -0.209*** -0.252***
variables (t-1) (0.080) (0.098) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.059)
trade balance 0.017 0.010 0.022 -0.009 0.012 0.065***
(t-1) (0.017) (0.033) (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.015)
∆ private consumption -0.007** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.045) (0.004) (0.003)
∆ export prices 0.005*** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.009 -0.010 -0.015 -0.031** -0.020 -0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.009)
constant 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.014 -0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 30 25 30 29 34 30
AR (2) 0.910 0.977 0.664 0.986 0.180 0.357
Hansen (p-value) 0.610 0.201 0.286 0.462 0.208 0.511
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
Test of hypothesis 3: Has the effectiveness of structural reforms and private
market adjustment been affected by EMU?
The estimation results based on regression equations designed to check the validity
of our third (EMU) hypothesis are reported in the Tables 8 and 9.28 Again, the
rows referring to the significance of interaction terms are highlighted in gray. The
estimated coefficients for the interaction between private market adjustment and the
EMU dummy are almost entirely insignificant. This suggests that EMU had virtually
no influence on the impact of private adjustment on current account balances. Only
if the degree of market adjustment is measured by the RCA variable, the interaction
terms (column 48, Table 8, and column 60, Table 9) become significant and reveal a
negative sign, indicating that the effectiveness of increasing share of high technology
goods to improve current accounts has dropped since the start of the EMU. That might
28As the Fraser Index is available at annual frequency not earlier than from 2000 on, we can, again,
only provide estimation results for structural unemployment and social benefits.
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be a hint, that price competition has become more important since start of the EMU.
These weak results gained for private market adjustment are in strong contrast to those
based on the degree of structural reforms, at least if the latter is proxied by structural
unemployment. The coefficients for the interaction of structural unemployment with
the EMU dummy are clearly negative and mostly significant. This suggests that in
some cases since the start of EMU the effectiveness of structural reforms to improve
current accounts declined in most euro area countries. This could indicate that - as
was often argued with respect to EMU - the so-called up-front costs of structural re-
forms might be larger within a currency union. This holds especially in large, relatively
closed countries for which changes in the nominal exchange rate are not so effective
in alleviating the necessary “crowding-in” effect. Removing restrictions in financial
markets tend to stimulate demand more than labour market reforms and hence allow
an easier and quicker “crowding-in” of reforms (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006, 6-7).
However, using the social benefit variable instead of structural unemployment as a
proxy of structural reforms, the estimated coefficients of the interaction term reveal
a positive sign but at low significance levels. This conveys weak evidence in favour
of a higher effectiveness of structural reforms after the start of EMU in fostering the
adjustment of trade balances (Table 9, column 41). Seen on the whole, however, the
evidence of either a positive or a negative impact of EMU on the effectiveness of reforms
in improving current account balances appears to be overall weak.
2.4.4 Robustness checks
In macroeconomic applications with a low number of cross-sections a finite sample
problem emerges: the estimation results based on the System-GMM estimator might
depend on the specific choice of instruments. Therefore, we check our results as a com-
plement by means of bias-corrected dynamic fixed effect least square dummy variable
estimations (LSDV) with a boot-strap variance-covariance matrix (Bruno, 2005). This
method uses the Anderson-Hsiao estimator to correct biased standard errors to avoid
the Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). This method might lead to a potentially better finite-
sample performance than the System-GMM estimator used in the previous section.
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As examples, we display the corresponding results for the Fraser Summary Index in Ta-
ble 10 and for social benefits in Tables 11 and 12.29 Overall, the LSDV results confirm
our results gained using the System-GMM estimation procedure (see Tables 2, 5, and
7). The signs of the estimated coefficients generally remain the same. While private
market adjustment seems to have virtually no impact on current account balances, rel-
ative structural reforms, in contrast, tend to improve the bilateral trade balance. The
substitutive relationship between structural reforms and market adjustment is only
weakly confirmed by this estimation procedure. Finally, we again find little evidence of
an interaction between structural reforms or market adjustment with the EMU dummy.
Hence, we do not report these results.
Second, we check for nonlinearities in the effect of structural reforms on the current
account balance. Thereby, we use squared values of the empirical realisations of our
structural reform variable.30 Non-linearities might emerge either because the underly-
ing relationships are non-linear (the so-called “Calmfors-Driffill hump” (Calmfors et al.,
1998, Belke et al., 2006b, Duval and Elmeskov, 2006, Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005))
because of the possibility that a given reform may have different impact on labour mar-
kets depending on the initial policy stance in the area considered (Duval and Elmeskov,
2006, 13) or because the sequencing of goods and labor market reforms plays a signif-
icant role (policy complementarity, Alesina et al. (2008). Another rationale might be
that some factors, such as capital and labor, may face non-linear adjustment costs and
irreversibilities in case of no reforms and, hence, reforms - by lowering fixed costs of
adjustment - also lead to non- linear effects and reform shifts may take various periods
to affect current account imbalances. By using the Fraser Index values or social bene-
fits as indicator for structural reforms, the coefficients of the structural reform and the
private adjustment variables and their squares are not statistically significant at con-
ventional critical values. However, coefficients for structural reforms become significant
if we use structural unemployment as proxy for structural reforms. That indicates a
non-linear relationship between structural unemployment and current account balances
(Table 13). As the interaction terms are overall not significant, we do not report the
29Our results based on equations containing the Fraser labour market sub-index and the variable
“structural unemployment” as an indicator of structural reforms confirm our results gained earlier
with System-GMM and are available on request.
30Figures are squared. However, the sign remains the same to keep the relationship.
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respective tables.
Third, we add the bilateral change in GDP per capita as a control variable. By this,
we account for the wealth effect on the current account balance as proposed by the
inter-temporal current account approach (see section 2.3.1). According to the lat-
ter, low-income countries are associated with current account deficits and high-income
countries with current account surpluses. A relative increase in GDP per capita should
therefore lead to an improved current account. Tables 14 and 15 provide the results of
the System-GMM estimations of the GDP (per capita) augmented equation to test our
hypotheses one and two for the case of structural unemployment as our macroeconomic
proxy of structural reform. Again, this estimation specification confirms our baseline
results. However, any significance of interaction effects between structural reforms and
market adjustment disappears. Relative GDP per capita is in general insignificant,
a result which casts some doubt on its role in explaining the intra-euro area current
account balances observed more recently within the euro area.
Table 10: Corrected LSDV Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment
and structural reforms (Fraser summary index) on bilateral trade balances (2001-2006)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 61 62 63 64 65 66
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 1.966***
adjustment compensation rate (0.268)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.008
(0.008)
∆ productivity -0.002
(0.005)
∆ labour capital -0.139***
substitution (0.020)
∆ FDI 0.007*
(0.002)
∆ RCA 0.002***
(0.000)
structural ∆ Fraser Index 0.126*** 0.112* 0.115*** 0.094*** 0.070 0.099***
reforms (summary index) (0.007) (0.061) (0.030) (0.028) (0.070) (0.029)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.069*** -0.072** -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.018 -0.067***
variables (t-1) (0.008) (0.033) (0.011) (0.009) (0.031) (0.004)
trade balance -0.546*** -0.545*** -0.546*** -0.556*** -0.783*** -0.596***
(t-1) (0.011) (0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.030) (0.013)
∆ private consumption -0.035*** -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
∆ export prices 0.008*** 0.007 0.009** 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)
model N 660 660 660 660 640 562
specification
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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Table 11: Corrected LSDV Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment
and social benefits on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 67 68 69 70 71 72
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 0.196
adjustment compensation rate (0.354)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.001)
∆ productivity 0.000
(0.000)
∆ labour capital -0.026**
substitution (0.013)
∆ FDI 0.003**
(0.001)
∆ RCA 0.000
(0.001)
structural ∆ (-1)*social benefits 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.020 0.061*** 0.027***
reforms (0.012) (0.005) (0.014) (0.027) (0.004) (0.005)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.060*** -0.103***
variables (t-1) (0.011) (0.002) (0.017) (0.019) (0.006) (0.017)
trade balance -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.135*** -0.327*** -0.179***
(t-1) (0.022) (0.006) (0.018) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010)
∆ private consumption -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.023***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
∆ export prices 0.008* 0.008*** 0.008** 0.009** 0.017*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.026* -0.029*** -0.029** -0.029** -0.052*** -0.023***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007)
model N 1652 1730 1730 1730 1396 1512
specification
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
Table 12: Corrected LSDV Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and social
benefits on bilateral trade balances including an interaction term (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 73 74 75 76 77 78
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 0.192
adjustment compensation rate (0.162)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.001)
∆ productivity 0.000
(0.000)
∆ labour capital -0.026**
substitution (0.011)
∆ FDI 0.003***
(0.001)
∆ RCA 0.000
(0.000)
structural ∆ (-1)*social benefits 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.020 0.061*** 0.026***
reforms (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.023) (0.011) (0.003)
interaction (market adjustment* -0.299*** -0.002 -0.001 0.011 -0.002*** 0.000
term structural reforms) (0.082) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024) (0.000) (0.035)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.107*** -0.109*** -0.060*** 0.103***
variables (t-1) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
trade balance -0.138*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.328*** -0.179***
(t-1) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.010) (0.022)
∆ private consumption -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 0.024*** -0.027*** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
∆ export prices 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.017*** 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.006)
EMU dummy -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.050*** -0.023***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008)
model N 1652 1730 1730 1730 1396 1512
specification
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
63
Table 13: Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and non-linear
structural unemployment on bilateral trade balances (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 79 80 81 82 83 84
market ∆ (-1)*nominal -0.388*
adjustment compensation rate (0.205)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.000
(0.002)
∆ productivity 0.000
(0.003)
∆ labour capital -0.008
substitution (0.012)
∆ FDI 0.001
(0.001)
∆ RCA -0.001
(0.001)
structural ∆ (-1)*structural 0.020* 0.025* 0.026** 0.029*** 0.036 0.014
reforms unemployment2 (0.012) (0.13) (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.011)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.138* -0.188** 0.150* 0.188* -0.213*** -0.245***
variables (t-1) (0.079) (0.083) (0.087) (0.085) (0.070) (0.071)
trade balance 0.017 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.020 0.057***
(t-1) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017)
∆ private consumption -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
∆ export prices 0.005** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EMU dummy -0.010 -0.018 -0.019 -0.020 -0.035* -0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011)
constant 0.002 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.022 0.008
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 26 26 26 26 26 26
AR (2) 0.968 0.656 0.898 0.871 0.161 0.417
Hansen (p-value) 0.582 0.189 0.307 0.309 0.071 0.281
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
Table 14: Regression results: impacts of private market adjustment and structural
unemployment on bilateral trade balances and testing for GDP per capita (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 85 86 87 88 89 90
market ∆ (-1)*nominal 0.035
adjustment compensation rate (0.432)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.002
(0.004)
∆ productivity 0.008
(0.007)
∆ labour capital 0.010
substitution (0.023)
∆ FDI 0.009
(0.006)
∆ RCA 0.001
(0.001)
structural ∆ (-1)*structural 0.050* 0.040** 0.071*** 0.071** 0.061 0.003
reforms unemployment (0.026) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.064) (0.025)
macro ∆ trade balance 0.101 0.088 0.040 0.113 0.214 0.033
variables (t-1) (0.137) (0.133) (0.141) (0.155) (0.147) (0.181)
trade balance 0.037* 0.030** 0.038*** 0.039** 0.003 0.055***
(t-1) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.018)
∆ private consumption -0.014* -0.004 -0.013* -0.012 -0.010 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
∆ export prices 0.006 0.010* 0.006 0.010 0.029*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006)
∆ GDP per capita -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.015 -0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.009)
EMU dummy -0.005 -0.016 -0.004 -0.009 -0.035* -0.017
(0.011 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011)
constant 0.003 0.015* 0.007 0.010 0.025 0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.007)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 23 23 23 23 23 23
AR (2) 0.424 0.426 0.504 0.388 0.289 0.523
Hansen (p-value) 0.282 0.450 0.554 0.543 0.393 0.241
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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Table 15: Regression results: impacts of market adjustment and structural unemploy-
ment on bilateral trade balances including an interaction term and testing for GDP
per capita (1992-2007)
dependent: ∆ bilateral trade balance
# 91 92 93 94 95 96
market ∆ (-1)*nominal -0.396**
adjustment compensation rate (0.195)
∆ (-1)*unit labour costs 0.001
(0.002)
∆ productivity -0.000
(0.004)
∆ labour capital -0.011
substitution (0.012)
∆ FDI 0.001
(0.001)
∆ RCA -0.001
(0.000)
structural ∆ (-1)*structural 0.047* 0.038* 0.054*** 0.045** 0.080* 0.013
reforms unemployment (0.028) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.043) (0.018)
interaction (market adjustment* -0.333 -0.002 -0.001 -0.016 0.003 0.001
term structural reforms) (0.343) (0.002) (0.005) (0.015) (0.004) (0.001)
macro ∆ trade balance -0.171** -0.178** -0.176** -0.195*** -0.214*** -0.237***
variables (t-1) (0.070) (0.076) (0.069) (0.071) (0.074) (0.071)
trade balance 0.017 0.023* 0.020 0.023* 0.012 0.055***
(t-1) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.016)
∆ private consumption -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
∆ export prices 0.006** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
∆ GDP per capita 0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
EMU dummy -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.051** -0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.009)
constant 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.037** 0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.187) (0.007)
model N 1643 1720 1720 1720 1396 1502
specification instruments 34 34 34 34 34 34
AR (2) 0.730 0.697 0.711 0.607 0.164 0.471
Hansen (p-value) 0.316 0.403 0.502 0.307 0.060 0.725
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
2.5 Economic policy implications
This paper has assessed the adjustment process in the euro area in the light of rising
intra-euro area current account balances. For this purpose, we investigated in particu-
lar the impact of structural reforms and private market adjustment on intra-euro area
balances. Our estimation results for euro area countries confirm only in some cases a
small significant impact of private market adjustment on bilateral trade balances. In
contrast, structural reforms overall tend to improve intra-euro area current accounts,
with labour market flexibility turning out to be a crucial determinant in this process.
Hence, we clearly confirm the empirical results of Kennedy and Sløk (2005) as well as
Bertola and Lo Prete (2009) for the euro area and have to reject the hypothesis that
structural reforms will first lead to a worsening of the current accounts balance. We
also find substitutive relationships among market adjustment and structural reforms.
The latter imply that, without structural reforms, private market adjustment such as
relative wage cuts is necessary to improve current accounts. However, there is some
evidence that in euro area countries the effectiveness of structural reforms to foster the
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adjustment of current accounts has diminished since the start of EMU.
Overall, thus, our empirical results strongly support the potential benefits of struc-
tural labour market reforms in countries with large intra-euro area current account
deficits. Referring to our empirical results, we therefore tend to join Gros (2009) and
Gros et al. (2005) and argue in contrast to de Grauwe (2009c,d) that the only way out
of the dilemma is to stick to the reform path already taken by the stronger reformer
countries as, e.g. Germany, within the euro area. It is apparent that Germany is the
country least affected by the crisis in Europe. The German export led model might
not have prevented (possibly only temporarily) a sharp fall in GDP, but it seems to
have provided a much more stable background for its consumers and workers than the
housing bubble led economies of, for instance, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Obviously,
the countries suffering most durably from the financial and economic crisis are those
which relied too much on private and public debt in order to stimulate domestic de-
mand. But, as the recent experience with Greece has clearly shown, the chickens come
home to roost and those countries are presented the bill which, however, most probably
will be passed on to other EU countries as well. Hence, re-gaining competitiveness is
certainly no zero-sum game for Europe, especially with an eye on sound public finances,
technological progress, innovation and general competitiveness vis-a´-vis the rest of the
world (Borbe´ly, 2006).
Given the substantial intra-euro area current account imbalances, reforms should be
implemented as soon and steady as possible. The necessary adjustment process will
be painful but then pass through to a timely economic recovery and less long-term
unemployment. The alternative would be a long-lasting period of high and painful un-
employment as experienced by Germany after its reunification. In this context, reform
pressure and enacting reforms are unlikely to lead to a race to the bottom with respect
to wage cuts, leading to a deflationary spiral. Instead, intra-euro area current account
balances would diminish and the international competitiveness of Europe as a whole
would rise, as the competition among wage setters and politicians is reinforced. This
in turn could also strengthen, for instance, the role of the euro as a reserve currency
vis-a´-vis the dollar. Moreover, this scenario neither calls for further steps towards po-
litical union nor for a coordination or centralization of wage policies at a supranational
level. Finally, it clarifies that any notion of a European Economic Government should
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include the fight against euro area internal imbalances and to go for fiscal consolida-
tion. Political union which turns to be a transfer union would be counter-productive
- not least because in this case, the former hard-currency countries would finally leave
the euro area.
Sustaining wage rigidities in under-performing euro area countries in order to stimu-
late domestic demand would not prevent these countries from turning into deflation.
Instead, it would finally lead to lower domestic demand and higher current account
balances within the euro area by destroying domestic employment. This, in turn, is
likely to strengthen economic nationalism and therefore the likelihood of a break-up
of the euro area. The recent example of Greece is highly illuminating in this respect.
Hence, in order to safeguard the European integration process, we should believe in
markets (again) and put the emphasis of our political efforts on shaping incentives to
enact structural reforms.
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Appendix - Data Sources
Table 16: Data availability and data sources
Data Source
FDI IMF, IFS.
GDP OECD, Economic Outlook Database and
IMF, World Economic Outlook Database.
GDP per capita IMF, World Economic Outlook Database.
INV OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
labour-capital substitution European Commission, AMECO Database.
structural unemployment European Commission, AMECO Database.
nominal compensation rate OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
private consumption OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
productivity OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
social benefits OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
bilateral trade balances, OECD, ITCS International Trade by Commodities
trade data for RCA Statistics, Rev. 3, Vol. 2007 Release 1.
export price inflation OECD, Economic Outlook Database.
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric International Risk Sharing and Labour
Market Flexibility in the Euro Area
Abstract This paper analyses the implications of diverging intra-euro area current
account balances on consumption smoothing via the capital markets in the euro area.
It can be shown that the asymmetry in foreign asset and liability holdings increases
consumption volatility, in particular in net debtor countries, compared to a symmetric
case. A panel econometric analysis for the euro area confirms this hypothesis. Hence,
income and consumption stabilization via the capital market is limited in the euro
area. This implies that more labour market deregulation is necessary in the euro area
in order to facilitate a labour market based adjustment of prices and wages in the face
of asymmetric shocks.
3.1 Introduction
Labour market flexibility is essential in a monetary union that real exchange rates
can realign after an asymmetric shock (Mundell, 1961). According to Mundell (1973)
and Belke and Baumga¨rtner (2002) capital markets and fiscal policy can substitute
for labour market flexibility and mitigate income and consumption volatility in the
face of an asymmetric shock. As labour markets have remained rigid in the euro area
(European Commission, 2008, 2010, Zemanek, 2010) and fiscal policy is constrained
by high public deficits and debt levels, the euro area seems to have to rely mainly on
macroeconomic stabilization via capital markets, the so-called international (financial)
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risk sharing (European Commission, 2008).31
In the last decade, persistent unidirectional intra-euro area capital flows from north-
ern European countries to southern European countries have led to an accumulation
of foreign assets in the saving surplus countries, in particular in Germany. In con-
trast, Greece, Portugal and Spain accumulated large stocks of foreign liabilities. This
asymmetric foreign asset and liability distribution created an asymmetric international
risk sharing pattern, where only few euro area countries benefit from international risk
sharing (while others have to pay for it). The aim of this paper is to shed theoretically
and empirically light on asymmetric international risk sharing pattern in the financial
markets of the euro area.
International risk sharing via financial markets was first proposed by Mundell (1973)
as an automatic stabilization mechanism in a monetary union. Mundell (1973) ar-
gued that a monetary union would accelerate capital market integration by stimulat-
ing international cross-border capital asset holdings. Portfolio diversification provides
a risk sharing mechanism between countries as income and consumption effects of an
asymmetric shock or adverse business cycles are compensated by alternating foreign
and domestic capital income and capital valuation. Consumption in the participating
countries is smoothed over time.
To allow for an equal consumption smoothing in countries of a monetary union, the
approach implicitly assumes a symmetric distribution of cross-border assets and liabili-
ties. However, in contemporary Europe the German stock of net foreign assets and the
large stocks of net foreign liabilities in southern Europe question the assumption of the
textbook risk sharing via financial markets. Therefore, we augment the international
risk sharing approach by an asymmetric foreign asset and liability distribution, which
is an important innovation for the literature on international risk sharing.
Our empirical analysis follows the literature testing for international risk sharing. Atke-
son and Bayoumi (1993) as well as Melitz and Zumer (1999) have tested international
risk sharing within the US and between OECD countries to draw implications for the
31Following the literature, we use the term international risk sharing as a synonym for business
cycle stabilization via capital markets (Sørensen et al., 2007, Kose et al., 2007).
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European Monetary Union (EMU). Later research on international risk sharing has
analysed its determinants, such as financial globalisation (Sørensen et al., 2007, Kose
et al., 2007, Stavrev, 2007, Demyanyk et al., 2008). We show that an asymmetric for-
eign asset and liability distribution reduces the degree of international risk sharing in
the euro area, in particular for countries with large net foreign liabilities.
3.2 Capital flows and asymmetric foreign assets and
liability distribution in the euro area
3.2.1 Intra-euro area capital flows
While Germany has experienced rising current account surpluses against euro area
countries since the introduction of the euro up to the recent crisis, other countries such
as Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal have perpetuated large current account deficits
(European Commission, 2010, Zemanek et al., 2010). Divergent current account bal-
ances within the euro area reflect private intra-euro area capital flows from surplus
countries to deficit countries. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) labelled intra-euro area
capital flows the end of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Instead of savings being invested
domestically as found by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), savings were invested abroad
in countries with the largest expected marginal return on capital.
The European integration process can be seen as one main driver of rising intra-euro
area asset and liability positions. Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal have taken ad-
vantage of improved access to the European financial market following the creation of
EMU. The expected rate of return for investments increased in these countries while
short-term and long-term interest rates converged towards low German rates since the
mid 1990s (Fagan and Gaspar, 2007, Mendoza et al., 2007). Macroeconomic conditions
in southern Europe improved due to EMU economic convergence rules and the aboli-
tion of exchange rate risk for lenders and borrowers. Borrowing constraints declined as
a result of financial deepening and accelerating intra-euro area capital flows (de Santis
and Lu¨hrmann, 2006).
Differences in real GDP growth between euro area countries enhanced intra-euro area
capital flows (de Santis and Lu¨hrmann, 2006). Whereas the average annual real GDP
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growth rate for the years 1999-2008 was 1.5 percent for Germany, Spain grew on aver-
age by 3.5 percent, Greece by almost 4 percent and Ireland by 5.5 percent. Modigliani
(1970) argued that private saving rises with growing income suggesting rising capital
outflows from a country with high GDP growth, such as Spain or Ireland. However, in
line with the theories of Tobin (1967) and Summers (1981), Spanish and Irish citizen
might have anticipated or expected continuing future income growth and therefore have
increased present consumption and investment in exchange for future income. High rel-
ative GDP growth then goes along with capital inflows to finance present consumption
and investment, as observed for capital flows from Germany to Greece or Spain.
Finally, intra-euro area capital flows have been accelerated by the common monetary
policy (Schnabl and Zemanek, 2011). Fuelled by ECB interest rate cuts, buoyant cap-
ital inflows and excessive credit growth in the private sector fuelled housing and con-
struction booms in Spain and Ireland and consumption booms in Greece and Portugal
(European Commission, 2010). For instance, wage growth in the construction sector
exceeded productivity gains by far in Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Greece and France (Ze-
manek, 2010). Wage increases in the service sector, strongly rising public sector wages
and pro-cyclical fiscal policy boosted national inflation in these countries above the
euro area average. In contrast, Germany and other euro area saving surplus countries
experienced low inflation rates which held average euro area inflation close to the ECB’s
target value of two percent. The single nominal interest rate for the euro area in com-
bination with dispersing national inflation rates (and inflation expectations) created
too low real interest rates in high inflation countries and too high real interest rates in
low inflation countries (Sturm and Wollmersha¨user, 2008). In addition, interest rate
cuts beyond the natural rate increased credit growth (Hoffmann and Schnabl, 2011).
The development of (ex-post32) real interest rates of euro area countries and the ECB
marginal lending rate are shown in Figure 11.33 Germany, which had had the lowest
real interest rates of euro area countries before 1999, has exhibited high real interest
rates relatively to other euro area countries since the start of the EMU in 1999. In
contrast, countries with high real interest rates before 1999 saw a strong decline, such
as Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy. Given a negative relationship between real in-
32Ex-post real interest rates are calculated based on realized CPI inflation rates. In contrast, ex-ante
real interest rates are calculated based on inflation expectations.
33To keep the figure clear, only major contributing countries are selected.
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terest rates and growth, the common monetary policy triggered asymmetric business
cycles in the euro area. Germany became the “sick man of Europe” during the early
years of EMU, while Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and France experienced
significant higher real GDP growth, prolonging unidirectional intra-euro area capital
flows. That becomes visible in Figure 12, which shows the divergence of intra-euro
area trade account balances.34
Figure 11: Ex-post real interest rates of Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain
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3.2.2 Asymmetric foreign asset and liability distribution in
the euro area
After a decade of unidirectional capital flows, the result has been not only the di-
vergence of intra-euro area current account balances, but also an uneven distribution
of net foreign asset and foreign liability positions in the euro area. Capital exporting
countries, in particular Germany, have built up large net foreign assets or reduced their
net foreign liabilities (such as Finland). In contrast, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ire-
land, and France have substantially increased net foreign debt. This becomes evident
34Figure 12 shows bilateral trade balances, as bilateral data are not available for current accounts
or financial accounts.
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Figure 12: Intra-euro area trade account balances
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
in Table 17 which shows the net international investment positions (IIP) in percent of
GDP for the EMU 12 countries since 1998. Germany, the Netherlands and Finland
are those countries, which have seen a significant rise of their net IIP since 1998, with
Germany, Netherlands and Luxembourg having relatively large net asset positions.
Although data on IIP include investment in and from countries other than EMU 12
countries, they provide first evidence for an asymmetric foreign asset and liability dis-
tribution in the euro area.35 Data on foreign bank claims by the Bank for International
Settlement36 confirm an asymmetric foreign asset and liability distribution. Figure 13
shows net outstanding liabilities of Spanish banks in Germany in relation to Spanish
GDP. Until 2004, net liabilities remained relatively stable. However, since then, Ger-
man banks have intensively accumulated claims in Spain, outrunning claims of Spanish
Banks in Germany. The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 stopped and reversed
the trend. This asymmetric distribution of foreign assets and liabilities across the euro
area has affected the ability of the euro area to absorb asymmetric shocks.
35Data on IIP against single countries are not available.
36BIS Quarterly Review, Table 9B: Consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks - immediate
borrower basis, December 2010. Data on ultimate risk basis are only available from 2005.
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Table 17: Net international investment position in percent of GDP of EMU 12 countries
1998 2002 2008 ∆ 1998-2008∗
Austria -19.6 -21.1 -14.4 5.2
Belgium 38.7 41.3 31.4 -7.3
Finland -76.9 -40.6 -4.1 72.7
France 9.0 3.0 -18.1 -27.1
Germany 0.4 5.6 25.3 24.9
Greece -26.9 -58.8 -69.7 -42.8
Ireland -20.0 -54.1 -34.1
Italy -1.6 -5.9 -20.2 -18.6
Luxembourg 79.1 75.0 -4.1
Netherlands -3.8 -27.0 10.5 14.3
Portugal -25.0 -62.5 -91.9 -67.0
Spain -21.6 -46.8 -75.7 -54.1
Source: Datastream, 2010. Note: ∗ Percentage points, difference for Ireland and Luxembourg 2002-
2008. The euro countries Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia are not considered as they
are EMU members for a too short time period.
Figure 13: Net outstanding liabilities of Spanish banks in Germany
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3.3 Asymmetric international risk sharing in the
euro area
3.3.1 Shock adjustment in a monetary union and international
risk sharing
The fixation of nominal exchange rates and a common monetary policy in a monetary
union shift the burden of adjustment to asymmetric shocks or economic development
to the real exchange rate. In this process the adjustment channel is the labour mar-
ket as Mundell (1961) put forward in his seminal paper on optimum currency areas.
Mundell (1961) argued that labour markets need to be flexible in a monetary union
to assure that wages and prices can adjust and real exchange rates align in the case
of an asymmetric shock. First, wages can be the adjustment channel. In a country
which is affected by a negative asymmetric demand shock and rising unemployment,
wages need to decrease to lower the price level. This is ceteris paribus equivalent to
a real depreciation against all other countries of the monetary union. Additionally,
rising wages in the country affected by the positive asymmetric shock contribute to a
real exchange rate appreciation, which moderates the boom.
Second, labour force can migrate from a country affected by a negative asymmetric
shock to the booming economy with labour shortage. That would increase labour sup-
ply in the booming country while labour supply in the recession country falls. This
process re-equilibrates the labour markets in both countries. The respective adjust-
ment of wages fosters a business cycle convergence. However, labour market flexibility,
i.e. (downward) wage flexibility and labour mobility, remains low in Europe (Bayoumi
and Eichengreen, 1992, European Commission, 2008, 2010). Thus, euro area labour
markets and euro area real exchange rates cannot properly readjust in the case of asym-
metric shocks. This poses the question concerning alternative stabilizing mechanisms
to smooth income and consumption over time in the presence of asymmetric shocks or
idiosynchratic business cycles.
First, fiscal policy can compensate for reduced (increased) private spending by more
(less) public spending in a recession (boom) (Belke and Baumga¨rtner, 2002, von Hagen
and Wyplosz, 2008). Fiscal policy could be organized either on national or suprana-
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tional level (see Chapter 4). A supra-national fiscal policy would lead to an quasi-
automatic business cycle smoothing. However, the competence for fiscal policy has
remained with national governments in the euro area (European Commission, 1993)
and high public deficits and public debt levels after the crisis limit the scope for ex-
pansive fiscal policy in the face of recession. Therefore, the use of fiscal policies to
counterbalance asymmetric shocks is constrained in the euro area.
Intra-industry trade can be a second (automatic) stabilization mechanism. Given
strong intra-industry trade linkages, booming countries import additional consump-
tion and investment goods from the recession country where domestic demand is low
and spare capacities are available. Rising exports compensate for declining domestic
demand. In fact, buoyant German exports contributed to German growth and com-
pensated for low domestic investment and consumption prior to the crisis. However,
differences in product specialisation or technology or aspects of non-price competitive-
ness such as different product quality question the capacity of intra-industry trade to
absorb asymmetric shocks in the euro area (European Central Bank, 2005, Baumann
and di Mauro, 2007).37
A third stabilizing mechanism can be capital markets within a monetary union as dis-
cussed by Mundell (1973) in his late research on optimum currency areas. Mundell
argued that cross-country capital asset holdings38 will increase in a monetary union,
supported by capital market integration, as the devaluation risk of nominal exchanges
rates disappears (McKinnon, 2000). If each country is holding claims on output of all
other members of a monetary union, asymmetric shocks or adverse business cycles will
be commonly shared by anti-cyclically fluctuating capital income and capital valua-
tion. Income effects of asymmetric shocks and adverse business cycles are mitigated
and consumption is smoothed over time in all countries of a monetary union.
In general, this international risk sharing mechanism by Mundell (1973) has two chan-
nels through which consumption is smoothed in the case of an asymmetric shock. First,
investment income is a direct channel. Dividends or profits surge in a boom, while they
37In the context of international trade, the role of multi-national corporations may affect the risk-
sharing effects, as intra-firm trade accounts for an increasing share of international trade (OECD,
2010).
38Capital assets are bonds, equities, real estates as well as bank credit.
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shrink in a recession. In a boom (recession), a country has to pay more (less) dividends
on its foreign liabilities, but receives less (more) investment income from its investments
in the recession (boom) country. Second, capital valuations are an indirect income dis-
tribution channel. In a boom (recession), equity, bond and real estate prices rise (fall)
in their value. An investor’s portfolio with domestic and foreign assets will not change
in value if rising (falling) prices of foreign assets compensate falling (rising) prices of
domestic assets. The wealth effect of business cycle fluctuations on consumption is
smoothed over time.
The concept of consumption smoothing can be visualised by a numerical example. We
assume a monetary union of two countries which are of equal size, called Spain and
Germany with the same initial output of 100 units. Both countries hold foreign as-
sets of each other at the value of 200 percent of the respective other country’s output.
Thus, foreign assets are each 200 units worth. The annual interest rate of these assets
is assumed to be 10 percent. If there is no asymmetric shock or adverse business cy-
cle, net investment income, payable (20 units) and receivable (20 units), cancel out in
both countries. If we assume that consumption consists of output and net investment
income, consumption will be 100 in each country.
Now, we assume adverse business cycles. In the case of a recession in Spain (output
falls to 98), while Germany is in a boom (output rises to 102), Spanish assets in Ger-
many will rise in value and profits are supposed to rise. German assets in Spain are
devalued and profits decline. For simplicity, we assume that the value of foreign assets
changes by the same rate as the output in the country where they are invested. The
interest rate is assumed to remain constant. Therefore, Germany will only receive an
investment income of 19.6 units on its assets of 196 units in Spain and Spain will get
an investment income of 20.4 units on its assets of 204 units invested in Germany.
Net investment income of Germany becomes negative, as it pays net 0.8 units to Spain.
Therefore, German consumption is only 101.2 (output 102 minus 0.8) compared to its
output of 102. In contrast, Spanish consumption of 98.8 is larger than its current out-
put of 98 due to its net investment income of 0.8 units. Germany implicitly transfers
some of its additional income in the boom to Spain. In contrast, Germany would re-
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ceive net investment income, if we assume a reversed business cycle situation.
The consumption smoothing effect of a symmetric international risk sharing, where
both countries hold the same share of foreign assets (net foreign assets are zero), is
equal for both countries. While, in our example, output fluctuates by 4 units between
boom (102) and recession (98), consumption in both countries alternates only 2.4 units
(98.8 - 101.2). The relative output volatility is 4 percent of trend output (100) while
consumption volatility is only 2.4 percent of trend consumption (100). Thus, symmet-
ric international risk sharing reduces the impact of asymmetric output shocks as well as
unsynchronized business cycles, at least partly, and smoothes consumption over time.
Table 18 summarizes the results for a symmetric international risk sharing. Absolute
volatility indicates the change of output or consumption over the business cycle in
units, while relative volatility gives the change relative to the trend.
Table 18: Symmetric international risk sharing, numerical example
Output Consumption
Spain Germany
Boom 102 101.2 101.2
Recession 98 98.8 98.8
Absolute volatility 4 2.4 2.4
Relative volatility (% of trend) 4% 2.4% 2.4%
Note: Germany and Spain hold assets of each other, worth 200 percent of GDP. Annual yield is
assumed to be 10 percent. Values are units of GDP or consumption, if not labeled otherwise.
This international risk sharing argument was one argument in favour of the monetary
union in Europe during the discussion prior to EMU (European Commission, 1990).
It advocated the optimistic view that EMU would lead to more integration in the euro
area capital markets, which would endogenously reduce the negative effects of adverse
business cycles or asymmetric shocks (European Commission, 1990, Frankel and Rose,
1998). This argument has also been put forward by the European Commission at the
beginning of the current crisis (European Commission, 2008).
3.3.2 Asymmetric international risk sharing
The textbook case of international risk sharing by Mundell (1973) implicitly assumes
a symmetric cross-country holding of financial assets. However, as we have shown in
80
section 3.2.2, intra-euro area capital flows have led to a substantial asymmetry in for-
eign asset and liability distribution. Thus, international risk sharing in the EMU has
become asymmetric.
To analyse the effects of asymmetric international risk sharing, we set up a model
of consumption smoothing for a two-country monetary union with variable shares of
foreign assets. Business cycles of both countries are assumed to be perfectly adverse.
Consumption in both countries (which are indicated by subscript 1 and 2) is based
on output Y and net investment income, only. We abstract from long-term output
growth and saving. During a boom (denoted by superscript B), output will increase by
Y B − Y 0 above the trend (denoted by superscript 0) and falls in a recession (denoted
by superscript R) by Y 0 − Y R below trend output. If both countries have foreign
assets, the international risk sharing mechanism will distribute output between both
countries. First, each country has capital income from its foreign assets in the other
country. Capital income depends on yield r and the size of its foreign assets, measured
as share a of foreign output with a > 0. For instance, capital income for country 1 is
ra1Y2. Second, countries have to pay interest on foreign liabilities, which for country
1 is equivalent to ra2Y1. Therefore, consumption C in country 1 in a boom can be
expressed in our simplified model as:
CB1 = Y
0
1 +
(
Y B1 − Y 01
)
+ a1rY
R
2 − a2rY B1 (20)
and in a recession:
CR1 = Y
0
1 +
(
Y R1 − Y 01
)
+ a1rY
B
2 − a2rY R1 (21)
Assuming r to be equal over the business cycle simplifies the model without changing
the interpretation.
We calculate the consumption volatility over the business cycle relative to trend con-
sumption C
B−CR
C0
= ∆C
B−R
C0
to analyse the consumption smoothing effect based on
equations (20 and 21) which yields for country 1:
∆CB−R1
C01
=
[(
Y 01 +
(
Y B1 − Y 01
)
+ a1rY
R
2 − a2rY B1
)− (Y 01 + (Y R1 − Y 01 ) + a1rY B2 − a2rY R1 )]
Y 01 + a1rY
0
2 − a2rY 01
(22)
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Assuming for simplicity that both countries have the same size and business cycles
(Y B1 = Y
B
2 , Y
R
1 = Y
R
2 , Y
0
1 = Y
0
2 ), and setting Y
B
1 − Y R1 = x, equation (22) reduces to:
∆CB−R1
C01
=
x− xr (a1 + a2)
Y 01 + Y
0
1 r (a1 − a2)
(23)
For country 2, the equation is equivalent. In equation (23) the first part of the nomina-
tor (x) is the absolute domestic income volatility over the business cycle. The second
part rx (a1 + a2) is the redistribution of output between both countries due to interna-
tional risk sharing. The difference between the absolute domestic income volatility and
the redistribution due to changing capital income is the absolute consumption volatil-
ity over the business cycle. Relative consumption volatility, as stated in the equation
(23) depends positively on output variation x, negatively on output variation relative
to trend output x/Y 0, and negatively on the asset yield r. Increasing shares of foreign
asset holdings a1 and a2 reduce relative consumption volatility, and therefore, increase
consumption smoothing.
However, the effects of a1 and a2 on consumption smoothing are different, depending
on the type of the international investment position. This can be shown by calculating
the first derivations of
∆CB−R1
C01
and
∆CB−R2
C02
with respect to a1. The first derivation shows
the effect of a change in country 1’s own stock of foreign assets on its consumption
smoothing. The derivation of
∆CB−R2
C02
with respect to a1 reveals the effects on consump-
tion smoothing in country 2 if country 1 changes its share of foreign assets in country
2’s output (a1). For Y
0
1 = Y
0
2 it holds that:
δ
(
∆CB−R1
C01
)
δa1
<
δ
(
∆CB−R2
C02
)
δa1
(24)
as
− 4rx+ r (4a2rx)
(1− a1r − a2r)2 Y 01
< − r (4a2rx)
(1− a1r − a2r)2 Y 02
(25)
Equation (25) shows that a build-up of net foreign liabilities in either country 1 or
country 2, thus a decrease of either a1 or a2 away from equality, reduces consumption
smoothing in country 1 and country 2. The size of the effect on each country is different
and depends which country has net foreign liabilities as the derivations in equation (25)
are different. For example Spain, country 1, reduces its stock of foreign assets in Ger-
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many (country 2) whose stock remains constant. Thus, a1 falls below a2 constituting a
net liability position for Spain and a net asset position for Germany. International risk
sharing between both countries becomes asymmetric. Given equation (25), Spanish
and German consumption volatility will increase compared to symmetric risk sharing –
consumption smoothing is reduced. The reason is the reduced net investment income.
However, Spanish consumption smoothing will be more reduced relatively to Germany
as Spanish consumption reduces due to a net investment payment to Germany at every
stage of the business cycle. Spanish consumption will become relatively more volatile
than German consumption.
That relationship is displayed in Figure 14, which shows the graphical solution of
equation (23) by using the same values as used for the symmetric example of Table 18:
Y = 100, r = 0.1 and Y B − Y R = x = 2. The y-axis shows the relative consumption
volatility depending on the share of foreign asset holdings of country 1 in country 2 (a1)
at the x-axis and assuming a fixed foreign asset holding of country 2 in country 1 (a2).
The dashed line shows relative consumption volatility for country 1 (CV1) dependent
on a1, given a2 = 2 (IIP of country 2 is 200 percent); the solid line shows relative
consumption volatility for country 2 (CV2) dependent on a1, given a2 = 2. In the case
of symmetric international risk sharing with a1 and a2 being 2 (both countries have an
equal share of foreign assets of 200 percent of foreign output, thus net IIP=0), relative
consumption alternates by 2.4 percent in both countries over the business cycle (point
A), although output fluctuates by 4 percent. Consumption is smoothed to the same
degree in both countries as in Table 18.
However, if country 1 (Spain) has a share of foreign assets of only 50 percent, con-
sumption in country 2 (Germany) will slightly more alternate by 2.6 percent over the
business cycle (point B), compared to the symmetric case. In contrast, Spain’s con-
sumption volatility increases to 3.5 percent (point C), which is close to an output
variation of 4 percent. Table 19 summarizes the results for the asymmetric example.
Overall, asymmetric international risk sharing reduces consumption smoothing in all
countries of a monetary union compared to a symmetric case. However, consumption
volatility in countries with net foreign liabilities rises in particular. At the current
distribution of foreign assets and liabilities as shown in Table 17, Germany is expected
to benefit more from international risk sharing with less volatile consumption than
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southern European countries with high foreign liabilities.
Figure 14: Graphical solution of asymmetric international risk sharing
15 
Figure 4 – Graphical solution of asymmetric international risk sharing 
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Table 3: Asymmetric international risk sharing, numerical example 
Output
Spain Germany
Boom 102 86.5 116.5
Recession 98 83.5 113.5
Absolute volatility 4 3 3
Relative volatility (% of trend) 4% 3.5% 2.6%
Consumption
 
Note: Germany holds Spanish assets worth 200 percent of Spanish GDP. Spain holds German assets worth 50 
percent of German GDP. Annual yield is assumed to be 10 percent. Values are units of GDP or consumption, if 
not labelled otherwise. 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
Based on our analysis in section 3, we test the empirical significance of asymmetric 
international risk sharing and its effect on consumption smoothing in a panel econometric 
framework for the euro area. In this context, we test the following three hypotheses:  
 
1. Consumption smoothing differs significantly between euro area countries, revealing that 
international risk sharing is asymmetric in the euro area.  
CV1 (a2=2) 
CV2 (a2=2) 
a1 
Relative consumption 
volatility in country 1 and 2 
A
B
C
Table 19: Asymmetric international risk sharing, numerical example
Output Consumption
Spain Germany
Boom 102 86.5 116.5
Recession 98 83.5 113.5
Absolute volatility 4 3 3
Relative volatility (% of trend) 4% 3.5% 2.6%
Note: Germany holds Spanish assets worth 200 percent of Spanish GDP. Spain holds German assets
worth 50 percent of German GDP. Annual yield is assumed to be 10 percent. Values are units of GDP
or consumption, if not labelled otherwise.
3.4 Empirical analysis
Based on our analysis in section 3.3, we test the empirical significance of asymmetric in-
ternational risk sharing and its effect on consumption smoothing in a panel econometric
framework for the euro area. In this context, we test the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Consumption smoothing differs significantly between euro area countries,
revealing that international risk sharing is asymmetric in the euro area.
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Hypothesis 2 The foreign asset and liability distribution determines asymmetric inter-
national risk sharing in the euro area.
Hypothesis 3 Asymmetric international risk sharing reduces overall euro area con-
sumption smoothing compared to a symmetric case.
3.4.1 Model and data
The empirical analysis follows Sørensen et al. (2007), Kose et al. (2007) and Stavrev
(2007). International risk sharing is measured by the correlation of GDP growth and
consumption growth of a single country relative to the euro area. The idea is to analyse
how a deviation of a country’s GDP growth from the average GDP growth of the euro
area systematically affects the deviation of consumption growth relative to the euro
area. This can be shown in the following baseline estimation relationship:
(
∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt
)
= β
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
(26)
∆Ci,t is the consumption per capita growth rate, ∆Yi,t is GDP per capita growth rate
for a specific country i in time t.39 The superscript EMU indicates euro area con-
sumption per capita growth or euro area GDP per capita growth, respectively. The
Coefficient β models the value of uninsured risk (Sørensen et al., 2007). Uninsured
risk is defined as the percentage of GDP volatility which is not be smoothed by in-
ternational risk sharing. Therefore, the coefficient β measures inversely consumption
smoothing. If β is zero, the relative deviations of per capita GDP growth in country i
(∆Yi,t−∆Y EMUt ) will not systematically affect relative per capita consumption growth
(∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt ). This case represents perfect consumption smoothing. In reverse, β
will be 1 if there is no consumption smoothing via the capital market. Relative devia-
tions of GDP growth are perfectly correlated with relative deviations in consumption
growth. Hence, β is expected to be in the range of 0 and 1, depending on the degree
of consumption smoothing.
To evaluate hypothesis one, that consumption smoothing differs between euro area
countries, we estimate the following standard panel estimation equation, with βEMU
representing overall uninsured risk for euro area countries, a constant α, country-
39∆Ci,t = ln (Ci,t)− ln (Ci,t−1) and ∆Yi,t = ln (Yi,t)− ln (Yi,t−1)
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specific fixed effects ρi, and the white noise error term µi,t. The coefficient βEMU
indicates average uninsured risk for the euro area:
(
∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt
)
= α + βEMU
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+ ρi + µi,t (27)
To discriminate between country differences in consumption smoothing, we include a
threshold dummy variable Di. Variable Di is a country specific dummy for each country
i, which is 1 for the specific country i and 0 for all other 11 countries.40 Following Melitz
and Zumer (1999) and Sørensen et al. (2007), we split the coefficient βEMU of equation
(27) into a country specific effect and a remaining effect. Thereby, βT,i, with T defining
the threshold dummy approach, is country specific uninsured risk of country i and β1
is the average uninsured risk of all countries but country i:
βEMU = β1 + βT,iDi (28)
Inserting equation (28) into (27) yields:
(
∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt
)
= α + β1
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+ βT,i
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
Di+
+ρi + µi,t
(29)
Equation (29) includes the interaction term
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
Di. The interpretation
of coefficients changes (Hardy, 1993, Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003, 81-82), which allows
to differentiate between single countries while using the explanatory power of the full
data set. The coefficients are interpreted as follows:
• β1 is the value of uninsured risk if Di is zero, yielding the average uninsured risk
for all countries but country i.
• βT,i is the number of units that β1 changes if Di becomes one, thus, the value
of uninsured risk that a country i differs from the average of all countries but
country i.
• The sum β1 + βT,i is the uninsured risk for country i.
40Di are similar to the dummy variables related to country specific fixed effects ρi. However, while
ρi captures the country specific fixed effect related to the constant α, Di indicates the country specific
effect on uninsured risk β.
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Given that interpretation, we cannot reject our first hypothesis that consumption
smoothing differs between euro area countries, if there is a significant coefficient βT,i
for at least one country.
In a similar way, we test the validity of hypothesis two that the foreign asset and
liability distribution determines asymmetric international risk sharing in the euro area.
As no intra-euro area data on foreign assets and liabilities are available, we use the net
international investment position (IIP) in percent of GDP as a proxy for mutual foreign
asset and liability distribution within the euro area. We assume that overall uninsured
risk βEMU in equation (27) is determined by the net IIP (IIPi,t ). Therefore, we again
separate βEMU in one part, which is affected by the net IIP βIIP and the remaining
uninsured risk β2:
βEMU = β2 + βT,iIIPi,t (30)
Inserting equation (30) into (27), the estimation equation becomes:
(
∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt
)
= α + β2
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+
+βIIP
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
IIPi,t + ρi + µi,t
(31)
In this specification, we interact relative GDP growth with the respective net IIP
(IIPi,t). The interpretation of coefficients changes in a similar way as above (Jaccard
and Turrisi, 2003). The coefficient β2 indicates the value of uninsured risk if the net
IIP is zero. This is the level of risk sharing for a hypothetic symmetric foreign asset
and liability distribution IIPi,t = 0. In contrast, βIIP shows whether risk sharing
will be affected by a net IIP unequal zero. According to our analysis in section 3.3,
we expect a negative coefficient βIIP . Net foreign liabilities increase uninsured risk,
reducing a country’s consumption smoothing within the euro area. In contrast, net
foreign assets reduce the uninsured risk. As our sample period includes a substantial
change of net IIPs over time, the average coefficients β2 and βIIP for the full time
period might bias the interpretation. Therefore, we estimate additional to the full
sample (Q1/1996-Q3/2009) several sub-samples. These are a “pre-EMU” sub-sample
(Q1/1996-Q4/1999), an EMU sub-sample (Q1/1999-Q3/2009) and two “late-EMU”
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sub-samples (Q1/2002-Q3/2009) and (Q1/2004-Q2/2009).
We test the validity of hypothesis three that asymmetric risk sharing reduces the over-
all euro area consumption smoothing compared to a symmetric case by comparing
coefficients β of equation (31) and equation (27). While β2 of equation (31) repre-
sents a hypothetic symmetric international risk sharing, βEMU of equation (27) repre-
sents the asymmetric case. We test for statistical significance by using a t-test with
H0 : β2 < βEMU . According to our theoretical analysis, we expect that coefficient
β2 (uninsured risk for a symmetric foreign asset/liability distribution) is significantly
lower than βEMU (uninsured risk for an asymmetric foreign asset/liability distribu-
tion). Additionally, we recursively estimate β2 and βEMU over time and present their
development over time to provide a dynamic picture of consumption smoothing in the
euro area.
The empirical analysis is based on a panel of quarterly data for twelve euro area coun-
tries.41 Our data set covers the period from Q1/1996 to Q3/2009. We exclude Cyprus,
Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia because they have been euro area members for a
short period relative to other countries. No adjustment for seasonality is necessary as
we use year-over-year growth data. As data are not available for the full sample length
for all EMU 12 countries (unbalances panel), the maximum number of observations
is 632. The Appendix shows the data availability for each country. Data sources for
consumption42 and nominal GDP are the Eurostat Database on Quarterly National
Accounts and for population figures the Eurostat Database on Population. The latter
are only available in an annual frequency and are assumed to be stable during the year.
IIP data are compiled from Datastream.
As the euro area includes large and very small countries there is the concern, that euro
area aggregate growth rates of Y EMUt or C
EMU
t are basically driven by large countries.
In that case, consumption smoothing of a small country such as Luxembourg or Portu-
gal can be over- or underestimated. We test for the influence of large countries in our
sample by calculating the correlation coefficients of national consumption and GDP
41The respective countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
42We use final consumption, which includes public consumption. Therefore, we implicitly account
for fiscal policy.
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growth rates with the respective euro area growth rates. These values range from 0.53
to 0.93 for GDP growth and 0.42 to 0.89 for consumption growth. However, those
correlation coefficients of national GDP and consumption growth rates with euro area
GDP and consumption growth rates are only to a low degree correlated with country
size measured by population (the correlation coefficient for GDP is 0.12 and -0.03 for
consumption) as shown in Figures 15 and 16.
Figure 15: Correlation of GDP growth in
country i with EMU 12 GDP growth and
population
Figure 16: Correlation of consumption
growth in country i with EMU 12 con-
sumption growth and population
For all estimations, we estimate a standard least square dummy variable (LSDV ) esti-
mator with country fixed effects, as suggested by the Hausman-Test (Hausman, 1978)
with robust standard errors. Panel unit-root tests (Levin et al., 2002, Maddala and
Wu, 1999, Choi, 2001) reject non-stationarity of the time series (Table 20).
Table 20: Panel Unit Root test results (Q1/1996-Q3/2009)
Panel Unit Root Test
Levin/Lin/ Chu t* ADF-Fisher chi-square PP-Fisher chi-square
Consumption 0.000 0.000 0.000(
∆C − ∆CEMU)
Output 0.000 0.000 0.000(
∆Y − ∆Y EMU)
Interaction term 0.000 0.002 0.000
IIP ∗ (∆Y − ∆Y EMU)
Note: Entries are p-values. Lag selection has been conducted using the modified Hannan-Quinn
criterion, an individual intercept is not allowed. A variation of the lag selection criteria as well as
estimating the regression equation without intercept and trend or without trend does not significantly
change the results.
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3.4.2 Estimation results
Results concerning our hypothesis one based on equation (29), that consumption smooth-
ing differs between euro area countries, are shown in Table 21. Eight out of twelve
coefficients βT,i for country specific threshold dummies reach the common levels of sta-
tistical significance. Therefore, we conclude, that the degree of consumption smoothing
is different in euro area countries. This suggests that international risk sharing is asym-
metric in the euro area. Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria have a sta-
tistically significant positive coefficient βT,i. These countries have a significantly higher
uninsured risk (β1 + βT,i) and a therefore a lower degree of consumption smoothing
than the average of the respective remaining eleven EMU countries (β1). In particular,
for Spain and Italy there is indication for a very low consumption smoothing within
the euro area which could be due to high levels net foreign debt. These countries need
a high degree of labour market flexibility as the international risk sharing does not
smooth income and consumption in the case of asymmetric shocks.
On the other hand, Luxembourg, Finland and Greece have a negative coefficient which
indicates, based on the underlying assumptions, that these countries have a relatively
high consumption smoothing. For Greece the results suggest high consumption smooth-
ing although the country has high net foreign debt. However, results for Greece have to
be interpreted with caution as only 35 observations are available for Greece. Overall,
we cannot reject our hypothesis one.
The results for hypothesis two based on equation (31) that the foreign asset and liability
distribution affects international risk sharing are shown in Table 22 for different time
periods. The coefficients β2, which measures average consumption smoothing for net
IIP=0, decrease over time. That indicates that consumption smoothing between EMU
countries has increased over time. The coefficients βIIP show the impact of the foreign
asset and liability distribution on consumption smoothing. While coefficient βIIP for
the full sample Q1/1996-Q3/2009 (column 14) is not significant, indicating on average
no relevance of the net IIP for consumption smoothing, βIIP is statistical significant in
the pre-EMU sample and all EMU samples. The net IIP has a positive impact on con-
sumption smoothing prior to EMU (column 13), suggesting a consumption smoothing
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Table 21: LSDV estimation results, discriminating for country specific uninsured risk
Sample Q1/1996-Q3/2009
# 1 2 3 4 5 6
Country Belgium Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
β1 0.526*** 0.527*** 0.487** 0.544*** 0.518*** 0.530***
(0.130) (0.131) (0.178) (0.131) (0.130) (0.128)
βT,i 0.206 0.202 0.131 -0.533*** 0.424*** 0.273*
(0.131) (0.131) (0.178) (0.131) (0.130) (0.128)
Constant 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
R-square 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632
Sample Q1/1996-Q3/2009
# 7 8 9 10 11 12
Country Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland
β1 0.469*** 0.663*** 0.524*** 0.524*** 0.522*** 0.554***
(0.126) (0.073) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133) (0.138)
βT,i 0.477*** -0.562*** 0.313** 0.235* 0.204 -0.283*
(0.126) (0.073) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133) (0.138)
Constant 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-square 0.45 0.50 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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enhancing effect of net foreign liabilities and a negative effect of net foreign assets.
The coefficients βIIP are negative in the EMU samples (columns 15-17) and rise in their
absolute values since 1999. Since the introduction of the euro, net foreign liabilities
have on average contributed to reduce consumption smoothing. This result supports
our theoretical finding that countries with net foreign assets (liabilities) have a lower
(higher) degree of consumption volatility. In the sample Q1/2004-Q3/2009, consump-
tion smoothing increases (decreases) on average by 0.005 units per each percentage
points of net IIP assets (liabilities) per GDP. That seems to be small. However, net
IIP positions have reached high levels (negative as well as positive) for single countries
(see Table 22).
The negative (positive) effect of net foreign liabilities (net foreign assets) on consump-
tion smoothing has increased over time, which seems to mirror the build-up of intra-euro
area imbalances and the diverging net IIP in the euro area. Therefore, we cannot reject
our second hypothesis. The foreign asset and liability distribution affects consumption
smoothing in the euro area – net foreign assets increase consumption smoothing, net
foreign liabilities reduce consumption smoothing of a euro area country. In the light
of these results, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium can rely over
proportionally on international risk sharing in the case of an asymmetric shock. Spain,
Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy do only under proportionally benefit from risk
sharing via capital markets. Given a restricted fiscal policy due to already high public
debt levels, these countries need a high degree of labour market flexibility to adjust to
asymmetric shocks.
Hypothesis three, that asymmetric international risk sharing reduces overall euro area
consumption smoothing cannot be rejected, either. The levels of uninsured risk β2
in Table 22 (which assume a symmetric foreign asset and liability distribution) are
significantly lower in EMU samples (columns 15 – 17) than βEMU in Table 23 (which
account for an asymmetric foreign asset and liability distribution). Based on a t-test
with H0 : β2 < βEMU , the t-statistic for sample Q1/1999-Q3/2009 (column 15 vs. 20)
is 2.68, for sample Q1/2002-Q3/2009 (column 16 vs. 21) 3.34 and for sample Q1/2004-
Q3/2009 (column 17 vs. 22) is 3.37. The critical value for 5 percent significance for a
one-sided t-test is about 2.58. Thus, we cannot reject the H0; β2 is in all three samples
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significantly lower than βEMU .
That result is confirmed by recursive estimations. We estimate equations (27) and (31)
forty-two times. We start with the full sample, where βIIP is statistically insignificant,
and reduce the sample size in every step by starting one quarter ahead until Q4/2006,
while the sample end remains always Q3/2009. Therefore, we constantly increase the
weight of more recent data where βIIP is negative and statistical significant. Figure
17 shows the development of βEMU and β2 over time and the corresponding p-values
below. It clearly shows, that uninsured risk in the case of an asymmetric foreign asset
and liability distribution (indicated by βEMU) is larger rather than in the hypothetic
symmetric case where net IIP are zero (indicated by β2). Unidirectional intra-euro
area capital flows and increasing, divergent net IIP seem to have limited average con-
sumption smoothing in the euro area and make therefore on average a higher degree
of labour market flexibility necessary.
Figure 17: Development of βEMU and β2 over time based on recursive LSDV estimations
(variable start quarter - end quarter Q3/2009)
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Table 22: LSDV estimation results for β2, controlling for net IIP
Sample
Q1/1996- Q1/1996- Q1/1999- Q1/2002- Q1/2004-
Q4/1998 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009
# 13 14 15 16 17
β2 0.851*** 0.510*** 0.270*** 0.221*** 0.212***
(0.051) (0.140) (0.067) (0.046) (0.051)
βIIP 0.007*** -0.003 -0.003* -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 0.000** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
R-square 0.83 0.43 0.23 0.23 0.38
Observations 105 551 446 333 240
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
Table 23: LSDV estimation results of βEMU
Sample
Q1/1996- Q1/1996- Q1/1999- Q1/2002- Q1/2004-
Q4/1998 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009
# 18 19 20 21 22
βEMU 0.669*** 0.532*** 0.450** 0.375* 0.384**
(0.103) (0.127) (0.164) (0.175) (0.174)
Constant -0.000 0.003*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-square 0.68 0.41 0.30 0.19 0.20
Observations 124 632 508 372 267
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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3.4.3 Robustness checks
We first test for robustness of our results by adjusting our empirical specification for
a time trend in international risk sharing (Sørensen et al., 2007). We include the time
trend to check whether the estimated downward trend of uninsured risk has been af-
fected by the net IIP effect or spuriously by other international market developments
over time such as increasing financial globalisation.
In order to account for a time trend, we add to equations (29, 31, and 27) the interaction
term
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
(t− t¯) (Sørensen et al., 2007). The variable t is the current
quarter and t¯ the middle quarter of the respective sample. Quarters are consecutively
numbered. Therefore, the respective coefficient βt captures the average year-by-year
change in international risk sharing. Panel regression equations (29, 31, and 27) change
to:
(
∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt
)
= α + β1
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+ βt (t− t¯)
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+βT,i
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
Di + ρi + µi,t
(32)
(
∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt
)
= α + β2
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+ βt (t− t¯)
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+βIIP
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
IIPi,t + ρi + µi,t
(33)
(
∆Ci,t −∆CEMUt
)
= α + βEMU
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+
+βt (t− t¯)
(
∆Yi,t −∆Y EMUt
)
+ ρi + µi,t
(34)
Estimation results change only partly when we control for the time trend as shown in
Tables 24, 25 and 26. Concerning hypothesis one, the time trend becomes statistically
significant for Ireland as well as for Luxembourg. For specifications concerning hypoth-
esis two, we find a significant time trend for the whole sample (Q1/1996-Q3/2009) and
that levels of significance of coefficients for uninsured risk βEMU and β2 are reduced in
the EMU samples. The negative coefficients for the time trend βt suggest that unin-
sured risk has decreased steadily on average in these samples. Hypothesis three has
to be rejected in this specification due to low significance of coefficients. Therefore,
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Table 24: LSDV estimation results, discriminating for country specific risk sharing and
adjusting for a time trend in international risk sharing
Sample Q1/1996-Q3/2009
# 23 24 25 26 27 28
Country Belgium Germany Ireland Greece Spain France
β1 0.502*** 0.503*** 0.408** 0.517*** 0.492*** 0.503***
(0.139) (0.139) (0.168) (0.140) (0.140) (0.138)
βt -0.006 -0.006 -0.008* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
βT,i 0.123 0.114 0.255 -0.492*** 0.420*** 0.211**
(0.120) (0.120) (0.181) (0.146) (0.129) (0.072)
Constant 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-square 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.43
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632
Sample Q1/1996-Q3/2009
# 29 30 31 32 33 34
Country Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Austria Portugal Finland
β1 0.467*** 0.636*** 0.496*** 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.528***
(0.136) (0.058) (0.141) (0.140) (0.141) (0.145)
βt -0.003 -0.006* -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
βT,i 0.317*** -0.555*** 0.327** 0.209 0.145 -0.290*
(0.075) (0.058) (0.135) (0.123) (0.122) (0.134)
Constant 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-square 0.45 0.51 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
financial globalization might have contributed to falling levels of uninsured risk over
time. Still, the significance of coefficients βT,i and βIIP support our hypotheses 1 and
2. Additionally, we check whether country size, measured in GDP, affects international
risk sharing. Small countries might be able to accumulate in particular large foreign
assets or liabilities relative to their GDP. However, coefficients of GDP or interaction
coefficients between GDP and the difference of GDP growth are very small and do not
significantly change our results.
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Table 25: LSDV estimation results for β2, controlling for net IIP and adjusting for a
time trend in international risk sharing
Sample
Q1/1996- Q1/1996- Q1/1999- Q1/2002- Q1/2004-
Q4/1998 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009
35 36 37 38 39
β2 0.901*** 0.451*** 0.251* 0.029 0.093
(0.101) (0.078) (0.144) (0.160) (0.370)
βt 0.009 -0.010*** 0.001 0.007 0.003
(0.009) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
βIIP 0.007** -0.002 -0.003* -0.005*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Constant 0.001 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
R-square 0.83 0.50 0.23 0.27 0.38
Observations 105 551 446 333 240
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
Table 26: LSDV estimation results of βEMU and adjusting for a time trend in interna-
tional risk sharing
Sample
Q1/1996- Q1/1996- Q1/1999- Q1/2002- Q1/2004-
Q4/1998 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009 Q3/2009
# 40 41 42 43 44
βEMU 0.596*** 0.505*** 0.472*** 0.169 -0.285
(0.098) (0.137) (0.150) (0.174) (0.850)
βt -0.024* -0.006 -0.002 0.007 0.018
(0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.024)
Constant 0.001 0.003*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R-square 0.68 0.43 0.30 0.20 0.22
Observations 124 632 508 372 267
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level.
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We can summarize our empirical analysis for the euro area as follows:
• consumption smoothing differs significantly between euro area countries. There-
fore, we can conclude that international risk sharing is asymmetric in the euro
area.
• The foreign asset and liability distribution, measured by net IIP, is an important
determinant for different country specific consumption smoothing.
• Average euro area consumption smoothing has been limited by unidirectional
capital flows and increasing, divergent net IIP rather than being contributed to
international risk sharing in the euro area. However, this result is not robust
with respect to the inclusion of a time trend.
3.5 Economic policy implications
We have analysed how an asymmetric net foreign asset and liability distribution changes
international risk sharing and effects consumption smoothing in the euro area. That
analysis is very topical after a decade of unidirectional capital flows in particular from
Germany to the southern euro area countries. This development resulted in a diver-
gence of current account balances, and net international investment positions within
the euro area and thereby contributed to the European debt crisis. Based on a theo-
retical and empirical analysis, it is found that an asymmetric foreign asset and liability
distribution reduces consumption smoothing in the monetary union as a whole as well
as in all member countries. Countries with high net foreign liabilities are shown to be
in particular exposed to consumption volatility and crisis.
Hence, the international risk sharing mechanism does not work in the euro area as as-
sumed by Mundell (1973) and as argued by the European Commission (2008). Without
labour market flexibility, limited fiscal flexibility and poorly working international risk
sharing via the capital market, the capability of the euro area to cope with asymmetric
shocks seems to be very limited. That is an alarming result for the euro area in gen-
eral and in particular for euro area countries currently facing real adjustment needs.
For instance Spain with a net foreign debt position will not participate in the current
German boom, as did Germany in the past Spanish boom.
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Based on the seminal theory of optimum currency areas (Mundell, 1961), the deregula-
tion of labour markets throughout the euro area would be the straight-forward solution
to enhance the monetary union’s adjustment ability in the face of asymmetric shocks.
In particular, Greece, Spain, and Portugal would not only benefit from flexible labour
markets in terms of an improved adjustment capability to cure their current account
deficits. It would also facilitate the economic recovery after the crisis, which is a nec-
essary prerequisite to regain capital market confidence and lower risk premiums on
government bonds. Therefore, the sustainable way to improve the internal adjustment
capability of the euro area and to safeguard the euro is to implement consequent labour
market reforms.
Appendix - Data Sources
Table 27: Data availability and data sources
Data: Source: Availability:
Nominal GDP, quarterly Eurostat Q1/1995 - Q3/2009
Ireland: Q1/1997-Q/2009
Greece: Q1/2000-Q/2009
Consumption, quarterly Eurostat Q1/1995 - Q3/2009
Ireland: Q1/1997-Q/2009
Greece: Q1/2000-Q/2009
Population, annually Eurostat 1995-2009
International Investment
Position (IPP), annually,
Assets-Liabilities
IMF International Financial
Statistics, via DataStream
1995-2008 (quarterly data
were created by linear in-
terpolation)
Ireland: 2001-2008
Greece: 1998-2008
Luxembourg: 2002-2008
Portugal: 1996-2008
Note: y-o-y growth figures used in the empirical analysis start four quarters later.
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Chapter 4
Fiscal Stabilization and the Incentive for Structural
Reforms in the Euro Area
Abstract This paper analyses national and supranational fiscal stabilization policies
and the incentives for structural reforms based on a principal agent model. The issue
has become topical during the European sovereign debt crisis. The quasi-defaults of
Greece and Portugal have their origins in persistent public deficits, delayed structural
reforms on labour markets and a postponed adjustment of intra-euro area current ac-
count imbalances. The weak Stability and Growth pact and extraordinary low interest
rates are identified as reasons for delayed reforms in the euro area prior to the crisis.
The rescue packages for Greece, Portugal and Ireland are argued to further postpone
necessary labour market reforms to achieve an adjustment of competitiveness in the
euro area.
4.1 Introduction
The financial crisis and the European debt crisis have revived the discussion on whether
independent national fiscal policies or a supranational fiscal policy is the better policy
option for euro area countries to cope with asymmetric shocks. The supporters of a
supranational fiscal policy argue that national fiscal policies have failed to stabilize
euro area countries before and during the crisis and therefore need to be substituted
by a fiscal policy on EU level (Plender, 2009, Dullien and Schwarzer, 2009, Dullien,
2011). In contrast, supporters of national fiscal policies argue that the Stability and
Growth pact has to be reformed and tightened to prevent more public debt crises in the
euro area. They highlight the need for more labour market flexibility and structural
reforms in the euro area (European Commission, 2008), which would ensure a (labour)
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market based adjustment in the case of an asymmetric shock.
In general, the adjustment mechanisms to asymmetric shocks in a monetary union have
to be flexible prices and wages (Mundell, 1961) when monetary policy autonomy is lost.
To substitute for labour market flexibility or to attenuate sudden income changes dur-
ing real exchange rate adjustment, fiscal policy can be used to mitigate sharp declines
of income and consumption, in particular during recessions. This fiscal stabilization
can either be achieved based on a credit financed anti-cyclical national fiscal policy
or a supranational fiscal policy (European Commission, 1993, Persson and Tabellini,
1996, de Grauwe, 2009a, von Hagen and Wyplosz, 2008). In both cases, anti-cyclical
public consumption smoothes overall consumption over time until the reason for fiscal
stabilization has vanished or the real adjustment process is completed.
In the euro area, however, labour markets are still inflexible (Bayoumi and Eichen-
green, 1992, European Commission, 2008, 2010) and labour market reforms continue
to be postponed (Calmfors, 2001, Duval and Elmeskov, 2006, Belke et al., 2006b).
This prevents a swift real exchange rate alignment to cope with current account imbal-
ances. If the real exchange rate realignment keeps to be postponed after an asymmetric
shock, any fiscal policy to stabilize a specific consumption level will become sooner or
later unsustainable (Belke and Baumga¨rtner, 2002). Either national public debt lev-
els become unsustainable or supranational fiscal redistribution becomes unidirectional.
Therefore, given rigid labour markets in the euro area, fiscal policy should only be used
for temporary stabilization needs such as in the case of unsynchronized business cycles.
In contrast, if asymmetric economic developments are persistent because of diverging
competitiveness, structural labour market reforms need to be implemented to ensure
the adjustment of real exchange rates and a convergence of current account positions.
However, it may depend on the fiscal stabilization approach, either national fiscal poli-
cies or supranational fiscal policy and their implementation, whether labour market
reforms are implemented or not. As labour market reforms comprise political costs,
politicians might have the incentive to use fiscal policy to alleviate the effects of non-
reforming instead of financing reforms (Rodrik, 1996, Hsieh, 2000). By doing so, politi-
cians assure their re-election or prevent opposition of insiders who would loose their
rents in the case of flexible labour markets (Saint-Paul, 2004, Alesina et al., 2006).
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Thus, moral hazard might inhibit structural reforms and the initial reason for further
fiscal policy intervention persists until rising debt levels become unsustainable.
In this paper, we analyse the incentive of supranational fiscal stabilization and national
fiscal policies for structural reforms based on a principal agent model. It is shown that
structural reforms to achieve more labour market flexibility in the euro area has been
delayed due to the weak Stability and Growth Pact and extraordinary low interest rates
prior to the crisis. Moreover, fiscal rescue packages for Greece, Portugal and Ireland
are argued to further postpone necessary labour market reforms in the euro area.
4.2 Adjustment to asymmetric shocks and fiscal
stabilization in the euro area
4.2.1 Real exchange rate adjustment and automatic stabiliz-
ers in a monetary union
The irrevocable fixation of nominal exchange rates and the common monetary policy in
the euro area have shifted the burden of adjustment in the face of asymmetric shocks to
the real exchange rate (Mundell, 1961). Therefore, the labour markets need to be suffi-
ciently flexible to assure a swift realignment of real exchange rates. First, wages could
be the transmission channel. In a country affected by a negative asymmetric demand
shock and rising unemployment, wages need to decrease to lower the national price
level, which leads to a real depreciation and assures the economic recovery. Addition-
ally, rising wages in the country affected by the positive asymmetric shock contribute
to real exchange rate appreciation, which moderates the boom and inflation pressure.
Second, labour force could migrate from a country affected by a negative asymmetric
shock to the booming economy with labour shortage. That would increase labour sup-
ply in the booming country while labour supply in the recession country falls. This
process re-equilibrates the labour markets in both countries. However, labour mar-
ket flexibility, (downward) wage flexibility and labour mobility, remains low in Europe
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1992, European Commission, 2008, 2010). Euro area real
exchange rates and euro area labour force cannot properly readjust in the case of
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asymmetric shocks. This poses the question concerning alternative automatic stabi-
lizing mechanisms to smooth income and consumption over time in the presence of
asymmetric shocks.
Despite the drawbacks of rigid labour markets, theoretically, several automatic stabi-
lizing mechanisms allow euro area countries to smooth income and consumption over
time in the presence of asymmetric shocks. First, capital markets are an internal sta-
bilizing mechanism within a monetary union (Mundell, 1973). Cross-country foreign
capital asset holdings43, i.e. capital market integration, increase in a monetary union
as exchange rate risk and the devaluation risk of nominal exchanges rates disappears
(McKinnon, 2000). This allows for portfolio diversification. Volatile income and con-
sumption in a country due to an asymmetric shock or unsynchronized business cycles
can be mitigated by alternating foreign capital income and foreign capital valuation. A
country in a boom (recession) with rising (falling) profits pays (receives) a net foreign
capital income to (from) the country in a recession (boom). The same mechanism
applies for (relative) valuation effects. However, diverging and asymmetric net foreign
asset and liability positions of euro area countries reduce the effectiveness of the capital
market stabilization (see chapter 3).
Intra-industry trade can be a second (automatic) stabilization mechanism. Given
strong intra-industry trade linkages, booming countries import additional consump-
tion and investment goods from the recession country where domestic demand is low
and spare capacities are available. Rising exports compensates for declining domestic
demand. In fact, the German export contributed to German growth and compensated
for low domestic investment and consumption prior the crisis. However, differences
in product specialisation, technology or aspects of non-price competitiveness such as
different product quality question the efficiency of intra-industry trade to timely ab-
sorb asymmetric shocks in the euro area (European Central Bank, 2005, Baumann and
di Mauro, 2007).44
A third stabilizing mechanism is an anti-cyclical fiscal policy, which compensates lower
(increased) private spending by more (less) public spending in a recession (boom).
43For instance, bonds, equities as well as bank credit.
44In the context of international trade, multi-national corporations can affect the risk-sharing, as
intra-firm trade accounts for an increasing share of international trade (OECD, 2010).
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This can be achieved by a credit financed anti-cyclical national fiscal policy or a supra-
national fiscal policy (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1996), Belke and Baumga¨rtner
(2002), von Hagen and Wyplosz (2008)). An anti-cyclical national fiscal policy varies
public spending by public savings or public debt and redistributes resources inter-
temporally. Figure 18 shows a stylized national fiscal anti-cyclical stabilization pattern
for a two-country monetary union with countries C1 and C2 over time t. (Unsynchro-
nized) business cycles are absorbed and smoothed within each country by saving for
and borrowing from the future as indicated by capital flows (block arrows), in this
case borrowing and repayment or saving. For instance, country 2 finances rising public
spending during a recession in t1 by public debt (arrow pointing to the left), which has
to be repaid in t2. However, country 1 saves capital in the boom in t1 that can be used
in t2 (arrow pointing to the right).
Figure 18: National fiscal stabilization of asymmetric shocks
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In contrast, a supranational fiscal stabilization collects, for instance, fluctuating tax
revenues of euro area countries via a supranational authority and (automatically) redis-
tributes them back to countries to achieve equally smoothed tax revenues and spending
in all euro area countries. A recession country receives additional tax revenues from
booming countries to compensate shortfalls in private spending by more public spend-
ing. Figure 19 shows the functioning of a supranational fiscal stabilization analogous
to Figure 18. Block arrows again indicate public capital flows, in this case transfers
flows. In t1, country 1 is in a boom and transfers some of its tax revenue to country 2,
where reduced tax revenues during a recession are compensated. In contrast, country
2 transfers tax revenue to country 1 in t2, as country 2 is in a boom and country 1 in
a recession.
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Figure 19: Supranational fiscal stabilization of asymmetric shocks
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In the euro area, the EU economic framework constitutes national fiscal stabilization as
the main fiscal stabilization system (European Commission, 1993). Euro area countries
independently decide on public debt (public savings) in the case of asymmetric shocks.
The Stability and Growth Pact constitutes a limit for national fiscal deficits and limits
national fiscal stabilization during a recession. Figure 20 shows fiscal balances and real
GDP growth for the euro area. The cyclicality is clearly visible; public net borrow-
ing (indicated by fiscal deficits) rises in times of low GDP growth and declines during
recovery. However, euro area countries did on average not reduce public debt during
boom the years 2000 or 2006/2007, as intended by an anti-cyclical fiscal stabiliza-
tion concept. Moreover, euro area countries on average violated the deficit ceiling of
3 percent of GDP in the years 2003 and 2004 as well as during the crisis 2009 and 2010.
A supranational fiscal stabilization is, up to now, not in place in the euro area. How-
ever, some member countries use a fiscal stabilization mechanism to absorb regional
shocks. These mechanisms work analogous to supranational fiscal stabilization but
with the national level redistributing between regions or federal states. For exam-
ple, Germany has a tax equalisation system (La¨nderfinanzausgleich), which shifts tax
revenues from federal states with high per capita tax revenues to federal states with
low tax revenue per capita. Similar systems are in place in Belgium (Intervention de
Solidarite´ Nationale) or Italy (to assist the Mezzogiorno region). Supranational redis-
tribution at EU level such as EU Structural Funds or Social Funds do not intended to
stabilize asymmetric shocks but to promote long-term convergence between member
countries or to support a certain sector (Common Agriculture Policy). Although EU
structural funds related to EU cohesion policy distribute 347 billion euros between 2007
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and 2013 (European Union, 2009) the transfer volume is low in relation to the EU-GDP.
Figure 20: Euro area fiscal balances and euro area real GDP growth
Source: European Commission, AMECO Database and IMF (real GDP growth)
4.2.2 Fiscal stabilization and persistent asymmetric economic
developments
Both, national fiscal and supranational fiscal stabilization are in theory suitable eco-
nomic policy tools to smooth temporary asymmetric economic developments in the
face of asymmetric shocks or due to unsynchronized business cycles. However, if an
asymmetric economic development becomes persistent and the real exchange rate can-
not realign, the adjustment of wages and prices will become long lasting (Blanchard,
2007). In the long run, as unemployment increases, the political and economic pressure
to adjust competitiveness increases. Blanchard (2007, 7) calls this way of adjustment
competitive disinflation, representing “[...] a period of sustained high unemployment,
leading to lower nominal wage growth until relative unit labour costs have decreased
[...]”, and the real exchange rate has realigned. During such a competitive disinflation
both fiscal stabilization mechanisms, national fiscal stabilization and supranational
stabilization, might become unsustainable (Belke and Baumga¨rtner, 2002, de Grauwe,
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2009a).45
Figure 21 and 22 illustrate the effects of a persistent asymmetric economic development
on fiscal stabilization, given that the real exchange rates do not realign. In Figure 21,
country 1, which has permanently higher growth than country 2, has public budget
surpluses while permanent sluggish growth in country 2 makes them to run public
deficits until the debt level becomes unsustainable. In a monetary union with a cen-
tralized fiscal policy, the supranational fiscal policy would be unidirectional, leading to
a permanent tax transfer payment for country 1 (Figure 22).
Figure 21: National fiscal stabilization and persistent heterogeneous growth
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Figure 22: Supranational fiscal stabilization persistent heterogeneous growth
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The divergence of competitiveness and current accounts within the euro area since
1999 originated a persistent asymmetric economic development (Zemanek et al., 2010,
45A symmetric shock, such as the entry of former communist countries into the world market and the
rise of China can destabilize national fiscal stabilization as well. For instance, low cost production in
Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia has substituted labour intensive production all over Europe.
Rising unemployment might have been initially interpreted as temporary shock, which triggered an
increase in public debt initially perceived as temporary. The persistent nature of the shock however
resulted in a continuing rise of public debt levels.
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Schnabl and Zemanek, 2011). It was caused by persistent asymmetric wage growth
between Germany and the southern European countries. While Germany had a mod-
erate wage growth, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy experienced a high wage growth
above productivity. That gradually increased Germany’s competitiveness, measured in
unit labour costs, while southern European countries significantly lost competitiveness
within the euro area (Schnabl and Zemanek, 2011).46
Until the crisis, in particular Greece and Portugal used public borrowing to stimulate
sluggish domestic economic activity caused by the gradual decline of competitiveness
in labour intensive production versus low-cost countries in East Asia and Central and
Eastern Europe. Moreover, public wages as well as social benefits increased which
stimulated domestic consumption. The reluctance against structural reforms of rigid
labour markets and social security systems prior to the crisis made governments to fi-
nance social security and employment via public debt. The financing needs to stabilize
the economy during the crisis dramatically further inflated fiscal deficits and public
debt levels.
During the course of the economic crisis, investors began to doubt the sustainability of
public debt levels in crisis countries. In particular, they expect that the twin deficits in
the current accounts and public finances will not unwind in a short time, if intra-euro
area real exchange rates are not realigned. Moreover, the crisis countries would need
to raise more public debt to sustain economic growth. Strongly diverging government
bond spreads against Germany indicated that capital markets have already judged fiscal
policies in Greece, Ireland and Portugal as unsustainable. Figure 23 shows government
bond spreads to German government bonds that started to rise since the end of 2008.
Since the end of 2009, lenders lost confidence in public finances of Greece, Portugal
and Ireland.47 Public borrowing at the capital market has now become impossible for
Greece, Ireland as well as Portugal. Their financing needs have been substituted by a
quasi-supranational fiscal stabilization via rescue packages by EU partner countries.
46The real depreciation of the Germany against European partner countries was partly due to a
competitive disinflation after a strong inflation following the German reunification boom (Schnabl and
Zemanek, 2011).
47The crisis in Ireland is the result of a banking crisis and is not fully comparable to Greece or
Portugal. However, Irish unit labour costs had also strongly increased prior to the financial crisis and
are an obstacle to economic recovery.
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Figure 23: Government bond spreads to Germany (10-year benchmark bonds)
Source: Datastream
Although the rescue packages are provided as loans and guaranties and are conditional
to fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, this indirect supranational fiscal stabi-
lization will become persistent, if the intended structural reforms fail. Then, current
loans and guaranties need to be converted into direct transfers. Examples for per-
sistent supranational fiscal stabilization, thus direct transfers systems, are those on
a national level in Italy (persistent north-south transfers) and Germany (persistent
west-east transfers). For instance in Germany, west-east transfers via the German tax
equalization system have summed up to almost 20 percent of the East German federal
states’ public budgets in 2008. The progress of the convergence process of East Ger-
many after the reunification shock is rather slow. Structural unemployment remains
high and tax revenues per capita low. Hence, the need for public transfers persists.
The question arises, why euro area countries failed to implement flexible labour mar-
kets prior the crisis in contradiction to predictions. E.g. European Commission (1990),
Berthold and Fehn (1998) and Calmfors (2001) argued that the loss of an autonomous
monetary policy and nominal exchange rate alignments in a monetary union would
enforce structural reforms to maintain flexibility in the case of an asymmetric shock.
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4.2.3 Fiscal stabilization and structural reforms
A possible explanation for less than expected structural reforms in the euro area could
be the fiscal stabilization policy by euro area countries. Structural reforms are associ-
ated with political costs, such as the opposition from voters or employees who lose their
rents originating in generous regulations, such as minimum wages or strict hiring and
firing regulations (Saint-Paul, 2004). To avoid political costs and to secure re-election,
politicians use fiscal policy to finance the consequences of non-reforming such as unem-
ployment or public employment, instead of implementing structural reforms to reduce
unemployment. Such behaviour is in particular analysed for development aid. For
instance Rodrik (1996) and Hsieh (2000) argue that aid transfers can be responsible
for delayed structural reforms. The transfer income and fiscal expansion reduce the
pressure on governments to implement structural reforms, which are the prerequisite
to attract private capital investments (Devarajan et al., 2001).
The hypothesis, that expansionary fiscal policy allows politicians to delay structural
reforms, is backed by empirical evidence on development aid (Heckleman and Knack,
2008, Rodrik, 1996). Fester and Seitz (2005) and Seitz et al. (2004) provide anecdotal
evidence for the German tax equalization system. They show that East German fed-
eral states, who benefit from transfers, have a significantly larger public sector (relative
to their size) than West German federal states. Furthermore, only around 50 percent
of transfers provided for public investments to the East German municipalities and
federal states are invested (Seitz et al., 2004). The remaining part has been diverted
to public consumption.
Thereby the ability to finance non-reforming and inter alia the pressure to implement
structural reforms depends on the fiscal stabilization policy. Sustained national fis-
cal stabilization (public borrowing) depends on the willingness of private lenders to
provide capital. If lenders do not punish rising debt levels by rising interest rates or
expect a bailout in the case of default (Krugman, 1998, Corsetti et al., 1999, Heppke-
Falk and Wolff, 2007), governments are able to prolong fiscal stabilization instead of
promoting structural reforms. In particular, supranational fiscal stabilization related
to a tax equalisation system provides a stable public transfer income, which can be
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used to finance delayed structural reforms.
Aid and fiscal stabilization will lead to moral hazard. Moral hazard will occur if an
economic agent behaves rational from an individual perspective (but suboptimal from
a perspective of the whole group). The difference in rational behaviour of the agent
and the group results from unequally distributed information or different risk taking
(e.g. Holmstro¨m (1979)). In the context of fiscal stabilization policies, the suboptimal
behaviour is the delay of structural reforms for instance by financing unemployment via
transfers or public debt. For the politician it is an optimal behaviour as the political
costs of reforms are circumvented, but it is a suboptimal behaviour for the country.
The incentive for structural reforms differs between supranational fiscal stabilization
and national fiscal stabilization, as will be shown in a principal-agent framework.
4.3 Supranational fiscal stabilization and structural
reform incentive
4.3.1 The principal-agent framework
The principal-agent framework is part of the contract theory developed by institutional
economics. The main assumption of the principal-agent framework is an asymmetric
distribution of information between two economic players (Arrow, 1970, Mirrlees, 1974,
1999). Thereby, the agent has an information advantage over the principal and/or the
agent does not bear the risk of its action. In the context of this paper, the agent is
the government of a country in a persistent recession with high unemployment and
rigid labour markets. To finance unemployment benefits, the country either receives
transfers from a supranational fiscal stabilization mechanism or increases public debt.
Instead of financing the prolongation of unemployment, the government can also opt
for structural reforms (and bear political reform costs) to reduce unemployment and
therefore government expenditure to support the country’s economic recovery. If po-
litical costs of reforms are high, financing unemployment instead of structural reforms
might be the preferred option for the agent. Then the recipient country will remain
reliant on further fiscal transfers or public debt. The principal is the payer of the
transfer, a prospering country or region, or a lender to the country in recession.
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The general model setting is the following. The principal denoted by subscript P , a
supra-national institution, another country, region, or a lender, provides capital to the
recipient country, which is the agent, denoted by subscript A. We assume that the
principal’s utility UP depends positively on output in the recipient country (YA). The
principal benefits from a high output in the agent country, as it reduces the probability
of further transfers or it maximises the probability of a repayment of the debt. The
transfer T reduces its utility as funds are not available for own use. In contrast, the
utility of the recipient country’s government UA depends positively on its output (YA)
and the transfer T .
UP = YA − T (35)
UA = YA + T (36)
The output YA is assumed to be stochastic with respect to the economic environment
but also conditional to the use of transfers, i.e. on structural reform effort aj. Non-
reforming is indicated by subscript no and represents ano = aj = 0. Structural reforms
are indicated by subscript ref . As structural reforms require a minimum reform effort,
aj needs to be significantly larger than zero above a certain unknown threshold level
amin, with aref = aj > amin > 0.
48 If the agent decides to use transfers for public con-
sumption and not to reform (ano), GDP will be high (Yhigh) with the probability (pi1).
With the probability (1− pi1) the GDP will be low (Ylow). However, if the government
implements structural reforms (aref ) the probability for a high GDP (Yhigh) jumps to
pi2. Probability pi2 is assumed to be higher than pi1 because structural reforms in-
crease labour market flexibility, thus allowing a real exchange rate depreciation, which
stimulates exports and growth. Table 28 shows probabilities for high and low output
contingent on reform effort. It is assumed that 0 < pi1 < pi2 < 1, Ylow < Yhigh and
ano < aref .
Thus, output YA can be rewritten as expected output conditional on reform effort
E [Yi|aj] with i = low, high and j = no, ref . Additionally, the agent has reform costs
48The assumption of a threshold level avoids that small reform effort accounts as a structural
reforms.
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Table 28: Output and its probability, conditional to structural reform effort
Output Ya
Reform effort Ylow Yhigh
ano non-reforming 1− pi1 pi1
aref structural reforms 1− pi2 pi2
for a certain reform effort aj. Reform costs are added to equation (36) weighted by γ
(γ > 0) and reduce the government’s utility. The utility functions UP and UA become:
UP = E [Yi|aj]A − T (37)
UA = E [Yi|aj] + T − γaj (38)
As the recipient country decides how it will use the transfers, the rational behaviour of
the agent is not equal to the expectations of the principal. For the principal the utility
is maximized if the recipient country (agent) implements structural reforms. Then,
the expected value of output in the receiving country is maximized, as the probability
of high output rises from pi1 to pi2. However, whether the recipient government will
choose structural reforms is unclear, because it balances the utility of a larger expected
output against the utility of the transfer income and the loss arising from potential
reform costs γaj.
Based on this framework, we analyse the incentive for structural reforms for differ-
ent forms of fiscal stabilization policy by comparing different model settings. For
supranational fiscal stabilization, we differentiate between unconditional, conditional
and co-financed transfers. Unconditional transfers are without any conditions to the
recipient authority, for example transfers in an tax-equalisation scheme such as in Ger-
many or the proposed supranational EU tax system (von Hagen and Wyplosz, 2008),
where funds are automatically redistributed. In contrast, conditional transfers are only
provided under the condition to implement structural reforms. Co-financed transfers
obligate the recipient region to co-finance a certain (small) proportion as in the case
of EU Structural funds.
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4.3.2 Unconditional supranational fiscal stabilization
The model setting for unconditional supranational transfers is similar to the baseline
setting as described above. The receiving government can use transfers without condi-
tions. This implies that transfers provide a larger utility in the case of non-reforming
than in the case of structural reforms. To model this “reverse utility”, transfers T in
equation (38) are weighted by (1− aj). Equation (38) becomes:
UA = E [Yi|aj] + T − Taj − γaj (39)
The game sequence for unconditional supranational transfers is presented in Figure
24. First, the transfer payment to the recipient country (T ) is ex-ante fixed and not
re-negotiable, as for instance in the German tax equalisation scheme. Second, the
government, which receives the transfer, will decide on its reform effort (ano or aref ).
Third, the output will become high or low (Yhigh or Ylow) given the probability (pi1 or
pi2) which is conditional to the chosen reform effort aj.
Figure 24: Game sequence of the decision process – unconditional supranational fiscal
stabilization
Given this model setting, the recipient government (agent) decides on whether it im-
plements structural reforms or not. Each decision will result in a specific utility. We
calculate the utility of the recipient government for both reform efforts ano and aref . To
analyse the decision, we set both utilities (no reforms and reforms) equal and scrutinize
under which conditions the government will be indifferent between non-reforming and
structural reforms.49 This indifference reform effort reveals the incentive for structural
reforms for the stabilization policy in question. The lower the indifference reform effort
a∗ref , the lower is the incentive for structural reforms.
49We assume that if the government is indifferent between non-reforming and structural reforms
and that aref > amin holds, it will choose structural reforms.
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UA (ano) = UA (aref ) (40)
E [YA|ano] + (1− ano)T − γano = E [YA|aref ] + (1− aref )T − γaref (41)
As ano = aj = 0 and E [YA|aj] = (1− pim)Ylow +pimYhigh with m = 1, 2, we can rewrite
equation (41):
((1− pi1)Ylow + pi1Yhigh) + T = ((1− pi2)Ylow + pi2Yhigh) + (1− aref )T − γaref (42)
Solving equation (42) for aref yields the indifference reform effort level a
∗
ref . The
subscript UC denotes the case of unconditional transfers.
a∗ref,UC =
1
γ + T
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) (43)
Given the assumptions pi1 < pi2, Ylow < Yhigh and a
∗
ref,UC > amin, it can be shown from
equation (43) that:
• The higher the weight of reform costs γ in the utility function, the lower needs to
be the indifference reform effort level a∗ref,UC to assure that the recipient govern-
ment will implement structural reforms, as
δa∗ref,UC
δγ
< 0. Otherwise, the utility
from using transfers without implementing structural reforms exceeds the utility
of structural reforms, despite a low expected output.
• A large transfer T reduces the incentive for structural reforms, as δa
∗
ref,UC
δT
=
− 1
(γ+T )2
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) < 0. The transfer compensates the government
for the reduced utility of a low expected output in the case of using transfers for
delaying reforms.
• A large difference of probabilities for high output (pi2− pi1) conditional to reform
efforts allows a higher effort level for structural reforms (aref ) relative to non-
reforming (ano). Structural reforms increase the expected output relatively more
and, hence, the expected output, which compensates for reform costs.
• The same is true for the difference for high and low output (Yhigh − Ylow).
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In short, for this model of an unconditional supranational fiscal stabilization, moral
hazard of politicians will result in delayed structural reforms if (i) the transfer income
is high relative to expected output and reform costs, if (ii) political costs of structural
reforms are high, or if (iii) the expected output after structural reforms is too low to
compensate for reform costs. Because a low output is more likely without reforms, the
dependency on transfers will persist as long as the recipient country has a low prob-
ability to generate a large output. Hence, unconditional transfers and the resulting
decrease in reform activity (moral hazard) lead to delayed structural reforms which
themselves constitute the need for further transfers. A vicious circle has set in.
Given political costs of structural reforms, unconditional supranational transfers are
likely to be used for public consumption and to delay reforms. That applies to un-
conditional automatic national tax equalisation schemes in several euro area countries
such as Germany or Belgium. Moreover, a supranational fiscal stabilization system for
the euro area as proposed by von Hagen and Wyplosz (2008) or other supranational
fiscal policy (Dullien and Schwarzer, 2009) would have similar implications.
4.3.3 Conditional supranational fiscal stabilization
One possibility to reduce moral hazard is to make transfers of a fiscal stabilization
mechanism conditional to structural reforms. After the recipient country has accepted
the conditions of transfers, the final decision to implement structural reforms remains
with the recipient government. An example is the rescue package for Greece, which
is conditional to structural reforms. Although the politicians seem to be willing to
implement far-reaching structural reforms, it is not certain whether high political costs
will make them change their mind.
Conditional transfers are modelled by weighting transfers T by the structural reform
effort aref , due to the conditionality of transfers. The utility function (38) changes to:
UA = E [Yi|aj] + arefT − γaj (44)
Deriving the indifference reform effort level a∗ref,CO, with the subscript CO indicating
conditional transfers, yields:
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a∗ref,CO =
1
γ
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) (45)
The indifference level of conditional transfers in equation (45) is larger than that of
unconditional transfers in equation (43). This indicates that, all variables equal, struc-
tural reforms are more likely with conditional transfers than with unconditional trans-
fers. Transfers T do not negatively affect the decision on structural reforms. Nev-
ertheless, if political costs of reform are too high the government will avoid reform
and may divert transfers to finance non-reforming. The experience of East Germany,
where transfers dedicated for investment were used for public consumption, shows the
relevance of this model (Seitz et al., 2004). To avoid that transfers are not used in line
with the agreed conditions, a monitoring system needs to be installed by the transfer
payer, or conditionality needs to be enforced by penalties.
4.3.4 Co-financed supranational fiscal stabilization
Monitoring, however, is costly and penalties might not be credible. To avoid monitoring
costs, a possibility to eliminate moral hazard within a supranational fiscal stabilization
system is to provide transfers conditional to a co-financing by the recipient govern-
ment. The recipient government has to add a certain percentage to each euro transfer
they receive, which corresponds to an risk participation of the recipient government
on transfers. Co-financing is for instance widely used for EU-Structural, Cohesion and
Social Funds.
We include a co-financing contribution (S) in our model in form of a loss for the
recipient government, as it cannot use these funds for other purposes. However, a
higher expected output in the case of structural reforms makes the agent’s contribution
relatively less costly as it earns a “reform return”. Therefore, the negative effect of
the co-financing contribution is reduced by weighting co-financing S with 1−E [Yi|aj].
A high output because of structural reforms reduces the loss from co-financing. The
utility function (38) becomes:
UA = E [Yi|aj] + T − S + E [Yi|aj]S − γaj (46)
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The effect of a co-financed (CF ) supranational fiscal stabilization on the reform incen-
tive is scrutinized in the same procedure as in equations (40) to (42), which yields:
a∗ref,CF =
1 + S
γ
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) (47)
Co-financing (S) positively affects the indifference reform effort. The larger the co-
financing the larger will be the incentive for structural reforms. Co-financing increases
reform incentive of the recipient government, compared to conditional transfers, as it
shifts some costs of non-reforming from the transfer payer to the transfer recipient.
Thus, the risk participation motivates the transfer recipient government to implement
structural reforms.
Summarizing, given a supranational fiscal stabilization system, unconditional and con-
ditional transfers without monitoring provide the lowest incentive for structural re-
forms. Co-financing internalizes costs of non-reforming and is therefore reform en-
hancing. The order is visualized in Figure 25, which displays the indifference re-
form efforts a∗ref at the y-axis dependent on the economic environment Ω described
by Ω = (pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) on the x-axis. The graphs indicate the three analysed
variants of supranational fiscal stabilization. Their slopes are given by the first parts
of equations (43), (45) and (47). Given a specific economic environment Ω∗, the graphs
determine the indifference reform effort levels. Co-financed transfers have the steepest
slope (1+S
γ
), thus, the highest incentive for structural reforms (indicated by a∗ref,CF ).
The grey area indicates the minimum reform effort amin. As in Figure 25 a
∗
UC < amin,
thus, reform incentive of unconditional transfers is too low given the Ω∗, no reforms
would be implemented with a unconditional supranational transfer system.
4.4 National fiscal stabilization and structural re-
form incentive
4.4.1 National fiscal stabilization and moral hazard
The public debt issued in the case of national fiscal stabilization in a recession is based
on a credit contract, through either a bond issue or a bank credit. A credit contract
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Figure 25: Indifference reform incentive for supranational fiscal stabilization
constitutes in theory an incentive compatible contract to overcome moral hazard in a
principal agent setting (Dietrich and Vollmer, 2005). The agent (who borrows funds for
investment from the principal) has to repay the loan plus the interest payment. Thus,
the agent will only receive a return from its investment, if the overall investment return
exceeds his payment to the principal. As the agent only gets the excess return, he has
a strong incentive to work for the success of the investment project. In the context of
public borrowing, this standard credit contract would imply that a government that
raises public debt always has the incentive to implement structural reforms to increase
the probability of a high output.
However, the general textbook setting does not fit in general to government debt. First,
politicians borrow on the behalf of the public budget or public investment projects.
They profit from the success of an investment project in the form of political success.
Taxpayers indirectly carry the debt burden. The government and the person respon-
sible for repayment of the debt (taxpayer) are not equal. This makes it possible that
politicians use public debt to “bribe” voters prior to elections (Nordhaus, 1975) i.e.
to finance the delay of structural reforms by increasing debt to postpone the political
costs of structural reforms. The politician can buy its re-election or prevent public
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opposition against reforms by passing the costs to future taxpayers (Rodrik, 1996).
Second, the possibility of a bailout of governments in the case of a default creates a
further moral hazard situation – this time for lenders. If lenders anticipate that credit
provided to a government is informally insured against default by a potential bailout
they will not account for the risk of rising debt accumulation by the debtor govern-
ment (Krugman, 1998, Corsetti et al., 1999). That can explain why interest rates for
euro area government bonds converged to uncommonly low levels since 1998 until the
2008-2011 crisis (grey boxed area of Figure 26) although some European governments
accumulated high stocks of public debt. Apparently, lenders seem to have interpreted
all countries of the European Monetary Union as being jointly liable for a single member
countries’ debt. Markets seem to have ignored the European Treaty, which explicitly
excludes bailouts for the euro area (Schnabl and Zemanek, 2011). Politicians might
have exploited this market interpretation by using national fiscal stabilization for de-
laying structural reforms and thereby accumulating high levels of public debt.
Figure 26: Government bond yields for selected euro area countries (10-year benchmark
bonds)
Source: Datastream, Note: The grey box indicates the era of low interest rates in the euro area.
Therefore, we analyse the incentive for structural reforms given a national fiscal sta-
bilization policy. We distinguish between public debt that have to be repaid after one
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period and debt accumulation. The latter one represents the situation in the euro area
prior the European debt crisis when easy lending conditions allowed euro area govern-
ments to accumulate large stocks of public debt.
4.4.2 National fiscal stabilization without debt accumulation
In this section, we abstract from debt accumulation and assume an one-period model.
Public debt has to be repaid including interest payment after the period. Such a
national fiscal stabilization without debt accumulation is a theoretical reference sce-
nario related to the textbook case of an incentive compatible standard credit contract.
The setting is that a government borrows capital, uses these capital for reforms or
non-reforming, and needs to repay debt inclusive interest payment after output YA is
realised. The game sequence for this national fiscal stabilization pattern is displayed
in Figure 27:
Figure 27: Game sequence of the decision process – national fiscal stabilization without
debt accumulation
For our analysis, we assume that the principal who provides capital has the stilized
utility function of equation (37),50 as we only analyse the agent’s behaviour (receiving
government). The utility function of the debt raising government (agent) is represented
by equation (48). Similar to co-financed supranational transfers, the government’s util-
ity is positively dependent on expected output and borrowed funds (D) and negatively
determined by political costs to use these funds for structural reforms γaj. The re-
demption amount including interest payment (1 + r)D, with r indicating the interest
rate, negatively enters the utility function. Similar to equation (46), redemption pay-
ment is weighted with 1 − E [Yi|aj] which makes the loss of utility of the repayment
smaller in the case of a structural reforms as a higher output is expected.
50We concentrate on moral hazard in using the borrowed capital for structural reforms and abstract
from moral hazard of lenders linked to an expected bailout.
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UA = E [Yi|aj] +D − [(1 + r)D − E [Yi|aj] (1 + r)D]− γaj (48)
Again, we analyse the incentive for structural reforms by comparing the utilities in the
case of structural reforms and no reforms. The indifference reform effort a∗ref,B (with
B labelling reference borrowing case without debt accumulation) is:
a∗ref,B =
1 + (1 + r)D
γ
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) (49)
Assuming the redemption amount (borrowing plus interest payment) (1 + r)D = R,
equation (49) becomes:
a∗ref,B =
1 +R
γ
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) (50)
Equation (50) has similar characteristics as equation (47) for a co-financed suprana-
tional fiscal stabilization. The decision on structural reforms depends positively on the
redemption amount. Increasing interest payment R, either by a rising interest rate r
or by a large credit D, increases the incentive for structural reforms. The redemption
amount (thus, indirectly the interest payment) reduces the utility of expected out-
put. Therefore, the government has an incentive to implement structural reforms to
increase the expected probability for a high output Yhigh, as long as reform costs γaj
are not prohibitively large and a∗ref,B < amin. Therefore, this case reflects the incentive
compatible standard credit contract.
4.4.3 National fiscal stabilization with debt accumulation
However, the characteristics of government debt allow governments to accumulate pub-
lic debt over time and to rollover debt to future taxpayers. We assume that debt has
not to be paid back and the government can borrow additional capital if required. By
doing so, the country accumulates a rising stock of public debt. The accumulation of
public debt changes the game sequence. In Figure 28, the government borrows and
decides on its reform effort. Then high or low output will occur. After that, either only
interest rates have to be paid and debt will be rolled-over or debt including interest
payments can be rolled-over.
122
Figure 28: Game sequence of the decision process – national fiscal stabilization with
debt accumulation
Because the public debt has not to be paid back after the period, the raised capital has
a similar characteristic as unconditional supranational transfers. It provides a larger
utility in the case of non-reforming than in the case of reforming. Therefore, D enters
the utility function of the recipient government similar to equation (39) and is weighted
by (1− aj). If only the initial debt D is rolled over and interest payments is made at
the end of the period (partial debt accumulation), the redemption amount R (which
includes interest payment) reduces the government’s utility in equation (51) similar to
equation (48). In the case that the debt and interest payment is rolled over (complete
debt accumulation), the redemption amount exits the utility function, as shown in
equation (52).
UA = E [Yi|aj] +D − ajD − (R− E [Yi|aj]R)− γaj (51)
UA = E [Yi|aj] +D − ajD − γaj (52)
The analysis for the government’s incentive for structural reforms yields an indifference
reform effort level a∗ref,PDA for a partial debt accumulation (PDA) of initial debt and
a∗ref,CDA for a complete debt accumulation of interest payments and debt (CDA):
a∗ref,PDA =
1 +R
γ +D
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) (53)
a∗ref,CDA =
1
γ +D
(pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) (54)
Debt accumulation in equation (53) reduces the incentive for structural reforms com-
pared to the reference case without debt accumulation as the debtD in the denominator
reduces the reform indifference effort. Thus, only the interest payment (included in
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1 + R) indirectly has a positive impact on the reform incentive. The utility of bor-
rowed capital compensates for the low probability for a high output in the case of
non-reforming and political costs of structural reforms are avoided. The moral hazard
to use public debt for delaying reforms will be in particular strong, if debt and interest
payments are rolled over (see equation (54)). Such unconditional public borrowing has
the same low reform effort level as unconditional supranational fiscal stabilization (see
equation (43)).
The order of structural reform incentives in national fiscal stabilization are presented
in Figure 29. The indifference reform effort a∗ref is plotted on the y-axis and the eco-
nomic environment Ω with Ω = (pi2 − pi1) (Yhigh − Ylow) is on the x-axis. The grey
area again shows the minimum reform effort amin. In this example, public borrowing
with a complete debt accumulation implies a too low incentive to implement structural
reforms given a certain economic environment Ω∗. Non-reforming can be financed by
public debt as long as borrowers are willing to provide funds and/or interest rates are
low enough that interest payment do not exceed the utility from borrowed funds. In
contrast, reform incentive of both other national stabilization mechanisms exceed the
minimum reform incentive and would lead to structural reforms.
Figure 29: Indifference reform incentive for national fiscal stabilization
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The declining interest rate levels in the euro area since the mid 1990s (Figure 26) can
therefore be a reason, why many euro area countries did not reform since the start of
the euro. In the context of our model, falling government bond interest rates (i) reduce
the pressure on governments to use borrowed funds for structural reforms and/or (ii)
provide an incentive to increase public debt. That correlates with results of empirical
studies which find that reform activity in euro area countries did not accelerate after
EMU (Duval and Elmeskov, 2006, Belke et al., 2006b, Zemanek et al., 2010). Instead,
in many countries the government debt became a cheap policy option to finance un-
employment benefits and public consumption to avoid structural reforms. This fuelled
the build-up of intra-euro area imbalances until the financial crisis.
The build-up of large stocks of public debt happened although the institutional setting
of EMU has aimed to prevent unsustainable debt accumulation. The Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) de jure limited public borrowing to three percent of GDP per year
and the stock of public debt to 60 percent of GDP. However, the effectiveness of the
SGP has been de facto very low and depending on political decisions. The mechanism
to enforce structural reform did not work. Thus, the current European debt crisis is
partially the result of the weakness of the SGP. The (almost) default of Greece and
Portugal may now enforce structural reforms in these crisis countries. However, the
political will of European politicians to avoid a present default in the euro area has lead
to the rescue package for Greece and the proposal of a permanent European Stability
Mechanism ESM (starting 2013).51 The credit facilities are a quasi-supranational fis-
cal stabilization system. Yet, it is unclear whether the conditionality of these transfers
becomes binding in the long-term. This imposes the threat that necessary structural
reforms might be further delayed and supranational transfers will be necessary in the
future.
This analysis shows that the institutional setting of fiscal stabilization mechanisms
determines whether a government feels forced to structural reforms or whether it will
finance non-reforming with transfers or public debt. Either national or supranational
fiscal stabilization could be used to postpone structural reforms, for instance uncon-
ditional supranational fiscal stabilization as well as a national fiscal stabilization with
51In December 2011, euro area countries agreed on to set up the ESM in 2012, but the contract still
waits for signing.
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debt accumulation. Co-financed supranational fiscal stabilization and public borrowing
without (or a very restricted) debt accumulation might stimulate structural reforms.
Table 29 summarizes different fiscal stabilization systems and their incentive for struc-
tural reforms.
Table 29: Fiscal stabilization systems and incentive for structural reforms
Indifference reform level - supranational
fiscal stabilization
Incentive for
structural re-
forms
Indifference reform level - national fiscal
stabilization
Unconditional supranational fiscal stabiliza-
tion
LOW Complete debt accumulation
a∗ref,UC =
1
γ+T
(pi2 − pi1)
(
Yhigh − Ylow
)
a∗ref,CDA =
1
γ+D
(pi2 − pi1)
(
Yhigh − Ylow
)
Conditional supranational fiscal stabilization MIDDLE Partial debt accumulation
a∗ref,CO =
1
γ
(pi2 − pi1)
(
Yhigh − Ylow
)
a∗ref,PDA =
1+R
γ+D
(pi2 − pi1)
(
Yhigh − Ylow
)
Co-financed supranational fiscal stabilization HIGH Without debt accumulation
a∗ref,CF =
1+S
γ
(pi2 − pi1)
(
Yhigh − Ylow
)
a∗ref,B =
1+R
γ
(pi2 − pi1)
(
Yhigh − Ylow
)
4.5 Economic policy implications
The main implication of this paper is that the design of a fiscal stabilization mechanism
affects structural reform activity. In particular, unconditional tax equalisation schemes
erode structural reform incentives in the recipient country, which creates a vicious cir-
cle: Supranational transfers finance the delay of structural reforms, which again makes
transfers necessary. Only a strict conditionality and an independent monitoring of the
transfer or co-financing of transfers can enhance the efficiency of a supranational fiscal
stabilization. In that light, the proposed explicit fiscal equalisation mechanism at EU
level (von Hagen and Wyplosz, 2008) and a further development of the ESM towards an
implicit transfer union need to be treated with caution. The urgently necessary struc-
tural reforms to adjust the real exchange rate towards increased competitiveness in the
euro area would be postponed and the need for further fiscal stabilization would persist.
Our research supports a tightening and the strict application of the Stability and
Growth Pact. If countries are able to accumulate excessive public debt, the potential
to finance persistent fiscal stimulus and to delay necessary structural reforms via new
debt will arise as long as creditors are willing to provide funds, as in the case of Portugal
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and Greece. In this context, a credible limit to public debt level and a very restricted
borrowing, such as constituted in a fiscal rule (e.g. the German Schuldenbremse), will
increase the incentive for structural reforms.
However, the current EU bailout package for Greece, the current EFSF bailout of
Portugal and Ireland as well as the future ESM might allow Greece and other countries
to postpone reforms further. It depends on the EU and its member countries to enforce
structural reforms to ensure the realignment of real exchange rates to reduce the intra-
euro area imbalances, at the risk of political resentments or even disintegration. A
better design of fiscal stabilization policy or a better enforcement of debt rules in the
euro area would have done better.
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